Policy Instruments and things governments can do Giancarlo Vecchi

Содержание

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1. Policy instruments are techniques of governance that, in one way

1.

Policy instruments are techniques of governance that, in one way

or another, involve the utilization of State authority or its conscious limitation
(M. Howlett 2005)
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A first simple classification Stick Regulation high low coercion Carrot Incentives and disincetives Sermons Persuasion

A first simple classification

Stick
Regulation

high

low

coercion

Carrot
Incentives and disincetives

Sermons
Persuasion

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1. Regulation = prescribe or proscribe behaviours/conducts, calibrate incentives or disincentives,

1.

Regulation = prescribe or proscribe behaviours/conducts, calibrate incentives or disincentives,

shaping preference changes (also trough penalities)
Examples
- rules that limits the environmental pollutions
- laws against child labour
- standards definition, eg quality of food, devices, etc.
- zoning in town planning
- etc.
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1. Incentives/disincentives: instruments that motivate/encourage actors to behave/stop to behave in

1.

Incentives/disincentives: instruments that motivate/encourage actors to behave/stop to behave in

a certain way
EXAMPLES: cash rewards/penalties, bonuses/tickets, income and profits. However, it's not all about money. External incentives can include such things as peer recognition, fame, social status and power.
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1. Sermons: narratives that try to shape the actors’ behaviours through

1.

Sermons: narratives that try to shape the actors’ behaviours through

moral suasion, education and training, communication campaigns, …
Examples: use of experts to explain the effectiveness of the vaccines against Covid; training courses to improve the compliance on innovations; etc.
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. See Video https://pt.coursera.org/lecture/greening-the-economy/policy-instruments-and-incentives-sgv0s

.

See Video
https://pt.coursera.org/lecture/greening-the-economy/policy-instruments-and-incentives-sgv0s

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2. Christopher Hood: NATO Model NATO Acronym: N = Nodality A

2. Christopher Hood: NATO Model

NATO Acronym:
N = Nodality
A = Authority
T =

Treasure
O = Organization
cfr: Hood and Margetts, The tools of government in the digital age
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2. Christopher Hood: NATO Model Nodality = the property of being

2. Christopher Hood: NATO Model

Nodality = the property of being in

the middle of a social network. It provides governments (and every actor) to detect information and build a panoramic picture of a phenomenon or an actors’ arena, to reach and maintain citizen trust.
Broadcast information and warnings, targeted messages (the nodality can be used to shape individuals’ behaviour, influencing them through information or disinformation - using specific narratives or sermons)
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2. Christopher Hood: NATO Model Authority = Legal authority: laws, regulations,

2. Christopher Hood: NATO Model

Authority = Legal authority: laws, regulations, norms

coercively enforced (is the ability to command and prohibit; commend and permit; through formal or recognised procedures and symbols).
Detector: Legal requirements to report information, data, statistics (eg. Obligation to notify, inspections, interrogations, etc.)
Effector: Prohibitions, tax raising, requisitions (certificates, permits, constraints, enablement - eg contracts, etc.)
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2. Christopher Hood: NATO Model Treasure = anything that can be

2. Christopher Hood: NATO Model

Treasure = anything that can be freely

exchanged (moneys and other tools)
Detector: Tax-funded research and investigations, rewards, offering positive incentives (eg. for information, for specific behaviours, etc.)
Effector: subsidies, grants, incentives, money/services/goods transfers (welfare services and benefits)
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2. Christopher Hood: NATO Model Organization =stock of land, buildings, equipment,

2. Christopher Hood: NATO Model

Organization =stock of land, buildings, equipment, personnel


Detectors: Maintaining an information collection network (eg. physical or digital devices to information-gathering)
Effectors: capacity to implement policies in the different contexts (storage and custody, services delivery, transportation and distribution, processing, large treatments, etc.)
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2. Renewing Hood model: Dunleavy 2016 – .

2. Renewing Hood model: Dunleavy 2016 –

.

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2. Renewing Hood model: Howlett 2000 Howlett underlines that policy instruments

2. Renewing Hood model: Howlett 2000

Howlett underlines that policy instruments

can be “Substantive” or “Procedural”
Substantive: instruments that have designed to directly or indirectly affect the production, consumption and distribution of different kinds of goods and services in society
EG: regulation, subsidies, good provision, etc.
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2. continue: Howlett 2000 Procedural: instruments that affect production, consumption and

2. continue: Howlett 2000

Procedural: instruments that affect production, consumption and

distribution processes only indirectly, if at all, and instead are concerned with altering aspects of a government’s own workings; moreover, the goal is to manipulate the behaviour of citizens and/or companies
Eg: use participation to improve trust in government; creating an evaluation committee including citizens to overcome conflicts; reorganization of institutions; etc.
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2. INSTRUMENTS MIX… .In the current debate, scholars underline that policies

2. INSTRUMENTS MIX…

.In the current debate, scholars underline that policies are

based on a mix of instruments.
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3. DESIGNING WITH INSTRUMENTS A LIST OF INSTRUMENTS WITH DEFINITION AND REASONS TO USE THEM

3. DESIGNING WITH INSTRUMENTS

A LIST OF INSTRUMENTS WITH DEFINITION AND REASONS

TO USE THEM
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3.1. Good & services provision Definition Delivery or withholding of good

3.1. Good & services provision

Definition
Delivery or withholding of good or/and services

by government employee, through public agencies
Delivery or withholding of good or/and services through private or third sector organization, or hybrid agencies (public-private partnership) under the control of public institutions
EG public transport, health system, railway, waste collection & disposal, water supply, crime control, etc
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3.1. Goods & Services provision/b a) What we might to do:

3.1. Goods & Services provision/b

a) What we might to do:
Add a

new service
Expand an existing service
Organize outreach to potential beneficiaries not now using the service
Better customize an existing service to a particular subpopulation
Provide vouchers for a particular service so that people may choose from an array of competitive service providers
Link two or more existing service delivery systems to take advantage of potential synergies or to make life easier for service recipients
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3.1. Goods & Services provision/c Reduce service users’ difficulties in accessing

3.1. Goods & Services provision/c

Reduce service users’ difficulties in accessing

and using the service by
a. going online
b. computerizing intake and eligibility processes
c. simplifying forms
d. collocating services (with precision)
e. permitting appointments by phone
f. facilitating personal inquiries and complaints
g. improving payment options
h. co-designing services, involving experts and recipients
b) Why?
N
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3.1. Goods & Services provision/d b) Why? Consider two different rationales:

3.1. Goods & Services provision/d

b) Why?
Consider two different rationales:
Desired services

are those that people want such as parks and good schools.
Paternalistic services are those that people may or may not want but that outsiders want them to have because there is some potential payoff to the outsiders (e.g., rehabilitative services for the mentally ill, organized shelters for the homeless, job search services for individuals on welfare).
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3.2. Social & Economic Regulation Definition Rules that identify permissible and

3.2. Social & Economic Regulation

Definition
Rules that identify permissible and impermissible activities

on the part of individuals, firms or government agencies, along with accompanying sanctions or rewards or both.
Control of prices, output and/or the entry and exit of firms in and industry.
Eg: environmental pollution, unsafe working environments, market competition, quality standards, etc.
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3.2. Regulation/b a) What we might to do: Add a new

3.2. Regulation/b

a) What we might to do:
Add a new regulatory regime

or abolish an old one
Write new standards or remove old ones
Tighten or loosen existing standards
Ban or prohibit something entirely
Improve the scientific and technical basis for writing standards
Close or open loopholes
Add, train, or better supervise enforcement personnel
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3.2. REGULATION/c (What we can do) Improve targeting of enforcement to

3.2. REGULATION/c

(What we can do)
Improve targeting of enforcement to catch bad

apples, or to
increase deterrence, or to increase resource efficiency
Raise or lower the level of effective sanctions
Tighten or loosen appeals procedures
Change reporting and auditing procedures
Add, subtract, or improve complaint mechanisms for workers or the public
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3.2. REGULATION/d b) Why? Different types of regulation: Social/protective regulation: To

3.2. REGULATION/d

b) Why?
Different types of regulation:
Social/protective regulation: To defend consumers

or workers, citizens, etc.
To defend economic competition and control monopolies and oligopolies (eg. cell phones, broadband, etc.)
To manage output and prices of natural monopolies (eg. rail network, highway network, airports, heavens, water services, electricity, etc.)
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3.3. Taxes, fiscal system & public expenditure Definition: This includes deciding

3.3. Taxes, fiscal system & public expenditure

Definition: This includes deciding how

to tax, how much money to raise, on which policy areas (crime, health, education) to spend and the balance between current (e.g. the wages of doctors) and capital (building a new hospital) spending
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3.3. Taxes etc. What we might to do: Add a new

3.3. Taxes etc.

What we might to do:
Add a new tax or

abolish an old tax
Change the tax rate or the tax base
Improve collection organization and processes
Tax a negative externality
b) Why?
Need of financial resources for some purposes, problem in the market structure (eg, oligopolies)
But: too many taxes can inhibit economy, etc.
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3.4. SUBSIDIES Definition: Economic incentives, such as subsidies to farmers or

3.4. SUBSIDIES

Definition: Economic incentives, such as subsidies to farmers or tax

expenditure on certain spending (giving to charity, buying services such as health insurance).
A subsidy or government incentive is a form of financial aid or support extended to an economic sector (business, third sector, or individual) generally with the aim of promoting economic and social policy
Subsidies come in various forms including: direct (cash grants, interest-free loans) and indirect (tax breaks, insurance, low-interest loans, accelerated depreciation, rent rebates)
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3.4. SUBSIDIES/b What we might to do: Add a new one

3.4. SUBSIDIES/b

What we might to do:
Add a new one OR Abolish

an old one
Change the level
Change the marginal rate
Introduce, abolish, or change a formula by which subsidies are allocated
Modify the conditions of eligibility
Loosen enforcement or Tighten enforcement
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3.4. SUBSIDIES/c b) Why? Incentive effects. Subsidies and grants are often

3.4. SUBSIDIES/c

b) Why?
Incentive effects. Subsidies and grants are often used to

stimulate activities that neither markets nor nonprofit or voluntary action appears to produce in adequate quantity or quality. They also play important roles in the system of intergovernmental relationships—when one level of government wishes to encourage another level of government to do certain things—and in the system of relationships between governments and nonprofit organizations.
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3.4. SUBSIDIES/d Wealth effects. Grants and subsidies also transfer resources to

3.4. SUBSIDIES/d

Wealth effects. Grants and subsidies also transfer resources to people

or organizations or levels of government in order to make the recipients wealthier.
Some design problems. It often happens that you want to create incentive effects but not wealth effects, or vice versa. For instance, you may wish to make poor people wealthier via grants and subsidies but without diminishing work incentives. Or you may wish to encourage businesses or universities to undertake more research and development of a certain kind but without unduly enriching them or allowing them to use the subsidies inefficiently.
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3.5. INFORMATION Definition: Public information is a tool to eliciting desired

3.5. INFORMATION

Definition: Public information is a tool to eliciting desired

people behaviours and policy outcomes. Institutions inform an audience of target actors about a policy issue or pattern of behaviour to influence what people think, think or believe when they engage in target behaviour.
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3.5. INFORMATION/b What we might to do: Require disclosure Direct government

3.5. INFORMATION/b

What we might to do:
Require disclosure
Direct government rating or

certification
Standardize display or format
Simplify information
Subsidize production of information
Subsidize dissemination of information
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3.5. INFORMATION/c b) Why? Information production, dissemination, and validation may be

3.5. INFORMATION/c

b) Why?
Information production, dissemination, and validation may be suboptimal due

to the declining average (and sometimes marginal) cost nature of the activity. Information consumption may be suboptimal due to the hidden costs of consumption (such as time spent reading or hearing or interpreting or sifting or verifying).
Blame avoidance and maintaining nodality in the information network, avoiding fake news, etc.
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3.6. EDUCATION, CONSULTATION, PARTICIPATION Definition: Public education and advertising are tools

3.6. EDUCATION, CONSULTATION, PARTICIPATION

Definition: Public education and advertising are tools to

highlight the opportunities or/and risks to certain behaviours; to improve social awarness regarding public problems and solutions; to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of public services, to improve trust in istitutions, etc..
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3.6. Education, consultation, participation/b a) What we might to do: Warn

3.6. Education, consultation, participation/b

a) What we might to do:
Warn of hazards

or dangers
Raise consciousness through exhortation or inspiration
Provide technical assistance
Upgrade skills and competencies
Change values, improve trust
Professionalize the providers of a service through training or certification or licensing
Learning from services users
b) Why?
N
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3.6. Education, consultation, participation/c b) Why? People may be unaware of

3.6. Education, consultation, participation/c

b) Why?
People may be unaware of a problem

or an opportunity. They may be careless or unfeeling. There may be too many untrained or unskilled people in jobs demanding too much responsibility.
Participation through co-production and co-evaluation can improve mutual learning between citizens and institutions, and improve trust
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3.7. FINANCING AND CONTRACTING Definition: is a business arrangement between a

3.7. FINANCING AND CONTRACTING

Definition: is a business arrangement between a

government agency and a private entity (for profit or non-profit) in which the private entity promises, in exchange for money, to deliver certain products or services to the government agency or to others on the government’s behalf.
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3.7. FINANCING AND CONTRACTING/b What we might to do: Create a

3.7. FINANCING AND CONTRACTING/b

What we might to do:
Create a new

(governmental) market
Abolish an existing (governmental) market
Alter reimbursement rates
Change the basis for reimbursement
Lease governmentally held resources
Alter user fee structure
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3.7. FINANCING AND CONTRACTING/c Redesign bidding systems Change contract enforcement methods

3.7. FINANCING AND CONTRACTING/c

Redesign bidding systems
Change contract enforcement methods
Furnish loans,

Guarantee loans, Subsidize loans
Set up a public enterprise
Dismantle a public enterprise
“Privatize” a hitherto public enterprise
Modify insurance arrangements
Change procurement practices
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3.7. FINANCING AND CONTRACTING/d b) Why? Capital and/or insurance markets may

3.7. FINANCING AND CONTRACTING/d

b) Why?
Capital and/or insurance markets may be working

inefficiently.
The governmental contracting and procurement machinery may not be operating well—it may be too rigid, or too corrupt, or too expensive, or too slow.
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3.8. THE STRUCTURE OF PRIVATE RIGHTS Definition: the rights of a

3.8. THE STRUCTURE OF PRIVATE RIGHTS

Definition: the rights of a person

or other entities to seek support, compensation or injunctive relief through the judicial system for harm caused by the negligence or other wrongful conduct of others
What we might to do:
Property rights, Contract rights and duties
Liability and duties
Family law
Constitutional rights
Labour law, Corporate/Civil law, Criminal law
Dispute-resolving institutions other than litigation and courts
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3.8. THE STRUCTURE OF PRIVATE RIGHTS/b b) Why? In recent years,

3.8. THE STRUCTURE OF PRIVATE RIGHTS/b

b) Why?
In recent years, two of

the biggest issues drawing the attention of policy analysts and economists interested in legal institutions are:
the economically efficient incidence of risk - it should fall on the party that can manage it at the lowest social cost;
and the costs involved in administering any adjudicative system (judicial or not).
In addition to these economic matters, there is also concern about compensation for harm.
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3.9. THE FRAMEWORK OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY What we might to do:

3.9. THE FRAMEWORK OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

What we might to do:
Encourage

competition or Encourage concentration
Control prices and wages (and profits) or Decontrol prices and wages (and profits)
Control output levels or Decontrol output levels
Change tax incentives up or down
Provide public jobs or Abolish public jobs
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3.9. THE FRAMEWORK OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY/b b) Why? Supporting more governmental

3.9. THE FRAMEWORK OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY/b

b) Why?
Supporting more governmental intervention. On

the supply side, there may be monopoly or oligopoly problems. On the demand side, consumers may be relatively nonmobile or otherwise vulnerable to exploitation— and the same may be true of workers.
Supporting less governmental intervention. You may decide that political forces have captured the government administrative apparatus and perverted the intent, or that the information costs to government entailed in doing the job well are simply too high, or that technology has changed and made an older form of governmental intervention less appropriate or effective or efficient.
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3.10. PUBLIC AGENCY BUDGET a) What we might to do: Add

3.10. PUBLIC AGENCY BUDGET

a) What we might to do:
Add a lot

to the budget
Add just a little to the budget
Hold the budget at last year’s level
Cut the budget a little
Cut the budget a lot—to the point of beginning to terminate the agency
Shift allocations from one budget item to another
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3.10. PUBLIC AGENCY BUDGET/b Why? We may want to adjust an

3.10. PUBLIC AGENCY BUDGET/b

Why?
We may want to adjust an agency’s budget

according to whether we like what it does
In addition, how we manipulate an agency’s budget sends political signals about the degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the agency’s performance and so may be thought to have incentive effects as well as wealth effects.
It is not easy to use the budget as a means of creating incentive effects, however.
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3.11. BUREAUCRATIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS a) What we might to do:

3.11. BUREAUCRATIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS

a) What we might to do:
Many

interventions available: they range across such activities as reorganizations, replacing top supervisory personnel, improving information systems and digitization, raising wages and salaries, introducing/extending a federalist system, etc.
b) Why?
The main reason is to introduce, legitimate and improve the power (or the opposite) of an actor and to legitimate a specific problem definition.
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Coercion instruments Mixed instruments Voluntary Instruments STATE INVOLVEMENT low high Direct

Coercion
instruments

Mixed
instruments

Voluntary
Instruments

STATE INVOLVEMENT

low

high

Direct provision
Public companies
Regulation
Prisons, Police, Military forces

Taxes
Property

rights auctions
Subsidies & contributions
Information & education

Markets
Voluntary Organizations, NGO
Families & communities

4. A SUMMARY (Ramesh and Howlett

Interventionist State

Minimal State

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5. REMEMBER : INSTRUMENTS ARE NOT NEUTRAL Public policy instrumentation reveals

5. REMEMBER : INSTRUMENTS ARE NOT NEUTRAL

Public policy instrumentation reveals a

(fairly explicit) theorization of the relationship between the governing and the governed: every instrument constitutes a condensed form of knowledge about social control and ways of exercising it and
An instrument constitutes a device that is both technical and social
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5. REMEMBER : INSTRUMENTS ARE NOT NEUTRAL/b Instruments at work are

5. REMEMBER : INSTRUMENTS ARE NOT NEUTRAL/b

Instruments at work are not

neutral devices: they can produce specific effects, independently of the objective pursued (the aims ascribed to them); eg:
inertia effect
a particular representation of the issue at stake,
a specific problematization of the issue,
the concretization of a specific theory
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5. REMEMBER : INSTRUMENTS ARE NOT NEUTRAL/c They partly determine/influence the

5. REMEMBER : INSTRUMENTS ARE NOT NEUTRAL/c

They partly determine/influence the behaviour

(and the expected behaviour) of the actors (eg: users)
They will eventually privilege certain actors and interests, and exclude others
They constrain the actors, while offering them possibilities
They drive forward a certain representation of problems.
The instruments partly determine what resources can be used and by whom. Like any institution, instruments allow forms of collective action to stabilize, and make the actors’ behaviour more predictable and probably more visible.