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- 2. About myself Graduated in ITMO university 2009 – Master 2012 – PhD More then 12 years
- 3. Agenda What are complicated systems and where they live What Hegel and dialectics doing in software
- 4. Hegelian dialectics Dialectic or dialectics (Greek: διαλεκτική, dialektikḗ), also known as the dialectical method, is a
- 5. Hegelian dialectics concepts Hegelian dialectics is based upon four concepts: Everything is transient and finite, existing
- 6. Grady Booch Grady Booch (born February 27, 1955) is an American software engineer, best known for
- 7. Attributes of a Complex System Hierarchic Structure Relative Primitives Separation of Concerns Common Patterns Stable Intermediate
- 8. Attributes of a Complex System Hierarchic Structure “All systems have subsystems and all systems are parts
- 9. Attributes of a Complex System Relative Primitives “The choice of what components in a system are
- 10. Attributes of a Complex System Separation of Concerns “Intracomponent linkages are generally stronger than intercomponent linkages.
- 11. Attributes of a Complex System Common Patterns “Hierarchic systems are usually composed of only a few
- 12. Attributes of a Complex System Stable Intermediate Forms “A complex system that works is invariably found
- 13. Evgeny Sedov Evgeny Alexandrovich Sedov (1929-1993) is a Russian scientist, PhD (к.т.н.), PDF (доктор философских наук).
- 14. The law of hierarchical compensation by Sedov “The growth of diversity at the top level of
- 15. How Complex Systems Fail?
- 16. Richard I. Cook, M.D. Physician, researcher, and educator Richard Cook is presently a research scientist in
- 17. 1. Complex systems are intrinsically hazardous systems. All of the interesting systems (e.g. transportation, healthcare, power
- 18. 2. Complex systems are heavily and successfully defended against failure. The high consequences of failure lead
- 19. 3. Catastrophe requires multiple failures – single point failures are not enough.. The array of defenses
- 20. 4. Complex systems contain changing mixtures of failures latent within them. The complexity of these systems
- 21. 5. Complex systems run in degraded mode. A corollary to the preceding point is that complex
- 22. 6. Catastrophe is always just around the corner. Complex systems possess potential for catastrophic failure. Human
- 23. 7. Post-accident attribution accident to a ‘root cause’ is fundamentally wrong. Because overt failure requires multiple
- 24. 8. Hindsight biases post-accident assessments of human performance. Knowledge of the outcome makes it seem that
- 25. 9. Human operators have dual roles: as producers & as defenders against failure. The system practitioners
- 26. 10. All practitioner actions are gambles. After accidents, the overt failure often appears to have been
- 27. 11. Actions at the sharp end resolve all ambiguity. Organizations are ambiguous, often intentionally, about the
- 28. 12. Human practitioners are the adaptable element of complex systems. Practitioners and first line management actively
- 29. 13. Human expertise in complex systems is constantly changing. Complex systems require substantial human expertise in
- 30. 14. Change introduces new forms of failure. The low rate of overt accidents in reliable systems
- 31. 15. Views of ‘cause’ limit the effectiveness of defenses against future events. Post-accident remedies for “human
- 32. 16. Safety is a characteristic of systems and not of their components Safety is an emergent
- 33. 17. People continuously create safety. Failure free operations are the result of activities of people who
- 34. 18. Failure free operations require experience with failure. Recognizing hazard and successfully manipulating system operations to
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