Free Russia. Plan of information and psychological operation

Август 9, 2022

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Free Russia. Plan of information and psychological operation

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2. Spread of panic and defeatist ideas among the enemy population (in different regions and public layers)
3. Informational support of the separatist ideas spread in national autonomies of Russian Federation Strengthening of the
4. Undermining the trust in Russian ruling regime by discrediting Putin’s authorized representatives Demonstration of the alleged
5. Virtual movement should combine all efforts and become an ideological and practical platform for “separatist organizations
6. Mending of virtual links via foreign missioners with public representatives of Russian opposition who are able
7. V.Putin S.Ivanov N.Patrushev V.Matvienko S.Naryshkin A.Bortnikov S.Shoigu V.Zolotov S.Lavrov D.Rogozin I.Sechin G.Timchenko U.Kovalchuk A.Rotenberg B.Rotenberg Undermine
8. General of the Army S.Shoigu, Minister of Defense of Russia (military criminal, Crimea invader). May be
9. Engagement of the “fifth column” in Russia, those who receive grants from foreign funds and independent
10. Revealing of organization’s contacts with radical Islamists Mystification of the Crimean Islamists as a new “enemy”
11. Analytical and popular science explanation of invalidity of the Russian “way of isolation” and a new
12. Creation of virtual links with Russians radical organizations and cells of international radical and pseudo radical
13. Use the problem aspects between Russia and its partners in Customs and Russian unions (primarily Byelorussia
14. Spread of rumors among socially active sections of the population that in case the war continues
15. Activization of work with Ukrainian Diaspora representatives and national and cultural organizations in Russia, primarily with
16. Creation of the network of rumor, misinformation and panic moods spread in contrast to same structures
17. Creation of anonymous virtual technical centers to conduct local network psychological and subversive actions and operations
18. Security Service of Ukraine Staff of the anti-terrorist operation (ATO) The Chief Intelligence Directorate of the
19. NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence U.S Special Operations Command
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Spread of panic and defeatist ideas among the enemy population (in

different regions and public layers) to make Russian state and non-governmental media focus on the localization of ideas and moods that undermine the basic principles of Russian political system

Goal of Operation

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Informational support of the separatist ideas spread in national autonomies of

Russian Federation
Strengthening of the Russian democratic opposition influence on the internal policy by providing them with the information for criticism of the ruling regime
Informational support of public organizations uncontrolled by the Russian state structures, especially of those that receive US grants and specialize on the Russian servicemen rights protection
Spread of the idea that Russia is threatened by Muslim radicalism allegedly coming from the Crimea
Conviction of Russian business and creative elite that the only way to preserve Russian statehood and economic stability is to change the ruling regime
Spread of radical moods among the Russian population, discredit of the ruling regime, spread of the appeals for decisive revolutionary actions in favorable environment for social changes

Tasks of Operation

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Undermining the trust in Russian ruling regime by discrediting Putin’s authorized

representatives
Demonstration of the alleged mutual distrust between Russia, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan presenting these countries as potential targets of Russian aggression and Kremlin imperial ambitions
Activation of information campaigns in the border regions of Russia (in case the war in Ukraine keeps on the border regions will face a wave of terrorism and violence from armed mercenaries)
Organization of the spread of misinformation, destructive rumors, panic and pessimistic moods in the territories under separatists control
Creation of anonymous virtual technical centers for local network psychological and subversive actions and operations on strictly defined zones under enemy control

Tasks of Operation

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Virtual movement should combine all efforts and become an ideological and

practical platform for “separatist organizations of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Kuban, Western Siberia, Tuva, Sakha (Yakutia), Kaliningrad, Dagestan and Chechnya”
Spread and promotion of these ideas and the platform in appropriate part of social networks, provocation of wide public response in these regions
Creation of the alleged image of the large-scale separatist movement and the real existence of these organizations: the spread of video messages from these structures, training meetings, creation of online radio station

Creation and support of All-Russian separatist movement "Freedom to Nations"

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Mending of virtual links via foreign missioners with public representatives of

Russian opposition who are able to provoke the wave of protests like on Bolotnaya Square
Organization of their fulltime “informational feed” with facts discrediting the ruling regime in Russia
Use of Russian opposition leaders as “talking heads” for the Ukrainian people (at present Boris Nemtsov is the only person engaged)

Work with Russian opposition

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V.Putin
S.Ivanov N.Patrushev V.Matvienko S.Naryshkin A.Bortnikov S.Shoigu
V.Zolotov S.Lavrov D.Rogozin I.Sechin G.Timchenko
U.Kovalchuk

A.Rotenberg B.Rotenberg

Undermine the trust in the ruling regime discrediting President Putin and his authorized representatives

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General of the Army S.Shoigu, Minister of Defense of Russia (military

criminal, Crimea invader). May be discredited through the Ministry economic departments that are engaged in "illegal real estate operations and overstating the military construction contracts"
General of the Army A.Bortnikov, Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) of Russia (reactionist, freedom oppressor, human rights activists' persecutor). May be discredited through "FSB support for ex-President Yanukovich". "In particular, general S.Beseda visited Kyiv many times in fall 2013, commanded the Ukrainian special forces"
Colonel-General V.Zolotov, Commander of Internal Troops of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of Russia (military criminal, one of the commanders of Russian invasion in Ukraine). May be discredited through his personal traits, "dictator manners, organization of a conspiracy, preparation of a military coup"

Primary objectives to discredit Vladimir Putin

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Engagement of the “fifth column” in Russia, those who receive grants

from foreign funds and independent media
Spread the information about human rights violations in Russia, especially concerning servicemen deployed in Ukraine
Maximum spread of indicated information among Russian audience (currently only “horizontal links” of the Committees of Soldiers' Mothers are engaged)

Cooperation with the Russian fifth column

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Revealing of organization’s contacts with radical Islamists
Mystification of the Crimean Islamists

as a new “enemy”
Permanent discussions in Russian blogs of the idea of the new terrorism heavens and the spread of radical Islam ideology
Putting into operation of the term “The Crimea is new Chechnya for Russia”

Creation and promotion of the virtual organization "Crimean Muslim Resistance "

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Analytical and popular science explanation of invalidity of the Russian “way

of isolation” and a new “Cold War”
Explanation of the consequences of the Russian government foreign policy to oligarchy, the middle class, students of prestige universities and “outstanding” Russians in the framework of historical parallels with the USSR and authoritarian regimes' collapse in Eastern Europe and Middle East
Demonstration of the idea that government closes the ways to Western countries for young Russians, prevents scientific exchange, etc.
Instillation of the idea “about Russia rotting in the circumstances of totalitarian neo-orthodoxy”

Discredit of Russian leadership totalitarian policy

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Creation of virtual links with Russians radical organizations and cells of

international radical and pseudo radical organizations in country
Image-building of “avenger” representing opposition forces in Russia or foreign movements, able to start revolutionary process in Russia. In case of open confrontation of appropriate authorities with them, the exaggeration by Ukrainian human rights activists with the issues to foreign media of the synopsis of the witch-hunt beginning in the capital and regions because of alleged reasons for social protest against Putin’s regime
“Gunpowder Plot” against Putin and creation of the “Russian Guy Fawkes”

Support for radical and opposition movements

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Use the problem aspects between Russia and its partners in Customs

and Russian unions (primarily Byelorussia and Kazakhstan) for the spread of idea of the “future Russian aggression against them”, “Kremlin’s plan of USSR restoration”, “Disclosure of Moscow neocolonialist policy”
Use of foreign grants receivers in CIS as voice of propaganda and further spread of this thesis in appropriate countries by bloggers
Possible creation in Russian internet segment of sites and blogs for open propaganda of indicated ideas on behalf of Kremlin to provoke further critic of “chauvinistic views and imperial ambitions” of Russian President and his team

Discredit of integration processes under the auspices of Russia

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Spread of rumors among socially active sections of the population that

in case the war continues people would have a new wave of violence, destruction of infrastructure and warlike situation with all possible consequences
Deployment of Russian troops in those zones will change the existing way of life (evacuation, mobilization) and will cause a significant damages
Border zones are the object of possible attacks and acts of terrorism from radical organizations
Economical consequences of relations aggravation with Ukraine for people from border zones (Liquidation of trade relations and ”shadow schemes” in which the significant part of people from border zones is engaged)

Work with the population of the Russian border regions

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Activization of work with Ukrainian Diaspora representatives and national and cultural

organizations in Russia, primarily with influential businessmen, members of administrative staff, public and culture figures
Formation of the negative attitude towards Russian government policy with regard to Ukraine among them, positive attitude towards the Ukrainian government efforts in preserving the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state

Work with the Ukrainian Diaspora in Russia

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Creation of the network of rumor, misinformation and panic moods spread

in contrast to same structures that are actively used by the enemy (especially on the territories with low availability of cellular network, internet and media)
Pay a special attention to misleading the enemy about plans and practical activities of Ukrainian Armed Forces, formation of mutual distrust and panic moods among separatists, negative relation from local peoples to fighters, etc.

Spread of misinformation and panic moods among separatists

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Creation of anonymous virtual technical centers to conduct local network psychological

and subversive actions and operations on the territories controlled by the enemy, primarily in the Crimea
Use of the spreading scheme of anonymous messages to breakdown functioning of some organizations and structures at a certain period of time (for example, during elections, etc.)

Creation of anonymous virtual technical centers

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Security Service of Ukraine
Staff of the anti-terrorist operation (ATO)
The Chief Intelligence

Directorate of the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces
74 Centre of information and psychological operations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces
16 Group of information and psychological operations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces

Forces and means to achieve the tasks

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NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of

Excellence
U.S Special Operations Command
U.S. Cyber Command
4th Military Information Support Operations Group
15 (UK) Psychological Operations Group
77th Brigade (United Kingdom)

Cooperation