Monopoly Behavior

Сентябрь 11, 2022

Содержание

2. A Scotsman phones a dentist to inquire about the cost for a tooth extraction : —
3. — "I can't guarantee their professionalism and it'll be painful. But the price could drop by
4. How Should a Monopoly Price? So far a monopoly has been thought of as a firm
5. Capturing Consumer Surplus All pricing strategies we will examine are means of capturing consumer surplus and
6. Capturing Consumer Surplus Quantity $/Q The firm would like to charge higher price to those consumers
7. Capturing Consumer Surplus Price discrimination is the practice of charging different prices to different consumers for
8. Price discrimination Price discrimination requires the absence of resale
9. Types of Price Discrimination 1st-degree: Each output unit is sold at a different price. Prices may
10. Types of Price Discrimination 3rd-degree: Price paid by buyers in a given group is the same
11. First-degree Price Discrimination Each output unit is sold at a different price. Price may differ across
12. First-degree Price Discrimination p(y) y $/output unit MC(y) Sell the th unit for $
13. First-degree Price Discrimination p(y) y $/output unit MC(y) Sell the th unit for $ Later on
14. First-degree Price Discrimination p(y) y $/output unit MC(y) Sell the th unit for $ Later on
15. First-degree Price Discrimination p(y) y $/output unit MC(y) The gains to the monopolist on these trades
16. First-degree Price Discrimination p(y) y $/output unit MC(y) So the sum of the gains to the
17. First-degree Price Discrimination p(y) y $/output unit MC(y) The monopolist gets the maximum possible gains from
18. Fig. 25.2
19. First-degree Price Discrimination First-degree price discrimination gives a monopolist all of the possible gains-to-trade, leaves the
20. First-Degree Price Discrimination In practice, perfect price discrimination is almost never possible Impractical to charge every
21. First-Degree Price Discrimination Examples of imperfect price discrimination where the seller has the ability to segregate
22. Second-Degree Price Discrimination In some markets, consumers purchase many units of a good over time Demand
23. Second-Degree Price Discrimination Quantity discounts are an example of second-degree price discrimination Ex: Buying in bulk
24. Second-Degree Price Discrimination $/Q Without discrimination: P = P0 and Q = Q0. With second-degree discrimination
25. Fig. 25.3 Second-Degree Price Discrimination Self selection
26. Fig. 25.3 Second-Degree Price Discrimination Self selection
27. Fig. 25.3 Second-Degree Price Discrimination Self selection
28. Fig. 25.3 Second-Degree Price Discrimination Self selection In practice, the monopolist often encourages self-selection by adjusting
29. Third-degree Price Discrimination Price paid by buyers in a given group is the same for all
30. Third-degree Price Discrimination A monopolist manipulates market price by altering the quantity of product supplied to
31. PRICE DISCRIMINATION Third-Degree Price Discrimination ● third-degree price discrimination Practice of dividing consumers into two or
32. PRICE DISCRIMINATION Third-Degree Price Discrimination Creating Consumer Groups Determining Relative Prices
33. PRICE DISCRIMINATION Third-Degree Price Discrimination Third-Degree Price Discrimination Figure 11.5 Consumers are divided into two groups,
34. Third-degree Price Discrimination MR1(y1) MR2(y2) y1 y2 y1* y2* p1(y1*) p2(y2*) MC MC p1(y1) p2(y2) Market
35. Third-degree Price Discrimination MR1(y1) MR2(y2) y1 y2 y1* y2* p1(y1*) p2(y2*) MC MC p1(y1) p2(y2) Market
36. Third-degree Price Discrimination In which market will the monopolist cause the higher price?
37. Third-degree Price Discrimination In which market will the monopolist cause the higher price? Recall that and
38. Third-degree Price Discrimination In which market will the monopolist cause the higher price? Recall that But,
39. Third-degree Price Discrimination So
40. Third-degree Price Discrimination So Therefore, if and only if
41. Third-degree Price Discrimination So Therefore, if and only if
42. Third-degree Price Discrimination So Therefore, if and only if The monopolist sets the higher price in
43. No Sales to Smaller Market Even if third-degree price discrimination is possible, it may not be
44. No Sales to Smaller Market Quantity $/Q Group one, with demand D1, is not willing to
45. The Economics of Coupons and Rebates Those consumers who are more price elastic will tend to
46. The Economics of Coupons and Rebates About 20 – 30% of consumers use coupons or rebates
47. Price Elasticities of Demand: Users vs. Nonusers of Coupons
48. Airline Fares Differences in elasticities imply that some customers will pay a higher fare than others
49. Elasticities of Demand for Air Travel
50. Airline Fares There are multiple fares for every route flown by airlines They separate the market
51. Other Types of Price Discrimination Intertemporal Price Discrimination Practice of separating consumers with different demand functions
52. Intertemporal Price Discrimination Once this market has yielded a maximum profit, firms lower the price to
53. Intertemporal Price Discrimination Quantity $/Q Over time, demand becomes more elastic and price is reduced to
54. Other Types of Price Discrimination Peak-Load Pricing Practice of charging higher prices during peak periods when
55. Peak-Load Pricing Objective is to increase efficiency by charging customers close to marginal cost Increased MR
56. Peak-Load Pricing With third-degree price discrimination, the MR for all markets was equal MR is not
57. Peak-Load Pricing Quantity $/Q MR=MC for each group. Group 1 has higher demand during peak times.
58. How to Price a Best-Selling Novel How would you arrive at the price for the initial
59. How to Price a Best-Selling Novel Company must divide consumers into two groups: Those willing to
60. How to Price a Best-Selling Novel Publishers must use estimates of past books to determine how
61. Two-Part Tariffs A two-part tariff is a lump-sum fee, p1, plus a price p2 for each
62. Two-Part Tariffs Should a monopolist prefer a two-part tariff to uniform pricing, or to any of
63. Two-Part Tariffs p1 + p2x Q: What is the largest that p1 can be?
64. Two-Part Tariffs p1 + p2x Q: What is the largest that p1 can be? A: p1
65. Two-Part Tariffs p(y) y $/output unit MC(y) Should the monopolist set p2 above MC?
66. Two-Part Tariffs p(y) y $/output unit CS Should the monopolist set p2 above MC? p1 =
67. Two-Part Tariffs p(y) y $/output unit CS Should the monopolist set p2 above MC? p1 =
68. Two-Part Tariffs p(y) y $/output unit CS Should the monopolist set p2 above MC? p1 =
69. Two-Part Tariffs p(y) y $/output unit Should the monopolist set p2 = MC? MC(y)
70. Two-Part Tariffs p(y) y $/output unit Should the monopolist set p2 = MC? p1 = CS.
71. Two-Part Tariffs p(y) y $/output unit Should the monopolist set p2 = MC? p1 = CS.
72. Two-Part Tariffs p(y) y $/output unit Should the monopolist set p2 = MC? p1 = CS.
73. Two-Part Tariffs p(y) y $/output unit Should the monopolist set p2 = MC? p1 = CS.
74. Two-Part Tariffs p(y) y $/output unit Should the monopolist set p2 = MC? p1 = CS.
75. Two-Part Tariffs The monopolist maximizes its profit when using a two-part tariff by setting its per
76. Two-Part Tariffs A profit-maximizing two-part tariff gives an efficient market outcome in which the monopolist obtains
77. The Two-Part Tariff Form of pricing in which consumers are charged both an entry and usage
78. The Two-Part Tariff Pricing decision is setting the entry fee (T) and the usage fee (P)
79. Usage price P* is set equal to MC. Entry price T* is equal to the entire
80. Two-Part Tariff with Two Consumers Two consumers, but firm can only set one entry fee and
81. The price, P*, will be greater than MC. Set T* at the surplus value of D2.
82. Two-Part Tariff with Two Consumers Firm should set usage fee above MC Set entry fee equal
83. The Two-Part Tariff with Many Consumers No exact way to determine P* and T* Must consider
84. The Two-Part Tariff with Many Consumers To find optimum combination, choose several combinations of P and
85. Two-Part Tariff with Many Different Consumers T Profit Total profit is the sum of the profit
86. The Two-Part Tariff Rule of Thumb Similar demand: Choose P close to MC and high T
87. The Two-Part Tariff With a Twist Entry price (T) entitles the buyer to a certain number
88. Polaroid Cameras In 1971, Polaroid introduced the SX-70 camera Polaroid was able to use two-part tariff
89. Polaroid Cameras Buying camera is like entry fee Unlike an amusement park, for example, the marginal
90. Polaroid Cameras Analytical framework:
91. Polaroid Cameras In the end, the film prices were significantly above marginal cost There was considerable
92. Bundling Bundling is packaging two or more products to gain a pricing advantage Conditions necessary for
93. Bundling When film company leased “Gone with the Wind,” it required theaters to also lease “Getting
94. Bundling Renting the movies separately would result in each theater paying the lowest reservation price for
95. Bundling If the movies are bundled: Theater A will pay $15,000 for both Theater B will
96. Relative Valuations More profitable to bundle because relative valuation of two films are reversed Demands are
97. Relative Valuations If the demands were positively correlated (Theater A would pay more for both films
98. Bundling If the movies are bundled: Theater A will pay $16,000 for both Theater B will
99. Bundling Bundling Scenario: Two different goods and many consumers Many consumers with different reservation price combinations
100. Reservation Prices r2 r1 For example, Consumer A is willing to pay up to $3.25 for
101. Consumption Decisions When Products are Sold Separately r2 r1 Consumers fall into four categories based on
102. Consumption Decisions When Products are Bundled r2 r1 Consumers buy the bundle when r1 + r2
103. Consumption Decisions When Products are Bundled The effectiveness of bundling depends upon the degree of negative
104. Reservation Prices If the demands are perfectly positively correlated, the firm will not gain by bundling.
105. Reservation Prices r2 r1 If the demands are perfectly negatively correlated, bundling is the ideal strategy
106. Movie Example r2 r1 Bundling pays due to negative correlation. (Wind) (Gertie) 5,000 14,000 10,000 5,000
107. Mixed Bundling Practice of selling two or more goods both as a package and individually This
108. Mixed Versus Pure Bundling For each good, marginal production cost exceeds reservation price of one consumer.
109. Mixed Bundling – Example Demands are perfectly negatively correlated but significant marginal costs Four customers under
110. Mixed Bundling – Example We can see the effects under different scenarios in the following table:
111. Bundling If MC is zero, mixed bundling can still be more profitable if consumer demands are
112. Mixed Bundling with Zero Marginal Costs A and D purchase individually. B and C purchase bundled.
113. Bundling in Practice Car purchasing Bundles of options such as electric locks with air conditioning Vacation
114. Bundling Mixed Bundling in Practice Use of market surveys to determine reservation prices Design a pricing
115. Mixed Bundling in Practice r2 r1 The firm can first choose a price for the bundle
116. A Restaurant’s Pricing Problem
117. Tying The practice of requiring a customer to purchase one good in order to purchase another
118. Tying Allows the seller to meter the customer and use a two-part tariff to discriminate against
119. Versioning Extreme example: damaged goods Intel 486 486SX - $333 in 1991 486DX - $588 in
120. Durable-goods pricing Waiting for the price cut. Non-price discrimination seems to increase profits Possible solutions: lowest
121. Advertising Firms with market power have to decide how much to advertise We can show how
122. Advertising Assumptions Firm sets only one price for product Firm knows quantity demanded depends on price
123. ADVERTISING Effects of Advertising Figure 11.20 AR and MR are average and marginal revenue when the
124. The price P and advertising expenditure A to maximize profit, is given by: The firm should
125. First, rewrite equation (11.3) as follows: Now multiply both sides of this equation by A/PQ, the
126. Advertising A Rule of Thumb for Advertising To maximize profit, the firm’s advertising-to-sales ratio should be
127. Advertising An Example R(Q) = $1 million/yr $10,000 budget for A (advertising--1% of revenues) EA =
128. Advertising The firm in our example should increase advertising A/PQ = -(2/-.4) = 5% Increase budget
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A Scotsman phones a dentist to inquire about the cost for

a tooth extraction :
— "85 pounds for an extraction, sir" the dentist replied.
** "85 quid ! Huv ye no'got anythin' cheaper ?„
— "That's the normal charge,” said the dentist.
** "Whit about if ye didn’t use any anesthetic ?„
— "That's unusual, sir, but I could do it and it would knock 15 pounds off".
** "What aboot if ye used one of your dentist trainees and still without any anesthetic ?"

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— "I can't guarantee their professionalism and it'll be painful. But

the price could drop by 20 pounds.”
** "How aboot if ye make it a trainin' session, have yer student do the extraction with the other students watchin' and learning‚?„
— "It'll be good for the students", mulled the dentist. "I'll charge you 5 pounds but it will be traumatic".
** " It's a deal,” said the Scotsman. "Can ye confirm an appointment for my wife next Tuesday then ?"

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How Should a Monopoly Price?
So far a monopoly has been thought

of as a firm which has to sell its product at the same price to every customer. This is uniform pricing.
Can price-discrimination earn a monopoly higher profits?

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Capturing Consumer Surplus
All pricing strategies we will examine are means of

capturing consumer surplus and transferring it to the producer
Profit maximizing point of P* and Q*
But some consumers will pay more than P* for a good
Raising price will lose some consumers, leading to smaller profits
Lowering price will gain some consumers, but lower profits

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Capturing Consumer Surplus
Quantity
$/Q
The firm would like to charge higher price to

those consumers willing to pay it - A

Firm would also like to sell to those in area B but without lowering price to all consumers

Both ways will allow the firm to capture more consumer surplus

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Capturing Consumer Surplus
Price discrimination is the practice of charging different prices

to different consumers for similar goods
Must be able to identify the different consumers and get them to pay different prices
Other techniques that expand the range of a firm’s market to get at more consumer surplus
Tariffs and bundling

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Price discrimination
Price discrimination requires the absence of resale

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Types of Price Discrimination
1st-degree: Each output unit is sold at a

different price. Prices may differ across buyers.
2nd-degree: The price paid by a buyer can vary with the quantity demanded by the buyer. But all customers face the same price schedule. E.g., bulk-buying discounts.

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Types of Price Discrimination
3rd-degree: Price paid by buyers in a given

group is the same for all units purchased. But price may differ across buyer groups. E.g., senior citizen and student discounts vs. no discounts for middle-aged persons.

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First-degree Price Discrimination
Each output unit is sold at a different price.

Price may differ across buyers.
It requires that the monopolist can discover the buyer with the highest valuation of its product, the buyer with the next highest valuation, and so on.

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First-degree Price Discrimination
p(y)
y
$/output unit
MC(y)
Sell the th unit for $

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First-degree Price Discrimination
p(y)
y
$/output unit
MC(y)
Sell the th unit for $ Later on sell

the th unit for $

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First-degree Price Discrimination
p(y)
y
$/output unit
MC(y)
Sell the th unit for $ Later on sell

the th unit for $ Finally sell the th unit for marginal cost, $

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First-degree Price Discrimination
p(y)
y
$/output unit
MC(y)
The gains to the monopolist on these trades are: and

zero.

The consumers’ gains are zero.

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First-degree Price Discrimination
p(y)
y
$/output unit
MC(y)
So the sum of the gains to the monopolist

on all trades is the maximum possible total gains-to-trade.

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First-degree Price Discrimination
p(y)
y
$/output unit
MC(y)
The monopolist gets the maximum possible
gains from

trade.

First-degree price discrimination is Pareto-efficient.

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Fig. 25.2

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First-degree Price Discrimination
First-degree price discrimination gives a monopolist all of the

possible gains-to-trade, leaves the buyers with zero surplus, and supplies the efficient amount of output.

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First-Degree Price Discrimination
In practice, perfect price discrimination is almost never possible
Impractical

to charge every customer a different price (unless very few customers)
Firms usually do not know reservation price of each customer
Firms can discriminate imperfectly
Can charge a few different prices based on some estimates of reservation prices

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First-Degree Price Discrimination
Examples of imperfect price discrimination where the seller has

the ability to segregate the market to some extent and charge different prices for the same product:
Lawyers, doctors, accountants, priests, policemen
Car salesperson (15% profit margin)
Colleges and universities (differences in financial aid)

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Second-Degree Price Discrimination
In some markets, consumers purchase many units of a

good over time
Demand for that good declines with increased consumption
Electricity, water, heating fuel
Firms can engage in second-degree price discrimination
Practice of charging different prices per unit for different quantities of the same good or service

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Second-Degree Price Discrimination
Quantity discounts are an example of second-degree price discrimination
Ex:

Buying in bulk at Sam’s Club
Block pricing – the practice of charging different prices for different quantities of “blocks” of a good
Ex: electric power companies charge different prices for a consumer purchasing a set block of electricity

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Second-Degree Price Discrimination
$/Q
Without discrimination: P = P0 and Q = Q0.

With second-degree discrimination there are three blocks with prices P1, P2, & P3.

Quantity

Different prices are charged for different quantities or “blocks” of same good.

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Fig. 25.3
Second-Degree Price Discrimination
Self selection

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Fig. 25.3
Second-Degree Price Discrimination
Self selection

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Fig. 25.3
Second-Degree Price Discrimination
Self selection

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Fig. 25.3
Second-Degree Price Discrimination
Self selection
In practice, the monopolist often encourages self-selection

by adjusting quality rather than quantity.
As a result, low-end consumers are offered lower quality and end up with zero consumers surplus. High end consumers get high quality and end up with some surplus (otherwise, they would choose low quality)

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Third-degree Price Discrimination
Price paid by buyers in a given group is

the same for all units purchased. But price may differ across buyer groups.

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Third-degree Price Discrimination
A monopolist manipulates market price by altering the quantity

of product supplied to that market.
So the question “What discriminatory prices will the monopolist set, one for each group?” is really the question “How many units of product will the monopolist supply to each group?”

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PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Third-Degree Price Discrimination
● third-degree price discrimination Practice of dividing consumers into

two or more groups with separate demand curves and charging different prices to each group.

Creating Consumer Groups

If third-degree price discrimination is feasible, how should the firm decide what price to charge each group of consumers?

1. We know that however much is produced, total output should be divided between the groups of customers so that marginal revenues for each group are equal.
2. We know that total output must be such that the marginal revenue for each group of consumers is equal to the marginal cost of production.

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PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Third-Degree Price Discrimination
Creating Consumer Groups
Determining Relative Prices

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PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Third-Degree Price Discrimination
Third-Degree Price Discrimination
Figure 11.5
Consumers are divided into two

groups, with separate demand curves for each group. The optimal prices and quantities are such that the marginal revenue from each group is the same and equal to marginal cost.
Here group 1, with demand curve D1, is charged P1,
and group 2, with the more elastic demand curve D2, is charged the lower price P2.
Marginal cost depends on the total quantity produced QT.
Note that Q1 and Q2 are chosen so that MR1 = MR2 = MC.

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Third-degree Price Discrimination
MR1(y1)
MR2(y2)
y1
y2
y1*
y2*
p1(y1)
p2(y2)
MC
MC
p1(y1)
p2(y2)
Market 1
Market 2
MR1(y1) = MR2(y2) = MC

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Third-degree Price Discrimination
MR1(y1)
MR2(y2)
y1
y2
y1*
y2*
p1(y1)
p2(y2)
MC
MC
p1(y1)
p2(y2)
Market 1
Market 2
MR1(y1) = MR2(y2) = MC and p1(y1*)

≠ p2(y2*).

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Third-degree Price Discrimination
In which market will the monopolist cause the higher

price?

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Third-degree Price Discrimination
In which market will the monopolist cause the higher

price?
Recall that

and

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Third-degree Price Discrimination
In which market will the monopolist cause the higher

price?
Recall that
But,

and

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Third-degree Price Discrimination
So

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Third-degree Price Discrimination
So
Therefore, if and only if

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Third-degree Price Discrimination
So
Therefore, if and only if

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Third-degree Price Discrimination
So
Therefore, if and only if
The monopolist sets the higher

price in
the market where demand is least
own-price elastic.

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No Sales to Smaller Market
Even if third-degree price discrimination is possible,

it may not be feasible to try to sell to both groups
It is possible that the demand for one group is so low that it would not be profitable to lower price enough to sell to that group

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No Sales to Smaller Market
Quantity
$/Q
Group one, with
demand D1, is not

willing to pay enough
for the good to make price discrimination profitable.

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The Economics of Coupons and Rebates
Those consumers who are more price

elastic will tend to use the coupon/rebate more often when they purchase the product than those consumers with a less elastic demand
Coupons and rebate programs allow firms to price discriminate

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The Economics of Coupons and Rebates
About 20 – 30% of consumers

use coupons or rebates
Firms can get those with higher elasticities of demand to purchase the good who would not normally buy it
Table 11.1 shows how elasticities of demand vary for coupon/rebate users and non-users

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Price Elasticities of Demand: Users vs. Nonusers of Coupons

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Airline Fares
Differences in elasticities imply that some customers will pay a

higher fare than others
Business travelers have few choices and their demand is less elastic
Casual travelers and families are more price-sensitive and will therefore be choosier

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Elasticities of Demand for Air Travel

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Airline Fares
There are multiple fares for every route flown by airlines
They

separate the market by setting various restrictions on the tickets
Must stay over a Saturday night
21-day advance, 14-day advance
Basic restrictions – can change ticket to only certain days
Most expensive: no restrictions – first class

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Other Types of Price Discrimination
Intertemporal Price Discrimination
Practice of separating consumers with

different demand functions into different groups by charging different prices at different points in time
Initial release of a product, the demand is inelastic
Hard back vs. paperback book
New release movie
Technology

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Intertemporal Price Discrimination
Once this market has yielded a maximum profit, firms

lower the price to appeal to a general market with a more elastic demand
This can be seen graphically looking at two different groups of consumers – one willing to buy right now and one willing to wait

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Intertemporal Price Discrimination
Quantity
$/Q
Over time, demand becomes
more elastic and price
is reduced

to appeal to the
mass market.

Initially, demand is less
elastic, resulting in a
price of P1 .

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Other Types of Price Discrimination
Peak-Load Pricing
Practice of charging higher prices during

peak periods when capacity constraints cause marginal costs to be higher
Demand for some products may peak at particular times
Rush hour traffic
Electricity - late summer afternoons
Ski resorts on weekends

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Peak-Load Pricing
Objective is to increase efficiency by charging customers close to

marginal cost
Increased MR and MC would indicate a higher price
Total surplus is higher because charging close to MC
Can measure efficiency gain from peak-load pricing

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Peak-Load Pricing
With third-degree price discrimination, the MR for all markets was

equal
MR is not equal for each market because one market does not impact the other market with peak-load pricing
Price and sales in each market are independent
Ex: electricity, movie theaters

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Peak-Load Pricing
Quantity
$/Q
MR=MC for each group. Group 1 has higher demand during

peak times.

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How to Price a Best-Selling Novel
How would you arrive at the

price for the initial release of the hardbound edition of a book?
Hardback and paperback books are ways for the company to price discriminate
How does the company determine what price to sell the hardback and paperback books for?
How does the company determine when to release the paperback?

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How to Price a Best-Selling Novel
Company must divide consumers into two

groups:
Those willing to buy the more expensive hardback
Those willing to wait for the paperback
Have to be strategic about when to release paperback after hardback
Publishers typically wait 12 to 18 months

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How to Price a Best-Selling Novel
Publishers must use estimates of past

books to determine how much to sell a new book for
Hard to determine the demand for a NEW book
New books are typically sold for about the same price, to take this into account
Demand for paperbacks is more elastic so we should expect it to be priced lower

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Two-Part Tariffs
A two-part tariff is a lump-sum fee, p1, plus a

price p2 for each unit of product purchased.
Thus the cost of buying x units of product is p1 + p2x.

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Two-Part Tariffs
Should a monopolist prefer a two-part tariff to uniform pricing,

or to any of the price-discrimination schemes discussed so far?
If so, how should the monopolist design its two-part tariff?

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Two-Part Tariffs
p1 + p2x
Q: What is the largest that p1

can be?

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Two-Part Tariffs
p1 + p2x
Q: What is the largest that p1

can be?
A: p1 is the “market entrance fee” so the largest it can be is the surplus the buyer gains from entering the market.
Set p1 = CS and now ask what should be p2?

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Two-Part Tariffs
p(y)
y
$/output unit
MC(y)
Should the monopolist set p2 above MC?

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Two-Part Tariffs
p(y)
y
$/output unit
CS
Should the monopolist set p2 above MC? p1 = CS.
MC(y)

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Two-Part Tariffs
p(y)
y
$/output unit
CS
Should the monopolist set p2 above MC? p1 = CS. PS is

profit from sales.

MC(y)

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Two-Part Tariffs
p(y)
y
$/output unit
CS
Should the monopolist set p2 above MC? p1 = CS. PS is

profit from sales.

MC(y)

Total profit

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Two-Part Tariffs
p(y)
y
$/output unit
Should the monopolist set p2 = MC?
MC(y)

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Two-Part Tariffs
p(y)
y
$/output unit
Should the monopolist set p2 = MC? p1 = CS.
CS
MC(y)

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Two-Part Tariffs
p(y)
y
$/output unit
Should the monopolist set p2 = MC? p1 = CS. PS is

profit from sales.

MC(y)

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Two-Part Tariffs
p(y)
y
$/output unit
Should the monopolist set p2 = MC? p1 = CS. PS is

profit from sales.

MC(y)

Total profit

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Two-Part Tariffs
p(y)
y
$/output unit
Should the monopolist set p2 = MC? p1 = CS. PS is

profit from sales.

MC(y)

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Two-Part Tariffs
p(y)
y
$/output unit
Should the monopolist set p2 = MC? p1 = CS. PS is

profit from sales.

MC(y)

Additional profit from setting p2 = MC.

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Two-Part Tariffs
The monopolist maximizes its profit when using a two-part tariff

by setting its per unit price p2 at marginal cost and setting its lump-sum fee p1 equal to Consumers’ Surplus.

Слайд 76

Two-Part Tariffs
A profit-maximizing two-part tariff gives an efficient market outcome in

which the monopolist obtains as profit the total of all gains-to-trade.

Слайд 77

The Two-Part Tariff
Form of pricing in which consumers are charged both

an entry and usage fee
Ex: amusement park, golf course, telephone service
A fee is charged upfront for right to use/buy the product
An additional fee is charged for each unit the consumer wishes to consume
Pay a fee to play golf and then pay another fee for each game you play

Слайд 78

The Two-Part Tariff
Pricing decision is setting the entry fee (T) and

the usage fee (P)
Choosing the trade-off between free-entry and high-use prices or high-entry and zero-use prices
Single Consumer
Assume firm knows consumer demand
Firm wants to capture as much consumer surplus as possible

Слайд 79

Usage price P* is set equal to MC.
Entry price T*

is equal to the entire consumer surplus.
Firm captures all consumer surplus as profit.

Two-Part Tariff with a Single Consumer

Quantity

$/Q

Слайд 80

Two-Part Tariff with Two Consumers
Two consumers, but firm can only set

one entry fee and one usage fee
Does it make sense to set usage fee equal to MC and entrance fee equal to CS of the consumer with the smaller demand?

Слайд 81

The price, P, will be
greater than MC. Set T
at

the surplus value of D2.

Two-Part Tariff with Two Consumers

Quantity

$/Q

Слайд 82

Two-Part Tariff with Two Consumers
Firm should set usage fee above MC
Set

entry fee equal to remaining consumer surplus of consumer with smaller demand
Firm needs to know demand curves

Слайд 83

The Two-Part Tariff with Many Consumers
No exact way to determine P*

and T*
Must consider the trade-off between the entry fee T* and the use fee P*
Low entry fee: more entrants and more profit from sales of item
As entry fee becomes smaller, number of entrants is larger and profit from entry fee will fall

Слайд 84

The Two-Part Tariff with Many Consumers
To find optimum combination, choose several

combinations of P and T
Find combination that maximizes profit
Firm’s profit is divided into two components
Each is a function of entry fee, T assuming a fixed sales price, P

Слайд 85

Two-Part Tariff with Many Different Consumers
T
Profit
Total profit is the sum of

the
profit from the entry fee and
the profit from sales. Both
depend on T.

:ΠTotal

Слайд 86

The Two-Part Tariff
Rule of Thumb
Similar demand: Choose P close to MC

and high T
Dissimilar demand: Choose high P and low T
Ex: Disneyland in California and Disney world in Florida have a strategy of high entry fee and charge nothing for ride

Слайд 87

The Two-Part Tariff With a Twist
Entry price (T) entitles the buyer

to a certain number of free units
Gillette razors sold with several blades
Amusement park admission comes with some tokens
On-line fees with free time
Can set higher entry fee without losing many consumers
Higher entry fee captures either surplus without driving them out of the market
Captures more surplus of large customers

Слайд 88

Polaroid Cameras
In 1971, Polaroid introduced the SX-70 camera
Polaroid was able to

use two-part tariff for pricing of camera/film
Allowed them greater profits than would have been possible if camera used ordinary film
Polaroid had a monopoly on cameras and film

Слайд 89

Polaroid Cameras
Buying camera is like entry fee
Unlike an amusement park, for

example, the marginal cost of providing an additional camera is significantly greater than zero
It was necessary for Polaroid to have monopoly
If ordinary film could be used, the price of film would be close to MC
Polaroid needed to gain most of its profits from sale of film

Слайд 90

Polaroid Cameras
Analytical framework:

Слайд 91

Polaroid Cameras
In the end, the film prices were significantly above marginal

cost
There was considerable heterogeneity of consumer demands

Слайд 92

Bundling
Bundling is packaging two or more products to gain a pricing

advantage
Conditions necessary for bundling
Heterogeneous customers
Price discrimination is not possible
Demands must be negatively correlated

Слайд 93

Bundling
When film company leased “Gone with the Wind,” it required theaters

to also lease “Getting Gertie’s Garter”
Why would a company do this?
Company must be able to increase revenue
We can see the reservation prices for each theater and movie

Слайд 94

Bundling
Renting the movies separately would result in each theater paying the

lowest reservation price for each movie:
Maximum price Wind = $10,000
Maximum price Gertie = $3,000
Total Revenue = $26,000

Слайд 95

Bundling
If the movies are bundled:
Theater A will pay $15,000 for both
Theater

B will pay $14,000 for both
If each were charged the lower of the two prices, total revenue will be $28,000
The movie company will gain more revenue ($2000) by bundling the movie

Слайд 96

Relative Valuations
More profitable to bundle because relative valuation of two films

are reversed
Demands are negatively correlated
A pays more for Wind ($12,000) than B ($10,000)
B pays more for Gertie ($4,000) than A ($3,000)

Слайд 97

Relative Valuations
If the demands were positively correlated (Theater A would pay

more for both films as shown) bundling would not result in an increase in revenue

Слайд 98

Bundling
If the movies are bundled:
Theater A will pay $16,000 for both
Theater

B will pay $13,000 for both
If each were charged the lower of the two prices, total revenue will be $26,000, the same as by selling the films separately

Слайд 99

Bundling
Bundling Scenario: Two different goods and many consumers
Many consumers with different

reservation price combinations for two goods
Can show graphically the preferences of consumers in terms of reservation prices and consumption decisions given prices charged
r1 is reservation price of consumer for good 1
r2 is reservation price of consumer for good 2

Слайд 100

Reservation Prices
r2
r1
For example, Consumer A is willing to pay up

to $3.25 for good 1 and up to $6 for good 2.

Слайд 101

Consumption Decisions When Products are Sold Separately
r2
r1
Consumers fall into
four categories based
on their

reservation
price.

Слайд 102

Consumption Decisions When Products are Bundled
r2
r1
Consumers buy the bundle
when r1 +

r2 > PB
(PB = bundle price).
PB = r1 + r2 or r2 = PB - r1
Region 1: r > PB
Region 2: r < PB

Слайд 103

Consumption Decisions When Products are Bundled
The effectiveness of bundling depends upon the

degree of negative correlation between the two demands
Best when consumers who have high reservation price for Good 1 have a low reservation price for Good 2 and vice versa
Can see graphically looking at positively and negatively correlated prices

Слайд 104

Reservation Prices
If the demands are
perfectly positively
correlated, the firm
will not gain

by bundling.
It would earn the same
profit by selling the
goods separately.

Слайд 105

Reservation Prices
r2
r1
If the demands are perfectly negatively correlated, bundling is the

ideal strategy – all the
consumer surplus can be extracted and a higher
profit results.

Слайд 106

Movie Example
r2
r1
Bundling pays due to
negative correlation.
(Wind)
(Gertie)
5,000
14,000
10,000
5,000
10,000
14,000

Слайд 107

Mixed Bundling
Practice of selling two or more goods both as a

package and individually
This differs from pure bundling when products are sold only as a package
Mixed bundling is good strategy when
Demands are somewhat negatively correlated
Marginal production costs are significant

Слайд 108

Mixed Versus Pure Bundling
For each good, marginal production cost exceeds reservation

price of one consumer.
A and D will buy individually
B and C will buy bundle

With positive marginal
costs, mixed bundling
may be more profitable
than pure bundling.

Слайд 109

Mixed Bundling – Example
Demands are perfectly negatively correlated but significant marginal

costs
Four customers under three different strategies
Selling good separately, P1 = $50, P2 = $90
Selling goods only as a bundle, PB = $100
Mixed bundling:
Sold individually with P1 = P2 = $89.95
Sold as a bundle with PB = $100

Слайд 110

Mixed Bundling – Example
We can see the effects under different scenarios

in the following table:

Слайд 111

Bundling
If MC is zero, mixed bundling can still be more profitable

if consumer demands are not perfectly negatively correlated
Example:
Reservation prices for consumers B and C are higher
Compare the same three strategies
Mixed bundling is the more profitable option since everyone will end up buying

Слайд 112

Mixed Bundling with Zero Marginal Costs
A and D purchase individually.
B and

C purchase bundled.
Profits are highest with mixed bundling.

Слайд 113

Bundling in Practice
Car purchasing
Bundles of options such as electric locks with

air conditioning
Vacation Travel
Bundling hotel with air fare
Cable television
Premium channels bundled together

Слайд 114

Bundling
Mixed Bundling in Practice
Use of market surveys to determine reservation prices
Design

a pricing strategy from the survey results
Can show graphically using information collected from consumers
Consumers are separated into four regions
Can change prices to find max profits

Слайд 115

Mixed Bundling in Practice
r2
r1
The firm can first choose a price
for the

bundle and then try individual
prices P1 and P2 until total profit
is roughly maximized.

Слайд 116

A Restaurant’s Pricing Problem

Слайд 117

Tying
The practice of requiring a customer to purchase one good in

order to purchase another
Xerox machines and the paper
IBM mainframe and computer cards
Allows firm to meter demand and practice price discrimination more effectively

Слайд 118

Tying
Allows the seller to meter the customer and use a two-part

tariff to discriminate against the heavy user
McDonald’s
Allows them to protect their brand name
Microsoft
Uses to extend market power

Слайд 119

Versioning
Extreme example: damaged goods
Intel 486
486SX - $333 in 1991
486DX -

$588 in 1991
IBM LaserPrinter E (5 pages per minute) LaserPrinter (10 pages per minute)

Слайд 120

Durable-goods pricing
Waiting for the price cut.
Non-price discrimination seems to increase profits
Possible

solutions:
lowest price guarantee
leasing instead of selling

Слайд 121

Advertising
Firms with market power have to decide how much to advertise
We

can show how firms choose profit maximizing advertising
Decision depends on characteristics of demand for firm’s product

Слайд 122

Advertising
Assumptions
Firm sets only one price for product
Firm knows quantity demanded depends

on price and advertising expenditure dollars, A
Q(P,A)
We can show the firm’s cost curves, revenue curves, and profits under advertising and no advertising

Слайд 123

ADVERTISING
Effects of Advertising
Figure 11.20
AR and MR are average and marginal revenue

when the firm doesn’t advertise,
and AC and MC are average and marginal cost.
The firm produces Q0 and receives a price P0.
Its total profit π0 is given by the gray-shaded rectangle.
If the firm advertises, its average and marginal revenue curves shift to the right.
Average cost rises (to AC′) but marginal cost remains the same.
The firm now produces Q1 (where MR′ = MC), and receives a price P1.
Its total profit, π1, is now larger.

Слайд 124

The price P and advertising expenditure A to maximize profit, is

given by:

The firm should advertise up to the point that

= full marginal cost of advertising

(11.3)

Advertising leads to increased output.
But increased output in turn means increased production costs, and this must be taken into account when comparing the costs and benefits of an extra dollar of advertising.

ADVERTISING

Слайд 125

First, rewrite equation (11.3) as follows:
Now multiply both sides of this

equation by A/PQ, the advertising-to-sales ratio.

● advertising-to-sales ratio Ratio of a firm’s advertising expenditures to its sales.

● advertising elasticity of demand Percentage change in quantity demanded resulting from a 1-percent increase in advertising expenditures.

A Rule of Thumb for Advertising

ADVERTISING

Слайд 126

Advertising
A Rule of Thumb for Advertising
To maximize profit, the firm’s advertising-to-sales

ratio should be equal to minus the ratio of the advertising and price elasticities of demand

Слайд 127

Advertising
An Example
R(Q) = $1 million/yr
$10,000 budget for A (advertising--1% of revenues)
EA

= .2 (increase budget $20,000, sales increase by 20%)
EP = -4 (markup price over MC is substantial)

Слайд 128

Advertising
The firm in our example should increase advertising
A/PQ = -(2/-.4) =

5%
Increase budget to $50,000

Monopoly Behavior

Содержание

A Scotsman phones a dentist to inquire about the cost for

— "I can't guarantee their professionalism and it'll be painful. But

How Should a Monopoly Price?So far a monopoly has been thought

Capturing Consumer SurplusAll pricing strategies we will examine are means of

Capturing Consumer SurplusQuantity$/QThe firm would like to charge higher price to

Capturing Consumer SurplusPrice discrimination is the practice of charging different prices

Price discriminationPrice discrimination requires the absence of resale

Types of Price Discrimination1st-degree: Each output unit is sold at a

Types of Price Discrimination3rd-degree: Price paid by buyers in a given

First-degree Price DiscriminationEach output unit is sold at a different price.

First-degree Price Discriminationp(y)y$/output unitMC(y)Sell the th unit for $

First-degree Price Discriminationp(y)y$/output unitMC(y)Sell the th unit for $ Later on sell

First-degree Price Discriminationp(y)y$/output unitMC(y)Sell the th unit for $ Later on sell

First-degree Price Discriminationp(y)y$/output unitMC(y)The gains to the monopolist on these trades are: and

First-degree Price Discriminationp(y)y$/output unitMC(y)So the sum of the gains to the monopolist

First-degree Price Discriminationp(y)y$/output unitMC(y)The monopolist gets the maximum possible gains from

Fig. 25.2

First-degree Price DiscriminationFirst-degree price discrimination gives a monopolist all of the

First-Degree Price DiscriminationIn practice, perfect price discrimination is almost never possibleImpractical

First-Degree Price DiscriminationExamples of imperfect price discrimination where the seller has

Second-Degree Price DiscriminationIn some markets, consumers purchase many units of a

Second-Degree Price DiscriminationQuantity discounts are an example of second-degree price discriminationEx:

Second-Degree Price Discrimination$/QWithout discrimination: P = P0 and Q = Q0.

Fig. 25.3Second-Degree Price DiscriminationSelf selection

Fig. 25.3Second-Degree Price DiscriminationSelf selection

Fig. 25.3Second-Degree Price DiscriminationSelf selection

Fig. 25.3Second-Degree Price DiscriminationSelf selectionIn practice, the monopolist often encourages self-selection

Third-degree Price DiscriminationPrice paid by buyers in a given group is

Third-degree Price DiscriminationA monopolist manipulates market price by altering the quantity

PRICE DISCRIMINATIONThird-Degree Price Discrimination● third-degree price discrimination Practice of dividing consumers into

PRICE DISCRIMINATIONThird-Degree Price DiscriminationCreating Consumer GroupsDetermining Relative Prices

PRICE DISCRIMINATIONThird-Degree Price DiscriminationThird-Degree Price DiscriminationFigure 11.5Consumers are divided into two

Third-degree Price DiscriminationMR1(y1)MR2(y2)y1y2y1*y2*p1(y1*)p2(y2*)MCMCp1(y1)p2(y2)Market 1Market 2MR1(y1*) = MR2(y2*) = MC

Third-degree Price DiscriminationMR1(y1)MR2(y2)y1y2y1*y2*p1(y1*)p2(y2*)MCMCp1(y1)p2(y2)Market 1Market 2MR1(y1*) = MR2(y2*) = MC and p1(y1*)

Third-degree Price DiscriminationIn which market will the monopolist cause the higher

Third-degree Price DiscriminationIn which market will the monopolist cause the higher

Third-degree Price DiscriminationIn which market will the monopolist cause the higher

Third-degree Price DiscriminationSo

Third-degree Price DiscriminationSoTherefore, if and only if

Third-degree Price DiscriminationSoTherefore, if and only if

Third-degree Price DiscriminationSoTherefore, if and only ifThe monopolist sets the higher

No Sales to Smaller MarketEven if third-degree price discrimination is possible,

No Sales to Smaller MarketQuantity$/QGroup one, with demand D1, is not

The Economics of Coupons and RebatesThose consumers who are more price

The Economics of Coupons and RebatesAbout 20 – 30% of consumers

Price Elasticities of Demand: Users vs. Nonusers of Coupons

Airline FaresDifferences in elasticities imply that some customers will pay a

Elasticities of Demand for Air Travel

Airline FaresThere are multiple fares for every route flown by airlinesThey

Other Types of Price DiscriminationIntertemporal Price DiscriminationPractice of separating consumers with

Intertemporal Price DiscriminationOnce this market has yielded a maximum profit, firms

Intertemporal Price DiscriminationQuantity$/QOver time, demand becomesmore elastic and price is reduced

Other Types of Price DiscriminationPeak-Load PricingPractice of charging higher prices during

Peak-Load PricingObjective is to increase efficiency by charging customers close to

Peak-Load PricingWith third-degree price discrimination, the MR for all markets was

Peak-Load PricingQuantity$/QMR=MC for each group. Group 1 has higher demand during

How to Price a Best-Selling NovelHow would you arrive at the

How to Price a Best-Selling NovelCompany must divide consumers into two

How to Price a Best-Selling NovelPublishers must use estimates of past

Two-Part TariffsA two-part tariff is a lump-sum fee, p1, plus a

Two-Part TariffsShould a monopolist prefer a two-part tariff to uniform pricing,

Two-Part Tariffs p1 + p2xQ: What is the largest that p1

Two-Part Tariffs p1 + p2xQ: What is the largest that p1

Two-Part Tariffsp(y)y$/output unitMC(y)Should the monopolist set p2 above MC?

Two-Part Tariffsp(y)y$/output unitCSShould the monopolist set p2 above MC? p1 = CS.MC(y)

Two-Part Tariffsp(y)y$/output unitCSShould the monopolist set p2 above MC? p1 = CS. PS is

Two-Part Tariffsp(y)y$/output unitCSShould the monopolist set p2 above MC? p1 = CS. PS is

Two-Part Tariffsp(y)y$/output unitShould the monopolist set p2 = MC?MC(y)

Two-Part Tariffsp(y)y$/output unitShould the monopolist set p2 = MC? p1 = CS.CSMC(y)

Two-Part Tariffsp(y)y$/output unitShould the monopolist set p2 = MC? p1 = CS. PS is

Two-Part Tariffsp(y)y$/output unitShould the monopolist set p2 = MC? p1 = CS. PS is

Two-Part Tariffsp(y)y$/output unitShould the monopolist set p2 = MC? p1 = CS. PS is

Two-Part Tariffsp(y)y$/output unitShould the monopolist set p2 = MC? p1 = CS. PS is

Two-Part TariffsThe monopolist maximizes its profit when using a two-part tariff

How Should a Monopoly Price?
So far a monopoly has been thought

Capturing Consumer Surplus
All pricing strategies we will examine are means of

Capturing Consumer Surplus
Quantity
$/Q
The firm would like to charge higher price to

Capturing Consumer Surplus
Price discrimination is the practice of charging different prices

Price discrimination
Price discrimination requires the absence of resale

Types of Price Discrimination
1st-degree: Each output unit is sold at a

Types of Price Discrimination
3rd-degree: Price paid by buyers in a given

First-degree Price Discrimination
Each output unit is sold at a different price.

First-degree Price Discrimination
p(y)
y
$/output unit
MC(y)
Sell the th unit for $

First-degree Price Discrimination
p(y)
y
$/output unit
MC(y)
Sell the th unit for $ Later on sell

First-degree Price Discrimination
p(y)
y
$/output unit
MC(y)
Sell the th unit for $ Later on sell

First-degree Price Discrimination
p(y)
y
$/output unit
MC(y)
The gains to the monopolist on these trades are: and

First-degree Price Discrimination
p(y)
y
$/output unit
MC(y)
So the sum of the gains to the monopolist

First-degree Price Discrimination
p(y)
y
$/output unit
MC(y)
The monopolist gets the maximum possible
gains from

First-degree Price Discrimination
First-degree price discrimination gives a monopolist all of the

First-Degree Price Discrimination
In practice, perfect price discrimination is almost never possible
Impractical

First-Degree Price Discrimination
Examples of imperfect price discrimination where the seller has

Second-Degree Price Discrimination
In some markets, consumers purchase many units of a

Second-Degree Price Discrimination
Quantity discounts are an example of second-degree price discrimination
Ex:

Second-Degree Price Discrimination
$/Q
Without discrimination: P = P0 and Q = Q0.

Fig. 25.3
Second-Degree Price Discrimination
Self selection

Fig. 25.3
Second-Degree Price Discrimination
Self selection

Fig. 25.3
Second-Degree Price Discrimination
Self selection

Fig. 25.3
Second-Degree Price Discrimination
Self selection
In practice, the monopolist often encourages self-selection

Third-degree Price Discrimination
Price paid by buyers in a given group is

Third-degree Price Discrimination
A monopolist manipulates market price by altering the quantity

PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Third-Degree Price Discrimination
● third-degree price discrimination Practice of dividing consumers into

PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Third-Degree Price Discrimination
Creating Consumer Groups
Determining Relative Prices

PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Third-Degree Price Discrimination
Third-Degree Price Discrimination
Figure 11.5
Consumers are divided into two

Third-degree Price Discrimination
MR1(y1)
MR2(y2)
y1
y2
y1*
y2*
p1(y1)
p2(y2)
MC
MC
p1(y1)
p2(y2)
Market 1
Market 2
MR1(y1) = MR2(y2) = MC

Third-degree Price Discrimination
MR1(y1)
MR2(y2)
y1
y2
y1*
y2*
p1(y1)
p2(y2)
MC
MC
p1(y1)
p2(y2)
Market 1
Market 2
MR1(y1) = MR2(y2) = MC and p1(y1*)

Third-degree Price Discrimination
In which market will the monopolist cause the higher

Third-degree Price Discrimination
In which market will the monopolist cause the higher

Third-degree Price Discrimination
In which market will the monopolist cause the higher

Third-degree Price Discrimination
So

Third-degree Price Discrimination
So
Therefore, if and only if

Third-degree Price Discrimination
So
Therefore, if and only if

Third-degree Price Discrimination
So
Therefore, if and only if
The monopolist sets the higher

No Sales to Smaller Market
Even if third-degree price discrimination is possible,

No Sales to Smaller Market
Quantity
$/Q
Group one, with
demand D1, is not

The Economics of Coupons and Rebates
Those consumers who are more price

The Economics of Coupons and Rebates
About 20 – 30% of consumers

Airline Fares
Differences in elasticities imply that some customers will pay a

Airline Fares
There are multiple fares for every route flown by airlines
They

Other Types of Price Discrimination
Intertemporal Price Discrimination
Practice of separating consumers with

Intertemporal Price Discrimination
Once this market has yielded a maximum profit, firms

Intertemporal Price Discrimination
Quantity
$/Q
Over time, demand becomes
more elastic and price
is reduced

Other Types of Price Discrimination
Peak-Load Pricing
Practice of charging higher prices during

Peak-Load Pricing
Objective is to increase efficiency by charging customers close to

Peak-Load Pricing
With third-degree price discrimination, the MR for all markets was

Peak-Load Pricing
Quantity
$/Q
MR=MC for each group. Group 1 has higher demand during

How to Price a Best-Selling Novel
How would you arrive at the

How to Price a Best-Selling Novel
Company must divide consumers into two

How to Price a Best-Selling Novel
Publishers must use estimates of past

Two-Part Tariffs
A two-part tariff is a lump-sum fee, p1, plus a

Two-Part Tariffs
Should a monopolist prefer a two-part tariff to uniform pricing,

Two-Part Tariffs
p1 + p2x
Q: What is the largest that p1

Two-Part Tariffs
p1 + p2x
Q: What is the largest that p1

Two-Part Tariffs
p(y)
y
$/output unit
MC(y)
Should the monopolist set p2 above MC?

Two-Part Tariffs
p(y)
y
$/output unit
CS
Should the monopolist set p2 above MC? p1 = CS.
MC(y)

Two-Part Tariffs
p(y)
y
$/output unit
CS
Should the monopolist set p2 above MC? p1 = CS. PS is

Two-Part Tariffs
p(y)
y
$/output unit
CS
Should the monopolist set p2 above MC? p1 = CS. PS is

Two-Part Tariffs
p(y)
y
$/output unit
Should the monopolist set p2 = MC?
MC(y)

Two-Part Tariffs
p(y)
y
$/output unit
Should the monopolist set p2 = MC? p1 = CS.
CS
MC(y)

Two-Part Tariffs
p(y)
y
$/output unit
Should the monopolist set p2 = MC? p1 = CS. PS is

Two-Part Tariffs
p(y)
y
$/output unit
Should the monopolist set p2 = MC? p1 = CS. PS is

Two-Part Tariffs
p(y)
y
$/output unit
Should the monopolist set p2 = MC? p1 = CS. PS is

Two-Part Tariffs
p(y)
y
$/output unit
Should the monopolist set p2 = MC? p1 = CS. PS is

Two-Part Tariffs
The monopolist maximizes its profit when using a two-part tariff