Denial-of-Service Attacks. Chapter 7. Computer Security: Principles and Practice

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Denial-of-service Denial of service (DoS) an action that prevents or impairs

Denial-of-service

Denial of service (DoS) an action that prevents or impairs the

authorized use of networks, systems, or applications by exhausting resources such as central processing units (CPU), memory, bandwidth, and disk space
Attacks (overload or invalid request services that consume significant resources)
network bandwidth
system resources
application resources
Have been an issue for some time (25% of respondents to an FBI survey)

Compromise System Availability

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Classic DoS attacks Flooding ping command Aim of this attack is

Classic DoS attacks

Flooding ping command
Aim of this attack is to overwhelm

the capacity of the network connection to the target organization
Traffic can be handled by higher capacity links on the path, but packets are discarded as capacity decreases
Source of the attack is clearly identified unless a spoofed address is used
Network performance is noticeably affected
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Classic DoS attacks

Classic DoS attacks

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Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) The Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)

Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)

The Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is

one of the main IP protocols; it is used by network devices, like routers, to send error messages (e.g., a requested service is not available or a host or router could not be reached)

The host must respond to all echo requests with an
echo reply containing the exact data received in the
request message

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Source address spoofing Use forged source addresses Usually via the raw

Source address spoofing

Use forged source addresses
Usually via the raw socket interface

on operating systems
Makes attacking systems harder to identify
Attacker generates large volumes of packets that have the target system as the destination address
Congestion would result in the router connected to the final, lower capacity link
Backscatter traffic
Advertise routes to unused IP addresses to monitor attack traffic
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Backscatter traffic Security researchers (Honeypot Project) advertise blocks of unused IP

Backscatter traffic

Security researchers (Honeypot Project) advertise blocks of unused IP addresses

(no real/legit uses)
If ICMP/connection request is made, this is most likely from attackers
Monitoring unused IP addresses provides valuable info on the type and scale of attack
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SYN spoofing Common DoS attack Attacks the ability of a server

SYN spoofing

Common DoS attack
Attacks the ability of a server to respond

to future connection requests by overflowing the tables used to manage them
Thus legitimate users are denied access to the server
Hence this is an attack on system resources, specifically the network handling code in the operating system
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TCP connection handshake syn/ack pkts y= server seq# x= client seq#

TCP connection handshake

syn/ack pkts
y= server seq#
x= client seq#

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SYN spoofing attack assumption: most connections succeed and thus table cleared quickly

SYN spoofing attack

assumption: most connections succeed and thus table cleared quickly

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SYN spoofing attack: attacker’s source Attacker often uses either random source

SYN spoofing attack: attacker’s source

Attacker often uses either
random source addresses (addresses

that may not exist)
or that of an overloaded server (that may not send a RST)
to block return of (most) reset packets
Has much lower traffic volume
attacker can be on a much lower capacity link
Objective: uses addresses that will not respond to the SYN-ACK with a RST
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Types of flooding attacks Classified according to the network protocol used

Types of flooding attacks

Classified according to the network protocol used
Objective: to

overload the network capacity on some link to a server
Virtually any type of network packet can be used
ICMP Flood
Uses ICMP packets, eg ping (echo) request
Typically allowed through, some required
UDP Flood
Alternative uses UDP packets to random ports (even if no service is available, attacker achieves its goal)
TCP SYN Flood (SYN spoof vs SYN flood)
Sends TCP SYN (connection request) packets
Focuses on volume attack
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UDP packet User Datagram Protocol (UDP) is a component of the

UDP packet

User Datagram Protocol (UDP) is a component of the IP

suite and allows computer applications to send messages
A UDP can be directed at practically any service (port); if service is unavailable, the packet is discarded but the attacker objective is achieved
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Distributed DoS attacks Have limited volume if single source used Multiple

Distributed DoS attacks

Have limited volume if single source used
Multiple systems allow

much higher traffic volumes to form a distributed DoS (DDoS) attack
Often compromised PC’s/workstations
Zombies with backdoor programs installed
Forming a botnet
Example: Tribe Flood Network (TFN), TFN2K
did ICMP, SYN and UDP floods
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DDoS control hierarchy Attacker sends one command to the handler zombies;

DDoS control hierarchy

Attacker sends one command to the handler zombies;
the handler

forwards to other handlers, agents
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Application-based bandwidth attacks Force the victim system to execute resource-consuming operations

Application-based bandwidth attacks

Force the victim system to execute resource-consuming operations (e.g.,

searches, complex DB queries)
VoIP Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) flood (see Figure 7.5): attacker sends many INVITE requests; major burden on the proxies
server resources depleted while handling requests
bandwidth capacity is consumed
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SIP invite scenario Standard protocol for VoIP telephony Text-based protocol with

SIP invite scenario

Standard protocol for VoIP telephony
Text-based protocol with a syntax

similar to that of HTTP
Two types of SIP messages: requests and responses
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HTTP-based attacks Slowloris: On each connection, it sends an incomplete request

HTTP-based attacks

Slowloris: On each connection, it sends an incomplete request that

does not include the terminating newline sequence. Existing intrusion detection and prevention solutions that rely on signatures to detect attacks will generally not recognize Slowloris
Attempts to monopolize by sending HTTP requests that never complete
Eventually consumes Web server’s connection capacity
Utilizes legitimate HTTP traffic
Spidering: Bots starting from a given HTTP link and following all links on the provided Web site in a recursive way
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Reflection attacks Attacker sends packets to a known service on the

Reflection attacks

Attacker sends packets to a known service on the intermediary

with a “spoofed source address” of the actual target system
When intermediary responds, the response is sent to the target
“Reflects” the attack off the intermediary (reflector)
Goal is to generate enough volumes of packets to flood the link to the target system without alerting the intermediary
The basic defense against these attacks is blocking spoofed-source packets
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Reflection attacks

Reflection attacks

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Reflection attacks Further variation creates a self-contained loop between intermediary and

Reflection attacks

Further variation creates a self-contained loop between intermediary and target

(attacker spoofs using port 7 requiring echoes)
Fairly easy to filter and block
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DNS amplification attacks Use packets directed at a legitimate DNS server

DNS amplification attacks

Use packets directed at a legitimate DNS server as

the intermediary system
Attacker creates a series of DNS requests containing the spoofed source address of the target system
Exploit DNS behavior to convert a small request to a much larger response (amplification)
Target is flooded with responses
Basic defense against this attack is to prevent the use of spoofed source addresses
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Amplification attacks Can take advantage of broadcast address of some network

Amplification attacks

Can take advantage of broadcast address of some network

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Four lines of defense against DDoS attacks Attack prevention and preemption

Four lines of defense against DDoS attacks

Attack prevention and preemption (before

attack)
Attack detection and filtering (during the attack)
Attack source traceback and identification (during and after the attack)
Attack reaction (after the attack)
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DoS attack prevention Block spoofed source addresses On routers as close

DoS attack prevention

Block spoofed source addresses
On routers as close to source

as possible
Filters may be used to ensure path back to the claimed source address is the one being used by the current packet
Filters must be applied to traffic before it leaves the ISP’s network or at the point of entry to their network
Use modified TCP connection handling code
Cryptographically encode critical information in a cookie that is sent as the server’s initial sequence number
Legitimate client responds with an ACK packet containing the incremented sequence number cookie
Drop an entry for an incomplete connection from the TCP connections table when it overflows
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Attack prevention Rate controls in upstream distribution nets On specific packets

Attack prevention

Rate controls in upstream distribution nets
On specific packets types e.g.

some ICMP, some UDP, TCP/SYN
Impose limits
Use modified TCP connection handling
Server sends SYN cookies when table full (reconstruct table data from the cookie from legit clients)
Selective or random drop when table full
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Attack prevention Block IP directed broadcasts Block suspicious services and combinations

Attack prevention

Block IP directed broadcasts
Block suspicious services and combinations
Manage application attacks

with a form of graphical puzzle (captcha) to distinguish legitimate human requests
Use mirrored and replicated servers when high-performance and reliability is required
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Responding to attacks Good incidence response plan Details on how to

Responding to attacks

Good incidence response plan
Details on how to contact technical

personal for ISP
Needed to impose traffic filtering upstream
Details of how to respond to the attack
Implement anti-spoofing, directed broadcast, and rate limiting filters
Ideally have network monitors and IDS to detect and notify abnormal traffic patterns
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Responding to attacks Identify type of attack Capture and analyze packets

Responding to attacks

Identify type of attack
Capture and analyze packets
Design filters

to block attack traffic upstream
Or identify and correct system/application bug
Have ISP trace packet flow back to source
May be difficult and time consuming
Necessary if planning legal action
Implement contingency plan
Switch to alternate backup servers
Commission new servers at a new site with new addresses
Update incident response plan