Distributed Denial of Service Attacks

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What Are DDoS Tools? Clog victim’s network. Use many sources (“daemons”)

What Are DDoS Tools?

Clog victim’s network.
Use many sources (“daemons”) for attacking

traffic.
Use “master” machines to control the daemon attackers.
At least 4 different versions in use: TFN, TFN2K, Trinoo, Stacheldraht.
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How They Work Victim Daemon Daemon Daemon Daemon Daemon Master Real Attacker

How They Work

Victim

Daemon

Daemon

Daemon

Daemon

Daemon

Master

Real Attacker

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How They Talk Trinoo: attacker uses TCP; masters and daemons use

How They Talk

Trinoo: attacker uses TCP; masters and daemons use UDP;

password authentication.
TFN: attacker uses shell to invoke master; masters and daemons use ICMP ECHOREPLY.
Stacheldraht: attacker uses encrypted TCP connection to master; masters and daemons use TCP and ICMP ECHO REPLY; rcp used for auto-update.
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Deploying DDOS Attackers seem to use standard, well-known holes (i.e., rpc.ttdbserver,

Deploying DDOS

Attackers seem to use standard, well-known holes (i.e., rpc.ttdbserver, amd,

rpc.cmsd, rpc.mountd, rpc.statd).
They appear to have “auto-hack” tools – point, click, and invade.
Lesson: practice good computer hygiene.
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Detecting DDOS Tools Most current IDS’s detect the current generation of

Detecting DDOS Tools

Most current IDS’s detect the current generation of tools.
They

work by looking for DDOS control messages.
Naturally, these will change over time; in particular, more such messages will be properly encrypted. (A hacker PKI?)
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What are the Strong Defenses? There aren’t any…

What are the Strong Defenses?

There aren’t any…

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What Can ISPs Do? Deploy source address anti-spoof filters (very important!).

What Can ISPs Do?

Deploy source address anti-spoof filters (very important!).
Turn off

directed broadcasts.
Develop security relationships with neighbor ISPs.
Set up mechanism for handling customer security complaints.
Develop traffic volume monitoring techniques.
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Traffic Volume Monitoring Look for too much traffic to a particular

Traffic Volume Monitoring

Look for too much traffic to a particular destination.
Learn

to look for traffic to that destination at your border routers (access routers, peers, exchange points, etc.).
Can we automate the tools – too many queue drops on an access router will trigger source detection?
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Can We Do Better Some Day? ICMP Traceback message. Enhance newer

Can We Do Better Some Day?

ICMP Traceback message.
Enhance newer congestion control

techniques, i.e., RED.
Warning – both of these are untested ideas. The second is a research topic.
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ICMP Traceback For a very few packets (about 1 in 20,000),

ICMP Traceback

For a very few packets (about 1 in 20,000), each

router will send the destination a new ICMP message indicating the previous hop for that packet.
Net traffic increase at endpoint is about .1% -- probably acceptable.
Issues: authentication, loss of traceback packets, load on routers.
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Enhanced Congestion Control Define an attack as “too many packets drops

Enhanced Congestion Control

Define an attack as “too many packets drops on

a particular access line”.
Send upstream node a message telling it to drop more packets for this destination.
Traditional RED+penalty box works on flows; this works on destination alone.
Issues: authentication, fairness, effect on legitimate traffic, implementability, etc.