Economics of pricing and decision making. (Seminar 1)

Слайд 2

The guessing game Each of you have to declare a number

The guessing game

Each of you have to declare a number between

0 and 100.
The winner is the person whose number is the closest to 2/3 of the average of all guesses.
What is your guess?
Слайд 3

`

`

Слайд 4

The guessing game Discussion Bounded rationality People do not naturally use

The guessing game Discussion

Bounded rationality
People do not naturally use deep levels

of strategic thinking. They just think 2-3 steps ahead.
Players may be fully rational, however if a player believes that all other players will say a number N>0, that player will declare N*2/3>0.
If all players believe that the average guess will be high, this becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Слайд 5

The guessing game Importance of repetition When the game is repeated,

The guessing game Importance of repetition

When the game is repeated, the

average guess eventually goes down to 0.
Слайд 6

Q1 V W X Y Z A 9,5 8,7 5,6 3,6

Q1 V W X Y Z A 9,5 8,7 5,6 3,6 9,2 B 2,5 7,6 3,5 8,5 0,8 C 7,3 1,4 5,2 4,1 9,7 D 5,0 1,6 8,9 0,0 0,9 E 4,4 3,8 9,6 2,9 1,2

Слайд 7

Q1 V W X Y Z A 9,5 8,7 5,6 3,6

Q1 V W X Y Z A 9,5 8,7 5,6 3,6 9,2 B 2,5 7,6 3,5 8,5 0,8 C 7,3 1,4 5,2 4,1 9,7 D 5,0 1,6 8,9 0,0 0,9 E 4,4 3,8 9,6 2,9 1,2

Слайд 8

Player 1: 2q+4(1-q)=4q+3(1-q) Implies q=1/3 Player 2: 2p+5(1-p)=3 implies p=2/3 Q2

Player 1:
2q+4(1-q)=4q+3(1-q)
Implies q=1/3
Player 2:
2p+5(1-p)=3 implies p=2/3

Q2

Слайд 9

Monopoly: Perfect competition: P=100-1/2Q=20, thus Q=160 and zero profit. Q3

Monopoly:
Perfect competition:
P=100-1/2Q=20, thus Q=160 and zero profit.

Q3

Слайд 10

Cournot: q1=q2=53.3 P=46.6 Π1=Π2=1422

Cournot:
q1=q2=53.3
P=46.6
Π1=Π2=1422

Слайд 11

Cournot with unequal costs: q1=66.6; q2=46.6 P=44.1

Cournot with unequal costs:
q1=66.6; q2=46.6
P=44.1

Слайд 12

Stackelberg: q1=80; q2=40 P=40 Π1=1600; Π2=800

Stackelberg:
q1=80; q2=40
P=40
Π1=1600; Π2=800

Слайд 13

Q4 Table:

Q4

Table:

Слайд 14

Q5 entrant incumbent entrant entrant

Q5

entrant

incumbent

entrant

entrant

Слайд 15

Mixed strategies Entrant: -1p+1-p=2p, p=1/4 Incumbent: 7q+5(1-q)=6q+8(1-q), q=3/4 Entrant: π=0.5 Incumbent: π =6.5

Mixed strategies
Entrant: -1p+1-p=2p, p=1/4
Incumbent: 7q+5(1-q)=6q+8(1-q), q=3/4
Entrant: π=0.5
Incumbent: π =6.5