Class 2 IR

Август 12, 2022

Содержание

2. Agenda for Week Two
3. Current Events
4. Theoretical Approaches
6. Realist IR Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue - 460 BCE Machiavelli’s The Prince – 15 century Thomas Hobbes’
7. Realist IR States Anarchy Self-help is the norm Most Important Actor International System
8. Realist IR Autonomy Security Behavior is driven by fear States are positional, envious, power-maximizers States are
9. Security Dilemma
10. Realist IR Negligible effect on state behavior Weak institutionalism Relative power (distribution of power) Role of
11. Power Ability to get one actor to do what he would not have otherwise done (Dahl)
12. Power Ratio of power capabilities Processes of counteracting alliances Multipolar Bipolar Unipolar (Hegemony) Balance of Power
13. Power Transition Change in the distribution of power affects the equilibrium
14. Case Study: Rise of China
15. Case Study: Rise of China
16. Case Study: Rise of China
17. Realist’s View on China Offensive realism: transition in power will not be smooth Defensive realism: China
18. Key Puzzle Public goods Conflict between collective and individual interests Free-ride problems Unilateral defection vs. collective
19. Agenda for Week Two
20. Current Events
21. Theoretical Approaches
23. Conceptual Distinction US politics Neo-liberal institutionalism Liberals in political sense Liberalism in IR
24. Neo-Liberal Institutionalism John Lock’s idea of limited government Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace Adam Smith’s critique of
25. Neo-Liberal Institutionalism State is important unitary actor But other actors matter as well such as International
28. Countries are at peace most of the time American deaths from: 9/11: 2,996 Terrorism: a few
29. Neo-Liberal Institutionalism Possibility of cooperation States are egoist, but NOT envious States are focused on absolute,
30. Utility Functions of States Ua=Va Ub=Vb Ua = Va – k(Vb – Va) Ub = Vb
31. Absolute and Relative Gains
32. Agenda for Week Two
33. Kahoot
34. Neo-Liberal Institutionalism Facilitate cooperation Reduce transaction costs Monitor compliance It is not the distribution of power
35. Yearbook of International Organizations
36. Collective Actions Problems Dominance/Coercion Strategy: Hegemon provides collective goods Realists Solutions
37. Collective Actions Problems Reciprocity and linkages: Exchanges of privileges Institutions and IOs: Set standards Monitoring mechanism
38. In-Class Exercise I – Taiwan Conflict Work in Pairs What are the possible implications of the
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Agenda for Week Two

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Current Events

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Theoretical Approaches

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Realist IR
Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue - 460 BCE
Machiavelli’s The Prince –

15 century
Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan - 17 century

Hans Morgenthau
Kenneth Waltz

Historical Lineage

Hall of Fame

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Realist IR
States
Anarchy
Self-help is the norm
Most Important Actor
International System

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Realist IR
Autonomy
Security
Behavior is driven by fear
States are positional, envious, power-maximizers

States are focused on relative gain

Main Concern

Assumptions

Security Dilemma

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Security Dilemma

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Realist IR
Negligible effect on state behavior
Weak institutionalism
Relative power (distribution

of power)

Role of IOs

Central Variable

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Power
Ability to get one actor to do what he would

not have otherwise done (Dahl)

Power as capacity:
Military
Size of territory
Population
Level of income
Technological advancement
Soft power

What it is?

How to measure it?

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Power
Ratio of power capabilities
Processes of counteracting alliances
Multipolar
Bipolar
Unipolar
(Hegemony)

Balance of Power

Power Distribution

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Power Transition
Change in the distribution of power affects the equilibrium

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Case Study: Rise of China

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Case Study: Rise of China

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Case Study: Rise of China

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Realist’s View on China
Offensive realism: transition in power will not

be smooth
Defensive realism: China is in a crowded neighborhood

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Key Puzzle
Public goods
Conflict between collective and individual interests
Free-ride problems
Unilateral defection

vs. collective action

Nations are sovereign

Collective Action Problems

Why It Arises?

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Agenda for Week Two

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Current Events

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Theoretical Approaches

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Conceptual Distinction
US politics
Neo-liberal institutionalism
Liberals in political sense
Liberalism in

IR

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Neo-Liberal Institutionalism
John Lock’s idea of limited government
Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace

Adam Smith’s critique of mercantilism
Woodrow Willson’s 14 Points

Robert Keohane
Joseph Nye

Historical Lineage

Hall of Fame

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Neo-Liberal Institutionalism
State is important unitary actor
But other actors matter as well

such as International Organizations

Anarchy
But self-help need not follow from anarchy
Complex Interdependence

Most important actor

International system

Does peace come naturally from open economy?

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Countries are at peace most of the time
American deaths from:
9/11:

2,996
Terrorism: a few dozen per year
Iraq War: 4,493
Murder, average year: 16,121
Car accidents, average year: 33,804
Accidental falls, average year: 30,208

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Neo-Liberal Institutionalism
Possibility of cooperation
States are egoist, but NOT envious
States are focused

on absolute, NOT relative gain

Focus

Assumptions

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Utility Functions of States
Ua=Va
Ub=Vb
Ua = Va – k(Vb – Va)

Ub = Vb – k(Va – Vb)

Liberals

Realists

K – coefficient to sensitivity to a gap

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Absolute and Relative Gains

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Agenda for Week Two

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Kahoot

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Neo-Liberal Institutionalism
Facilitate cooperation
Reduce transaction costs
Monitor compliance
It is not the

distribution of power that determines outcome in the global economy, but state’s interests and preferences
Cost-benefit analysis of pay-off structure

Role of IOs

Central Variable

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Yearbook of International Organizations

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Collective Actions Problems
Dominance/Coercion Strategy:
Hegemon provides collective goods
Realists Solutions

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Collective Actions Problems
Reciprocity and linkages:
Exchanges of privileges
Institutions and IOs:
Set

standards
Monitoring mechanism
Resolve disputes

Neo-Liberal Institutionalists Solutions

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In-Class Exercise I – Taiwan Conflict
Work in Pairs
What are the possible

implications of the US involvement?
Draw a payoff matrix
How would neo-liberal institutionalists resolve this CAP?
Propose solutions
How would realists resolve this CAP?

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