Evolutionary game theory. (Lecture 11)

Содержание

Слайд 2

Outline Auctions Common value auctions All-pay auctions Review of seminar 2 Revision slides

Outline

Auctions
Common value auctions
All-pay auctions
Review of seminar 2
Revision slides

Слайд 3

Structure Economic decision problem Model Analysis Theory Classify, choose representation to

Structure

Economic decision problem

Model

Analysis

Theory

Classify, choose representation
to model, sequential, repeated
etc.

Select tools to

identify the equilibrium
NE, pure, mixed, SPE

Formulate theory that predicts, explains

Perform data collection and
testing to develop theory

Слайд 4

Lecture 1-2 Classification Simultaneous games, 2 players Representation Concept Process Lesson

Lecture 1-2

Classification

Simultaneous games, 2 players

Representation

Concept

Process

Lesson

Normal form (payoff table)

Pure NE
Cooperation

NE= likely outcome
NE

vs. optimal outcome
Cournot

Iterative elimination
Best response

Слайд 5

Lecture 3 Classification Simultaneous games, 2 players Representation Concept Process Lesson

Lecture 3

Classification

Simultaneous games, 2 players

Representation

Concept

Process

Lesson

Normal form (payoff table)

Mixed NE

Randomness
Indifference

Solve π(a)=π (b)

Слайд 6

Lecture 4-5 Classification Sequential Representation Concept Process Lesson Extensive form (game

Lecture 4-5

Classification

Sequential

Representation

Concept

Process

Lesson

Extensive form (game tree)

SPE
Coordination

Order matters
Strategic moves

Backward induction

Слайд 7

Lecture 6 Classification Repeated games (vs one-shot games) Representation Concept Process

Lecture 6

Classification

Repeated games (vs one-shot games)

Representation

Concept

Process

Lesson

Normal form

Trigger strategies
Cooperation

Importance of r
TFT
Cournot and

repetition

Backward induction

Слайд 8

Lecture 7 Classification Evolutionary games Representation Concept Process Lesson Normal form

Lecture 7

Classification

Evolutionary games

Representation

Concept

Process

Lesson

Normal form

ESS

Justification for NE
Some NE are not ESS

Solve

π(a)=π (b)
Слайд 9

Lecture 8-9 Classification Asymmetric information Representation Concept Process Lesson Diverse Information

Lecture 8-9

Classification

Asymmetric information

Representation

Concept

Process

Lesson

Diverse

Information manipulation

Cheap talk may or may not work
Importance

of credibility ? costly signaling

Signaling, screening, mechanism design

Слайд 10

Lecture 10-11 Classification Auctions Representation Concept Process Lesson Bid scale Winning

Lecture 10-11

Classification

Auctions

Representation

Concept

Process

Lesson

Bid scale

Winning bid

Revenue equivalence
Winner’s curse

Optimal bid

Слайд 11

Exam Section A: 5 compulsory questions, at most 3 "mathematical/analytical" questions.

Exam
Section A: 5 compulsory questions, at most 3 "mathematical/analytical" questions. (10

marks each)
Section B: choose 1 long essay style question out of 2. (50 marks)
Слайд 12

Past paper (2014-15) 6. In games of cooperation, explain how the

Past paper (2014-15)

6. In games of cooperation, explain how the repetition of

play may affect the possibilities of cooperation compared with one-shot games. Illustrate your answer with an example.
7. Explain the purpose and the mechanism of signaling in games with incomplete information. Illustrate your answer with an example.
Слайд 13

Section A 1 conceptual question: e.g. explain the meaning of mixed

Section A

1 conceptual question:
e.g. explain the meaning of mixed strategies

in evolutionary game theory...
e.g. explain what the guessing game tells us about players’ rationality...
1 definition question: 3 definitions.
e.g: A Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, Subgame perfect equilibrium, The Winner’s curse.