Physical Security: A Crucial (But Often Neglected) Part of Cybersecurity

Август 8, 2022

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Physical Security: A Crucial (But Often Neglected) Part of Cybersecurity

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2. I. Introduction
3. Welcome and Thanks For Participating Today! Welcome to the Eugene IT Pro Forum at the Eugene
4. Helping the Good Folks, Not the Bad Ones Any time you talk about security issues, you
5. Physical Security and IT: It's Not A Cool Topic, I Know, I Know Physical security of
6. II. Losing Hardware (Maybe Containing PII)
7. A Recent Example from the UK Press
8. Some Things to Note About That Incident This incident happened just last month. It potentially impacts
9. Physical Access Typically Equals Total System Control Sometimes people think that they've "protected" a device (such
10. Encryption Isn't a "Magic Bullet," Either, Unfortunately When correctly used, carefully-implemented whole disk encryption is something
11. Desktops Can Be As Vulnerable As Laptops Somewhere along the line, many folks began to focus
12. Some HW Protective Solutions Can Be Expensive If a new low-end PC costs $500 or less
13. This Isn't "Just About Workstations" -- Another Physical Security Incident: Theft of Backups @ ECMC www.ifap.ed.gov/presentations/attachments/50DontBeTomorrowsHeadlinesV1.ppt
14. Some Things to Note About This Incident If you have applied for a student loan for
15. Please Note, I Do NOT Mean to Discourage Backups! Backups are a very important part of
16. "4800 Aussie Sites Evaporate After Hack" [* * *] In a statement published today, Distribute.IT said
17. Sometimes They "Take," Sometimes They "Give"... "Stuxnet Worm Heralds New Era of Global Cyberwar," www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/sep/30/stuxnet-worm-new-era-global-cyberwar The
18. Hardware With PII Isn't The Only PhysSec Issue “Masked thieves storm into Chicago colocation (again!)” November
19. Not All Incidents Are Intentional: Fiber Runs Across Bridges, and Bridges Sometimes Fall Down -- The
20. Fiber Also Runs Through Tunnels; Tunnels Sometimes Accidentally Burn: The Howard St Tunnel Fire, Baltimore, July
21. Tunnels Like The Howard Street One Can Be Key Physical Security Choke Points Source: http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2001-07-21/news/ 0107210195_1_fiber-pratt-st-internet-traffic
22. Bad As Those Incidents Are, Others Are (Arguably) Worse http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7222536.stm , October 4th, 2008
23. Summarizing The Physical Security Risk Model What Might Happen? Damage from a natural disaster, such as
24. Summarizing The Physical Security Risk Model Who Might Do It? Act of God Random individual (in
25. III. Is Physical Security Something That's On The IT Security Radar?
26. Do IT Security People Care About Physical Security? If you’re involved with IT system and network
27. Physical Facilities Security Is Certainly A Big Issue for Federal Agencies (But They're Generally Not Going
28. One Notable Federal Exception: FISMA The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) information security standards includes
29. Physical Security Areas From FISMA: PE-1—PE-19 PE-1 Physical and Environmental Protection Policy and Procedures PE-2 Physical
30. An Example: PE-4 – Access Control for Transmission Media
31. IV. Attacks on Critical Facilities?
32. What the Feds REALLY Worry About When It Comes To Physical Security Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive
33. Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia
34. WE Can’t Worry About “Everything…” In the real world, we all have to “make our numbers,”
35. But Eugene Can Be a Surprising Place Sometimes Eugene isn't the sleepy little quiet college town
36. Operation Backfire
37. Responding to Bomb Threats Terroristic threats, such as bomb threats, can also be very disruptive. There's
38. University of Texas Police Department K-9 Unit
39. University of Wisconsin Police Department K-9 Unit
40. San Diego State Police Department K-9 Unit
41. Sometimes IT's Role Is Supporting Efforts to Mitigate the Impact of Severe Weather, Active Shooters, etc.
42. V. Physical Security of Your Networks
43. Network Outages Due to Physical Network Damage Regardless of how skeptical we may be of other
44. Architecting and Building for High Availability One way you can improve the physical security of your
45. Redundancy and Resiliency Isn’t Free (Duh) Of course, the downside of all this is that redundancy
46. Provisioning Multiple Links For a 100 Unit load Links 1 Link Lost 2 Links Lost 3
47. Diminishing Returns When you’re thinking about how much you want to spend to insure that your
48. But An Example of How Sometimes Having Multiple Redundant Paths Can Pay Off Big Time: Public
49. Indirect Costs In addition to the direct costs associated with buying diverse redundant links, you'll also
50. Hardware Sparing You also want to work to ensure that if an outage does occur due
51. Network Confidentiality Most networks carry some sort of potentially sensitive information, whether that's financial information, health-related
52. Live Open Ethernet Jacks/Ports It is amazing how often organizations will tolerate live open ethernet jacks/ports
54. $8.99 to Defeat “Secure” Fasteners…
55. VI. Physical Security of Your Facilities
56. The Security of Cabinets, Rooms and Buildings When we think about the physical security of networks,
57. A Flooded Data Center… Video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ANU-oSE5_hU Time: 2:01
58. Locks Once we get beyond things like protecting a site from flooding or other natural disasters,
59. Surreptitious Opening of Traditional Pin Tumbler Locks Even though traditional pin tumbler locks, such as the
60. Video: How Lock Bumping Works Video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7xkkS2p7SuQ Time: 2:04
61. If Detection Isn’t A Problem… If discovery of an intrusion isn’t a problem, you should also
62. Hinges
63. Padlocks Padlocks are widely used to secure network equipment. They are typically subject to all the
64. A S&G 951 Padlock (Different key-ways are intended for use by different audiences)
65. Keys Key-related issues are another reason why traditional locks often provide mediocre security. In many environments,
66. Part of A Keys Control Checklist from the USDA See: http://www.usda.gov/da/physicalsecurity/physicalcheck.pdf
67. Alternatives to Locks and Keys Many facilities have moved to “key cards” (swipe cards, prox cards,
68. Some Prox Cards Tools Some resources are mentioned in http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/foundstone/wp-proxbrute.pdf -- Proxmark III: http://www.proxmark3.com -- Proxpick:
69. Proxmark3
70. FWIW, Many Swipe-Style Cards Aren’t Perfect Either
71. Biometrics Biometric systems use your physical characteristics to decide if you should or shouldn’t be granted
72. Example of One Site That Is Using Biometrics Video URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1SCZzgfdTBo
73. Building Security: Piggy Backing/Tailgating/Social Engineering Key cards or biometrics won’t help if random individuals can gain
75. Building Security: Stay Behinds There’s also the potential problem of “stay behind” visitors – if you’re
76. Walls, Ceilings, Floors, Roofs, Utility Tunnels, Etc. Sometimes you’ll see a high security lock “protecting” a
77. Windows (The Glass Type, Not The Microsoft Type!) Windows represent another potentially important physical security vulnerability.
78. Fencing University campuses aren’t like industrial or government facilities, but if you can add a fenced
79. Exclusion Zones, Intrusion Detection & Landscaping Most fences (particular with proper signage) will at least serve
80. Example of a Fencing Failure “A fence approximately six feet high surrounds some of [the Kinshasa
81. Alarms and Guards Access control features such as locks and reinforced doors and walls can’t keep
82. Surveillance Video You can’t be everywhere at once, so take advantage of surveillance cameras to increase
83. Emergency Systems: Fire Detection & Suppression Electrical fires are one of the most destructive events an
84. OSU’s Thanksgiving 2010 Steam Tunnel Fire “Oregon State University resumes classes, though some phone and computer
85. Source: http://tinyurl.com/65mrh3w
86. Emergency Power and Cooling Often uninterruptible power supplies prove to be too small for the load
87. An Example from 9/11 http://www.nanog.org/meetings/nanog23/presentations/donelan.ppt
88. VII. Personnel
89. Protecting Your Personnel (And Their Families) Just as you protect your personally identifiable information, networks, systems,
90. A Few Potential Personnel Protective Measures Limit the information about employees and their work (particularly any
91. Personnel Can Also Be A Potential Risk Personnel vetting and related controls are often viewed as
92. ID Badges ID badges are another routine component of personnel security programs, and become necessary when
93. Credentials and A False Sense of Security While ID badges have the potential to improve security
94. An Example of Credential Abuse From the GAO “Our undercover agents were 100 percent successful in
95. VIII. "Information Leakage"
96. “Information Leakage” (FISMA PE-19) The final area of physical security we might consider is what FISMA
97. Physical Surveillance Of Your Personnel The physical analog to some of those network-based eavesdropping attacks would
98. Simple Example: A Hardware Keylogger
99. More Hardware Logging Gear
100. Eavesdropping Just as your computer may have a hardware “bug” attached to it, so, too, in
101. (Un)Trustworthy Hardware? “Information leakage” and “physical security problems” take on a profound new meaning if you
102. Dumpster Diving and Surplus Equipment Historically, many crackers got their start by digging interesting computer and
104. What About Software Drive Sanitization? If you don't have access to hardware drive destructors, or a
105. Confidential Documents and Removable Media Sensitive documents and removable physical media also need to be shredded,
106. IX. Conclusion
107. All The Rest It isn’t possible to go over everything that we really should talk about
109. Скачать презентацию

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I. Introduction

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Welcome and Thanks For Participating Today!
Welcome to the Eugene IT Pro

Forum at the Eugene City Brewery! What a great location for this meeting!
I'd particularly like to thank Quentin Hartman for the invitation to speak with you tonight.
Mindful of the fact that this is an "after work" talk, and you all are enjoying fine beverages, I'll do my best to keep this talk moving right along.
In particular, Quentin has already stressed that I've got an hour (at the most). I promise I won't run over!
I also wanted to explain, for those of you who may not be familiar with my slide style, that I normally do fairly detailed slides to help those who may look at this talk after the fact, the hearing impaired, and Google. A second promise to you: I won't just read my slides to you!

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Helping the Good Folks, Not the Bad Ones
Any time you talk

about security issues, you need to walk a careful line: you want to help the good folks identify and fix security issues they may be facing, but you don't want to give the bad guys (or bad gals) inspiration or practical tips.
(I think) this talk threads that needle.
You'll notice that I will usually carefully cite a public source for pretty much anything I share with you tonight, so none of this should be information that's new or particularly helpful to the bad folks.
At the same time, we may talk about some issues you haven't thought about much...

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Physical Security and IT: It's Not A Cool Topic, I Know,

I Know

Physical security of systems and networks is probably the last topic you wanted to hear about tonight.
We could have talked about a lot of things that are more "trendy," I suppose, such as the security of mobile devices,* but I do think that the physical security of systems and networks is a pretty important (if largely underappreciated) area.
Oh heck, maybe we are talking about things like the security of mobile devices, at least if "mobile devices" includes laptops... ---- * "Securing Mobile Devices: A Security Professionals 2011 Pre-Conference Seminar," http://pages.uoregon.edu/joe/securing-mobile-devices/

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II. Losing Hardware (Maybe Containing PII)

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A Recent Example from the UK Press

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Some Things to Note About That Incident
This incident happened just last

month.
It potentially impacts millions of people.
The incident didn't involve a sophisticated attack – it took place because a laptop was able to be stolen from a storeroom.
Even though laptop whole disk encryption (WDE) is a best common practice (BCP) these days, the laptop's hard drive apparently wasn't protected by WDE.
I'd also would wager those laptops didn't have stolen laptop locator software (such as "Lojack") installed on them.
The article goes on to say, "All the laptops were password protected, and our policy is to manually delete the data from laptops after the records have been processed."
Hmm. "All the laptops were password protected." Does a password *really* protect the contents of missing laptops?

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Physical Access Typically Equals Total System Control
Sometimes people think that they've

"protected" a device (such as a laptop) because it has been made to require a boot-time (or "BIOS") password before it will boot its operating system.
That's a mistaken impression.
Remember, if an attacker has physical access to your system, he or she can remove the hard drives and mount it on another system that they control.
At that point they can mount and access any unencrypted files on your hard drives at will, even if the original system was using a hardware system startup password.
But what if that laptop HAD also been using whole disk encryption?

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Encryption Isn't a "Magic Bullet," Either, Unfortunately
When correctly used, carefully-implemented whole

disk encryption is something that only a national-level intelligence agency could successfully attack using technical crypto-analytical means.
However, any halfway competent private investigator with physical access could install a commercially available hardware key logger (or even just use a hidden camera to watch the user's screen and keyboard!), and once s/he has the user's passphrase, s/he could easily defeat that whole disk encryption scheme.
And let's not even mention so-called "rubber hose cryptography!"
So I would argue that physical security can genuinely matter! Far better to ensure that bad people can never get near a laptop in the first place, rather than having to worry about WDE failure modes, right?

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Desktops Can Be As Vulnerable As Laptops
Somewhere along the line, many

folks began to focus all their workstation security efforts on laptops, effectively ignoring desktop workstations. That's a bad idea, because desktops can be just as vulnerable, including being at risk of potentially having hard drives (sometimes with unencrypted PII!) stolen.
If you've ever run an unattended computer lab, you may be familiar with lab users defeating hardware security devices to steal system components. It can be quite tricky to fully secure all parts of modern systems (including small parts such as memory, and peripherals such as keyboards, mice, power bricks, and even cables – you'd be amazed at what people will steal, or try to steal).
You may be able to indelibly engrave ownership information on some property (or you can try STOP plates), but often only 100% positive user identification backed up by a video record of activity in the facility will stop theft of desktop systems or components.

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Some HW Protective Solutions Can Be Expensive
If a new low-end PC

costs $500 or less these days, it can be frustrating if you need to spend half that much (or more!) on top of that amount to buy a hardware security enclosure to lock it down.
Some hardware enclosures may make access for routine maintenance more difficult.
It may help to remember that you're not really protecting the $500 PC with the enclosure you buy, but rather the hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars worth of PII that's contained in the system (even though you're also being good about backing that information up, and encrypting it, right?)
There's also perception issues involved: have you taken REASONABLE common steps to protect your assets? (Would cheaper security cables be equally acceptable for this purpose?)

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This Isn't "Just About Workstations" -- Another Physical Security Incident: Theft

of Backups @ ECMC

www.ifap.ed.gov/presentations/attachments/50DontBeTomorrowsHeadlinesV1.ppt

(Reportedly, the stolen safes were small consumer-sized units, and were wheeled out on rolling office chairs…)

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Some Things to Note About This Incident
If you have applied for

a student loan for yourself (or for a family member), you know how many details you have to provide – it would truly be unfortunate for that sort of detailed financial PII to end up getting compromised.
This was yet another incident potentially impacting millions of us
The incident didn't involve a sophisticated attack – it took place because backups were able to be physically stolen.
Do you think the thieves might have hoped those safes had cash? Should they have been clearly labeled, "Contains No Money"?
And could those safes have been better secured? For example, given how light and easy to move they seem to have been, could they have been blind-bolted down to a concrete floor perhaps?
I also wonder: were the backups in the safes encrypted? (I bet not – they were "securely" ensconced in safes, after all, right?)

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Please Note, I Do NOT Mean to Discourage Backups!
Backups are a

very important part of physical information security. I do NOT mean to discourage anyone from routinely doing them!
However, when doing backups: -- make sure you encrypt them (while ensuring that the right people know password to decrypt those backups if they need to do so!) -- make sure the backups aren't just thrown on a shelf somewhere, store them securely offsite! -- don't reuse backup media – use fresh media each time, or at least rotate your backup media -- confirm that you're actually able to restore stuff from your backups! If there's a problem with them, you want to know now, not when you're desperately in need of what's on that unusable media.

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"4800 Aussie Sites Evaporate After Hack"
[* * *] In a statement published

today, Distribute.IT said it had been working around the clock in an attempt to recover data from its affected servers. "At this time, We regret to inform that the data, sites and emails that were hosted on Drought, Hurricane, Blizzard and Cyclone can be considered by all the experts to be unrecoverable," it said. "While every effort will be made to continue to gain access to the lost information from those hosting servers, it seems unlikely that any usable data will can be salvaged from these platforms.
"In assessing the situation, our greatest fears have been confirmed that not only was the production data erased during the attack, but also key backups, snapshots and other information that would allow us to reconstruct these servers from the remaining data."
The company said 4800 websites were affected and since it did not have the capacity to transfer the domain names to other parts of its platform, Distribute.IT had no choice "but to assist you in any way possible to transfer your hosting and email needs to other hosting providers".
The significant data loss has raised questions from backup experts as to why Distribute.IT did not appear to have offsite backups of customer data. [* * *]
www.smh.com.au/technology/security/4800-aussie-sites-evaporate-after-hack-20110621-1gd1h.html

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Sometimes They "Take," Sometimes They "Give"...
"Stuxnet Worm Heralds New Era of

Global Cyberwar," www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/sep/30/stuxnet-worm-new-era-global-cyberwar The memory sticks were scattered in a washroom at a US military base in the Middle East that was providing support for the Iraq war. [...] The result was the delivery of a self-propagating malicious worm into the computer system of the US military's central command – Centcom – which would take 14 months to eradicate.
‘Mysterious "Spy" Computer In [Iceland’s] Parliament Works Differently Than Being Reported, Tech Expert Says,’ January 20th, 2011, http://tinyurl.com/6ja62rq An unmarked computer found in a spare room of [Iceland’s] parliament, and connected directly to parliament’s internet system, was most certainly planted there […] Any identifying serial numbers had been erased from the machine, nor were any fingerprints found, and its origins have not yet been traced. The police believed that the matter was the work of professionals.

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Hardware With PII Isn't The Only PhysSec Issue
“Masked thieves storm into

Chicago colocation (again!)” November 2nd, 2007, http://tinyurl.com/2pn32z The recent armed robbery of a Chicago-based co-location facility has customers hopping mad after learning it was at least the fourth forced intrusion in two years. […] In the most recent incident, "at least two masked intruders entered the suite after cutting into the reinforced walls with a power saw," according to a letter C I Host officials sent customers. "During the robbery, C I Host's night manager was repeatedly tazered and struck with a blunt instrument. After violently attacking the manager, the intruders stole equipment belonging to C I Host and its customers." At least 20 data servers were stolen […]
“California Telecom Knocked-Out By Low-Tech Saboteur” April 11th, 2009, http://tinyurl.com/datfv3 Shortly before 1:30 a.m. on Thursday morning, four fiber-optic cables were severed in an underground vault along Monterey Highway in San Jose, Cal. About two hours later, another four were cut in San Carlos, followed by two more in San Jose shortly thereafter.

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Not All Incidents Are Intentional: Fiber Runs Across Bridges, and Bridges

Sometimes Fall Down -- The I-35 Bridge, St Paul MN, August 1st, 2007

26 Sec. Video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EKLjB_nq76c

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Fiber Also Runs Through Tunnels; Tunnels Sometimes Accidentally Burn: The Howard

St Tunnel Fire, Baltimore, July 18th, 2001

See also section 3.4.1 of http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/jpodocs/repts_te/13754.html

Image: www.baltimoresun.com/features/bal-trainfiregallery,0,1855948.photogallery

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Tunnels Like The Howard Street One Can Be Key Physical Security

Choke Points

Source: http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2001-07-21/news/ 0107210195_1_fiber-pratt-st-internet-traffic

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Bad As Those Incidents Are, Others Are (Arguably) Worse
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7222536.stm , October

4th, 2008

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Summarizing The Physical Security Risk Model
What Might Happen?
Damage from a natural

disaster, such as an earthquake or flood
Accidental damage (e.g., backhoe fade on poorly marked fiber)
Intentional vandalism (or complete destruction) of facilities
Theft of hardware (laptops, servers, routers, core switches, etc.)
Loss of system or network integrity (potentially with unauthorized disclosure of PII or other sensitive data)

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Summarizing The Physical Security Risk Model
Who Might Do It?
Act of God
Random

individual (in the accidental case)
Disgruntled insider (or former employee)
Financially-motivated criminals
(Maybe) ideologically-motivated actors (“insurgents”)
(Or even) state-sponsored professionals (“spies”)

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III. Is Physical Security Something That's On The IT Security Radar?

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Do IT Security People Care About Physical Security?
If you’re involved with

IT system and network security, it’s comparatively common to see security people continually worried about threats over the wire, paying relatively little attention to the physical security of systems and networks. Why?
One factor may be that we all know the “whole world” can attack our systems and networks online via the Internet, while (in general) attackers need to be locally present to exploit physical security vulnerabilities.
As a result, we continually see attacks from online sources, but (if we’re lucky), we may never have personally experienced a physical attack on IT systems and network resources.
We may also (incorrectly) view physical security as something that’s “someone else’s problem” – for example, isn’t the physical security of our systems and networks something that our local security guards will take care of? (Maybe, maybe not)

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Physical Facilities Security Is Certainly A Big Issue for Federal Agencies (But

They're Generally Not Going to Share Their Thinking With Us!)

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One Notable Federal Exception: FISMA
The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)

information security standards includes a variety of physical security-related controls (see PE1-PE19, Appendix F, NIST Special Publication 800-53 Rev 3, http://tinyurl.com/6awxb8d ).
I'm not normally a huge FISMA cheerleader, to say the least, but in this case, the FISMA authors should be commended for at least being willing to share their thinking with us.
FISMA specifically calls out 19 areas related to physical security, areas that you might want to keep in mind as we talk tonight...

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Physical Security Areas From FISMA: PE-1—PE-19
PE-1 Physical and Environmental Protection Policy

and Procedures
PE-2 Physical Access Authorizations
PE-3 Physical Access Control
PE-4 Access Control For Transmission Medium
PE-5 Access Control for Output Devices
PE-6 Monitoring Physical Access
PE-7 Visitor Control
PE-8 Access Records
PE-9 Power Equipment and Power Cabling
PE-10 Emergency Shutoff
PE-11 Emergency Power
PE-12 Emergency Lighting
PE-13 Fire Protection
PE-14 Temperature and Humidity Controls
PE-15 Water Damage Protection
PE-16 Delivery and Removal
PE-17 Alternate Work Site
PE-18 Location of Information System Components
PE-19 Information Leakage

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An Example: PE-4 – Access Control for Transmission Media

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IV. Attacks on Critical Facilities?

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What the Feds REALLY Worry About When It Comes To Physical Security
Vehicle

Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) are generally considered to be a top government/military threat, particularly after: -- the attack on the Marine Barracks in Beirut in 1983, -- the Oklahoma City Murrah Building bombing in 1995, and -- the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1996.
If you want to better understand the VBIED issue at a visceral level, let me recommend two movies you might want to watch: -- "The Kingdom" (2007) -- "The Hurt Locker" (2008)

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Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia

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WE Can’t Worry About “Everything…”
In the real world, we all have

to “make our numbers,” and that usually means prioritizing and spending money on security measures only when it is necessary and cost effective for us to do so.
The risks that you or I perceive may be different than the risks that someone else sees under different circumstances.
Here in Eugene, for example, we might hope that we could largely discount VBIEDs as a threat, choosing to accept that (hopefully low) risk rather than making investments in anti-VBIED technologies such as physical barriers and standoff zones, blast resistant glazing, vehicle inspection stations, specially trained and equipped bomb technicians, etc.

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But Eugene Can Be a Surprising Place
Sometimes Eugene isn't the sleepy

little quiet college town we might all hope it would be.
For example, I think most of us can remember some of the arson incidents that have disrupted the community over the past decade, including what some have referred to as the "largest domestic terrorism case in the United States."
That case, "Operation Backfire," played out (in part) right here in Eugene.

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Operation Backfire

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Responding to Bomb Threats
Terroristic threats, such as bomb threats, can also

be very disruptive. There's little choice but to take them seriously until they can be investigated and ruled out.
While many police agencies have interagency agreements allowing them to share specialized capabilities such as bomb detection dogs, a growing number of campus police departments have decided to deploy their own local K-9 units to help clear buildings in response to the bomb threats they receive.
These dogs and their handlers should be your good friends, and routinely invited to sweep your IT facilities so the animals and their handlers become familiar with them, and the potential intricacies of their layouts, should you ever experience a real threat where time is of the essence.
UO's DPS has recently proposed creation of a campus K-9 explosives detection unit (see http://tinyurl.com/65ojkb9 )

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University of Texas Police Department K-9 Unit

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University of Wisconsin Police Department K-9 Unit

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San Diego State Police Department K-9 Unit

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Sometimes IT's Role Is Supporting Efforts to Mitigate the Impact of

Severe Weather, Active Shooters, etc.

While IT (with its high value hardware and ongoing mission critical responsibilities) is sometimes the target of attacks, other times IT's role is to support efforts to mitigate the impact of attacks.
Since the shooting incident at Virginia Tech and passage of the Clery Act, many universities have created emergency notification programs, including things like: -- "reverse 911" services to provide emergency information to user cell phones or email addresses, and -- campus sirens, public address systems, electronic signage, etc.
For more information on what some campuses are doing, see "Real Time Notification During a Disaster or Other Emergency," http://pages.uoregon.edu/joe/notification/
You may also want to check out UO's emergency management site at: http://em.uoregon.edu/

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V. Physical Security of Your Networks

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Network Outages Due to Physical Network Damage
Regardless of how skeptical we

may be of other physical security threats (such as IEDs or arson risks), one very real threat that I think we’re all willing to acknowledge is that heavy construction equipment has an uncanny ability to home in-on and accidentally cut critical buried network infrastructure.
For the purposes of this talk, I'm going to assume that most of you DO NOT own or operate a regional or national fiber of your own. When you need wide area network connectivity, you buy what you need from a commercial network service provider.
As a result, I'm going to omit my spiel on what you might do to directly protect your own regional or national fiber infrastructure.
Let's talk a little about what you can accomplish via "appropriate use of purchase orders," instead.

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Architecting and Building for High Availability
One way you can improve the

physical security of your wide area network is by adding additional network connectivity, thereby obtaining redundancy, excess capacity, and a degree of resiliency.
Your network should be architected and constructed so that there are no choke points or “single points of failure” -- loss of any single link or piece of gear should NOT result in an outage! Think, “We must always have redundant paths over diverse facilities!”
One difficulty is that you may have a hard time determining the path that a given circuit or provider follows. You run the risk of purchasing "redundant" "diverse" connectivity from multiple providers that's all provisioned over the same infrastructure, thereby introducing unexpected single points of failure (ugh).
You may need to explain your concerns and be pushy. If you're a nice guy or nice gal, your primary and backup connectivity may end up running over the same glass, and that's not good. :-(

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Redundancy and Resiliency Isn’t Free (Duh)
Of course, the downside of all

this is that redundancy and resiliency comes at a cost (as the saying goes, “you can get whatever level of availability you can afford”).
The first path between two paths normally goes via the cheapest and most direct route. A diverse path (virtually by definition) will need to go via some longer/less desirable/more expensive-to-provision path.
You also need to accept that you’ll be buying capacity that you normally won’t be using. (If you do rely on use of your “backup” link to have enough capacity to accommodate your normal production traffic requirement, what will you do if your primary link goes down? Your links should be able carry all the traffic at your site, so long as at least one link is still available. Alternatively you need a plan to selectively shed or de-prioritize load until you’ve eliminated performance-killing congestion issues.

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Provisioning Multiple Links For a 100 Unit load
Links 1 Link Lost 2

Links Lost 3 Links Lost
1 100 unit 0 units n/a n/a 2 100 units 100 units 0 units n/a 3 100 units 200 units 100 units 0 units 4 100 units 300 units 200 units 100 units 2 50 units 50 units 0 units n/a 3 50 units 100 units 50 units 0 units 4 50 units 150 units 100 units 50 units
What you should buy depends on your availability requirements, your load characteristics, and your budget. Also note that you may be hard pressed to perfectly balance your load across multiple links. Under normal (and/or emergency!) circumstances, one link might run quite hot, while another might be nearly idle.

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Diminishing Returns
When you’re thinking about how much you want to spend

to insure that your network is “always available,” you need to remain cognizant of the law of diminishing returns.
The first backup/failover circuit you add will likely provide a substantial improvement in system availability, since if your main production circuit fails, that backup circuit will "save your bacon." It likely represents an excellent bit of "insurance" for you to buy.
If you’re really risk averse or your service must absolutely remain available, a second backup/failover circuit might allow you to avoid an outage in the rare circumstances where both your primary and your secondary circuits simultaneously experience an outage – but, that *should* be a vanishingly rare event.
But what of a third or fourth or n’th backup/failover circuit? You might only need that extra circuit one time in ten million, and the cost of eliminating an event that rare may be prohibitive.

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But An Example of How Sometimes Having Multiple Redundant Paths Can

Pay Off Big Time: Public Safety Communications On August 1st, 2007 in St Paul

http://www.srb.state.mn.us/pdf/I-35W%20Final%20Report.pdf [Remember, too, the triple cable outage mentioned on slide 16]

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Indirect Costs
In addition to the direct costs associated with buying diverse

redundant links, you'll also potentially incur significant indirect costs.
For example, multihoming across multiple commodity transit providers implies that you'll need a network engineer who understands BGP, border routers with the horsepower and capacity to carry a full routing table, your own ASN and your own provider independent address space, etc.
Some organizations may decide that they just can't afford those sort of expenses (especially if a salesperson offers a great alternative offer, albeit with all your eggs in just their one basket).

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Hardware Sparing
You also want to work to ensure that if an

outage does occur due to a hardware failure, you can recover from it in a timely fashion.
For example, are you continually monitoring your network and maintaining adequate local spares?
Often, particularly in smaller secondary markets, like Eugene, more expensive spares are not stocked locally, they’re shipped in from regional depots in Portland or Seattle or San Francisco or Denver on an as-needed expedited basis.
However, when multiple customers simultaneously suffer outages and all need replacement parts at the same time, or when same day courier service is disrupted due to a disaster, a lack of local spares could get ugly.
Beware of one disaster causing other "disasters!"

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Network Confidentiality
Most networks carry some sort of potentially sensitive information, whether

that's financial information, health-related information, FERPA-protected information, or whatever.
And if you're like most folks, you know that information sent over an unencrypted wireless like can easily be intercepted by a bad guy or gal, right? (WiFi is a broadcast medium after all)
But do you give any thought to the possibility that your hardwire 10/100/1000-base-T ethernet connection might also be getting monitored ("sniffed")?
Physical access to your network really simplifies the process of sniffing your/your users' traffic. Control access to wiring closets and cable runs!
And just because a network is switched, that doesn't mean it can't be forced into flooding traffic to all ports (c.f., dsniff, Cain&Abel)

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Live Open Ethernet Jacks/Ports
It is amazing how often organizations will tolerate

live open ethernet jacks/ports to which random people can plug in systems. Sometimes this even includes unlocked wiring closets, or publicly touchable routers, switches, or other network equipment.
Most universities do not allow “free love” open wireless networks, so why would you allow anyone with an ethernet cable to have open access to your wired network? Some options to consider: -- only heat up jacks on request, or at least disable jacks located in hallways and empty offices by default -- require authentication for most physical ethernet connections the same way you do for wireless connections -- consider locking unused jacks and installed patch cables (e.g., see www.rjlockdown.com, but remember that Torx screwdriver bits are publicly available and recognize that jack plates can still be removed or patch cables cut and reterminated for access)

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$8.99 to Defeat “Secure” Fasteners…

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VI. Physical Security of Your Facilities

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The Security of Cabinets, Rooms and Buildings
When we think about the

physical security of networks, there’s a temptation to think just about the network, e.g., the fiber and the ethernet themselves.
In reality, every network also has numerous other physical facilities (cabinets, rooms, buildings, etc.) housing things such as key network equipment (optronics, routers, switches, etc.), as well as servers, critical staff, documentation, media, etc.
Those facilities also need to be physically secure.
Physical security can mean, among other things, that the facilities aren’t likely to be damaged by a deluge or other natural disaster.

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A Flooded Data Center…
Video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ANU-oSE5_hU Time: 2:01

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Locks
Once we get beyond things like protecting a site from flooding

or other natural disasters, physical security often focuses on access control via locks.
Naturally, we all know that the locks on data equipment cabinets typically aren’t very strong, and more often than not the keys for those cabinet are just left on top of the cabinet so they don’t get “lost,” but because locks are used so many places related to computing and networking, let’s talk a little about locks.

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Surreptitious Opening of Traditional Pin Tumbler Locks
Even though traditional pin tumbler

locks, such as the locks used on most doors, have well known limitations, they still form at least part of the physical security at most sites, including many computer or networking sites.
If you think that traditional pin tumbler locks provide anything even *remotely* approaching reasonable security, I’d urge you to think again.
In particular, you should learn about “bump keys.”

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Video: How Lock Bumping Works
Video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7xkkS2p7SuQ
Time: 2:04

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If Detection Isn’t A Problem…
If discovery of an intrusion isn’t a

problem, you should also know that many traditional locks can be drilled, pried, ground, frozen or otherwise defeated by brute force in just a matter of minutes.
Thus, for any lock that “matters,” you should probably consult with a professional locksmith and have a high security lock (such as those made by Medeco) installed, reinforcing the door and the door jamb (including the strike plate area) at the same time.
Don’t forget to secure any exposed outward-swinging external door hinges, too!

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Hinges

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Padlocks
Padlocks are widely used to secure network equipment. They are typically

subject to all the issues associated with traditional pin tumbler locks, but they have additional issues of their own: -- warded padlocks (see image at right) are trivial to open; they should NEVER be used -- some padlocks are stamped with their “key code;” if you don’t remember to remove that code, it may be possible to use those numbers to create (or find) a key for that lock -- the unshielded shackle of a padlock can often be cut with bolt cutters or a gas torch -- even if you have a padlock that’s secure, it may be used in conjunction with a weak and easily defeated hasp or chain
The ultimate? The Navy has approved the S&G 951 High Security Padlock, but at >$1,000/lock, it might be, um, a little pricey

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A S&G 951 Padlock
(Different key-ways are intended for use by different

audiences)

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Keys
Key-related issues are another reason why traditional locks often provide mediocre

security.
In many environments, it is routine for the same key to get issued to multiple people. When one of those keys get lost (or is not recovered when someone quits or is terminated), the locks that are opened by that key tend not to get rekeyed (typically, the cost of doing this would be prohibitive, and there are only a finite number of usable key combinations given physical constraints).
Many sites also use master keys, allowing supervisors or custodial staff to have access to all offices on a given floor or in a particular building. If control over a master key is even temporarily lost (or an intruder can gain access to lock cylinders from multiple doors which all use the same master key), the intruder may be able to make a duplicate master and have the run of your facility.
You really want to have a conversation with your lock & key person

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Part of A Keys Control Checklist from the USDA
See: http://www.usda.gov/da/physicalsecurity/physicalcheck.pdf

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Alternatives to Locks and Keys
Many facilities have moved to “key cards”

(swipe cards, prox cards, etc.) as an alternative to traditional locks & keys
Key cards offer distinct advantages over traditional locks and keys: -- key cards can be integrated into user site IDs/badges -- key card use can be tracked, while use of a key leaves no audit trail or record -- key cards can be programmed to work only during particular days or particular periods of time, while keys work all the time -- many key card systems can be configured to require “two factors” (e.g., you must use your key card AND enter a PIN code) -- upon termination, a key card can be instantly canceled with no need to manually rekey the system, etc.
Sometimes, though, key cards may offer only an illusion of security. For example, some may be easily brute forced using widely available tools.

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Some Prox Cards Tools
Some resources are mentioned in http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/foundstone/wp-proxbrute.pdf -- Proxmark III:

http://www.proxmark3.com -- Proxpick: http://www.proxpick.com/ -- ProxClone: http://proxclone.com/reader_cloner.html
Also worth a read: “The RFID Hacking Underground,” Wired, May 2006 http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.05/rfid.htm and http://rfidiot.org/

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Proxmark3

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FWIW, Many Swipe-Style Cards Aren’t Perfect Either

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Biometrics
Biometric systems use your physical characteristics to decide if you should

or shouldn’t be granted access to a facility or resource.
Examples include: -- fingerprint or hand geometry readers -- iris and retina scanners -- voice identification -- facial recognition -- signature recognition
Nice discussion of biometric issues in GAO-O3-1137T, “Challenges in Using Biometrics,” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ d031137t.pdf
I'm not a huge fan of biometric solutions, but that's just me.

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Example of One Site That Is Using Biometrics
Video URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1SCZzgfdTBo

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Building Security: Piggy Backing/Tailgating/Social Engineering
Key cards or biometrics won’t help if

random individuals can gain access to a secure facility by piggy backing/tailgating behind an authorized user, or by manipulating basic social courtesies.
A nice example of manipulating basic social courtesies, mentioned to me by a colleague recently: approach the door to a controlled area carrying what’s obviously a heavy box. It takes a pretty "heartless" person to not help by holding the door. Social engineering is just as big a problem for IT physical security, as it is for phishing attacks.
An attendant at the door can also ensure that everyone coming in “cards in” as may be required (but I know that this is something that many higher education sites have trouble enforcing).
Floor to ceiling turnstiles or mantraps (interlocking pairs of doors) can be used to help physically prevent these sort of phenomena.

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Building Security: Stay Behinds
There’s also the potential problem of “stay behind”

visitors – if you’re not continually escorting all visitors from entry to exit, or at least signing all visitors in and out, how do you know that all visitors who’ve *entered* your facility have *left* by the end of the day?
An unescorted and forgotten visitor can be the “camel’s nose” that defeats many of your physical access controls, potentially allowing anyone or everyone to gain access to your facilities.
For example, a stay behind visitor can open an unalarmed external door from the inside, thereby allowing entry of additional people.
Finding stay-behinds is easier if a building has motion sensor alarms deployed, or if the organization routinely uses security dogs to sweep sensitive buildings at closing time. Routinely lock all places where an unauthorized person might hide, out of sight, until the building empties (such as supply closets, unused offices, etc.)

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Walls, Ceilings, Floors, Roofs, Utility Tunnels, Etc.
Sometimes you’ll see a high

security lock “protecting” a room with a hollow core door, sheetrock walls, a suspended ceiling, and maybe even a raised floor.
In that sort of environment, an intruder can ignore the high security lock and just punch through the door or sheet rock walls, or climb in above the suspended ceiling or below the raised floor. (Embedded heavy gauge wire mesh can at least make that sort of through-the-wall or through-the-ceiling or floor entry a little more difficult)
Similarly, have you secured your roof? Or could someone use an extension ladder to get to your roof, and then go through an unsecured roof hatch or skylight?
What about any utility tunnels? Manholes are often one of the easiest-to-breach access points. Although locking manhole covers are available (e.g., see www.securemanholes.com), most manhole covers are simple cast iron units that provide no impediment to an intruder with a manhole cover lifter (or just a couple of bolts and some wire).

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Windows (The Glass Type, Not The Microsoft Type!)
Windows represent another potentially

important physical security vulnerability.
We all love fresh air and nice views, but some windows are large enough to allow a skinny thief equipped with a rock to break in.
Other times, windows might be left ajar and unattended, so that an intruder doesn't even need to break anything to gain access – they may just be able to reach in, or crawl in.
Important: your ability to secure windows with security grills or bars may be limited by building code requirements and life safety concerns in case of fires or other emergency. Be sure that any mechanisms you deploy to secure window issues DO NOT create life safety hazards.
While you're working on improving your window security, you may also want to consider deploying reflective film. Reflective window film may reduce the ability of casual pedestrian traffic to "window shop" for valuables, and may also help reduce unauthorized viewing of what's on employee LCD panels (see also 3M's line of display privacy filters).

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Fencing
University campuses aren’t like industrial or government facilities, but if you

can add a fenced perimeter around critical facilities, that fence will immediately adds significantly to your site’s physical security.
Government and military folks (who worry about things like VBIEDs, as discussed earlier) like a wire cable-reinforced perimeter fence that’s ideally at least fifty feet away from the facility that’s to be protected, built from 9 gauge (or heavier) chain link, seven feet or more tall, with an outward facing razor wire top guard plus a bottom rail, well anchored and backed up by things like interlocking precast concrete obstacles or large concrete planters.
Dual fence designs are also popular.
That may all be a bit much for university environments, but if you can deploy it, it’s another layer of physical security.

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Exclusion Zones, Intrusion Detection & Landscaping
Most fences (particular with proper signage)

will at least serve to create a public exclusion zone in which an intruder can be readily identified and intercepted for questioning.
Extensive lighting plus physical intrusion detection systems will help managing that exclusion zone.
Any landscaping should not provide hiding spots for intruders.
Any trees near or overhanging a security fence should also be trimmed or removed to prevent the tree from being used as a pathway over the fence.

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Example of a Fencing Failure
“A fence approximately six feet high surrounds

some of [the Kinshasa Nuclear Research Center] CREN-K. The fence is constructed of cement in some places and chain-link in others. The fence is not lit at night, has no razor-wire across the top, and is not monitored by video surveillance. There is also no cleared buffer zone between it and the surrounding vegetation. There are numerous holes in the fence, and large gaps where the fence was missing altogether. University of Kinshasa students frequently walk through the fence to cut across CREN-K, and subsistence farmers grow manioc on the facility next to the nuclear waste storage building. […] No fence separates the nuclear waste storage building and the University of Kinshasa’s women’s dormitory. The two buildings sit approximately 300 meters apart, and one can walk freely from one to the other across the manioc field.” http://tinyurl.com/68sgdds

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Alarms and Guards
Access control features such as locks and reinforced doors

and walls can’t keep a determined intruder out “forever” – virtually any facility can eventually be breached if the intruder has enough time and no interruptions.
What access control features do give you is a window of time for guards to respond and deal with any intrusion attempt.
The sooner your guards know that someone is attempting to break in, the more time they’ll have to mobilize and deal with the attempted intrusion. Alarms buy you response time.
Again, just as was the case with locks, you should consider engaging an alarm professional to help you plan and deploy a suitable comprehensive alarm system (including things like area motion detectors, and perimeter integrity alarms with window-ajar and door-ajar sensors). You should also review response requirements with security guards and local law enforcement.

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Surveillance Video
You can’t be everywhere at once, so take advantage of

surveillance cameras to increase your security leverage. Cameras have come way down in price, while quality has gone up (as has ease of installation). It should now be possible for you to affordably add surveillance video throughout all critical facilities.
Surveillance video may deter issues from arising in the first place: if people know they’re potentially being monitored, that alone may deter them from engaging in illegal activities.
If illegal activities do occur, surveillance video can provide crucial evidence documenting what happened during the incident: (a) When did the incident occur? (b) How did the incident occur? (c) Who did it? (d) What did they take/what did they do?
Consider using a redundant out-of-building digital video recorder to ensure that an in-building video recorder doesn’t get stolen or compromised during a security incident.

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Emergency Systems: Fire Detection & Suppression
Electrical fires are one of the

most destructive events an IT organization can run into, and fire suppression has become trickier since new inert gas (“Halon 1301”) installations have been banned due to ozone depletion concerns.
Automatic water sprinkler systems (“dry pipe” systems) are the most common alternatives, but water sprinkler systems may not be effective when it comes to suppressing electrical fires occurring in machine rooms under raised floors.
Non-Halon gaseous fire suppression systems (for example, carbon dioxide based systems) may be an alternative, but they represent serious potential risks for operators and other personnel who may need to be rapidly evacuated in the event of a fire. See the discussion of some Halon alternatives: http://tinyurl.com/6agevle
Note: Regrettably, not all fires will take place in your well- fire-suppressed machine room…

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OSU’s Thanksgiving 2010 Steam Tunnel Fire
“Oregon State University resumes classes, though

some phone and computer services still disabled from fire,” November 29th, 2010, http://tinyurl.com/5sxxx3c [emphasis added below] Some Oregon State University buildings still had not regained telephone or computer data service Monday as the result of an electrical fire last week, but all classes resumed normally. The fire erupted early last Wednesday morning in wiring that runs through the university's steam tunnels, 6-to-8-foot-tall tunnels that run under most buildings on campus. Electrical wiring, telephone lines and fiber optic cables thread through the tunnels along with wrapped steam pipes that carry heat to buildings. Investigators are still trying to determine what caused an arc flash – a burst of electrically charged energy that burns at a temperature of 5,000 degrees or higher. The arc singed sections of wiring extending about a 100 feet from the flash point in three directions, said Vincent Martorello, director of facility services. The university gave its nearly 24,000 students early dismissal for the Thanksgiving break on Wednesday morning because the fire had disabled fire alarms in some buildings, Simmons said. The fire did not affect dormitories, but it left five buildings Monday without computer data connections and a dozen buildings without telephone service. Telephone service may not be fully restored until the end of the fall term, university officials said.

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Source: http://tinyurl.com/65mrh3w

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Emergency Power and Cooling
Often uninterruptible power supplies prove to be too

small for the load they’ve been stretched to support. In those cases, even if you immediately began shutting down systems as soon as the power flipped to the UPS, you would not be able to cleanly take down all the covered equipment before running out of juice (and naturally most people don’t want to begin powering things down until they’re SURE that they’re not facing just a brief outage). Check and figure out how long you can run with your actual load.
UPS systems need to be backed up by diesel generators. Have you tested yours recently? How much fuel do you have available for it? In an emergency will you be able to get more? Are you sure?
While most sites worry about emergency power, many forget to think about emergency cooling. If your machine room is going to overheat, even if you have juice, you won’t be able to stay online. Spend some time thinking about your emergency cooling plan.

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An Example from 9/11
http://www.nanog.org/meetings/nanog23/presentations/donelan.ppt

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VII. Personnel

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Protecting Your Personnel (And Their Families)
Just as you protect your personally

identifiable information, networks, systems, and facilities, you should also protect what's ultimately your most valuable asset: your staff (and potentially their family members).
Why worry about staff family members? Consider incidents such as the recent kidnapping of anti-virus expert Eugene Kaspersky's 20-year-old son Ivan* -- that incident caused a lot of concern for many security experts. Fortunately, the incident worked out okay for the Kaspersky family in the end, but it could have been a tragic event.
If you cannot effectively protect all critical staff and their families, you may want to consider "key person" insurance to hedge your business against the effects of their potential loss.
---- * "Russian Investigators Free Kaspersky's Son, No Ransom Paid," http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2384235,00.asp

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A Few Potential Personnel Protective Measures
Limit the information about employees and

their work (particularly any work on sensitive projects) that may be available on company web sites, in newsletters, and in brochures, etc.
Employee directories should receive particularly careful review to make sure that personal information (such as employee home addresses) doesn't get disclosed.
Limit facility access by the public. Tours and other visits, for example, are a great opportunity for bad people to check out your physical security measures, looking for any weaknesses.
Provide secure parking. Employees may be targeted for attack while walking to or from their vehicle, or their vehicle may be burglarized or tampered with if left in an insecure location.
Provide a means by which employees can report suspicious activity, whether that's an outsider reconnoitering your offices, or a co-worker who's making threatening comments.

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Personnel Can Also Be A Potential Risk
Personnel vetting and related controls

are often viewed as a key part of physical security because on-site personnel enjoy unique physical access to site facilities – they're literally "insiders."
Historically many IT sites have rarely done background checks on their employees, however, that practice has been evolving over time, particularly for system and networking staff members having effectively unlimited access to infrastructure.
Don’t neglect personnel background checks in your eagerness to fill hard-to-fill positions!
Be sure to discuss any planned background checks with your Legal Counsel and Human Resources Department, since specific notice and consent requirements or other limitations may apply, and vary from state to state.
You may also want to schedule periodic re-reviews to see what, if anything, may have changed.

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ID Badges
ID badges are another routine component of personnel security programs,

and become necessary when an organization grows beyond a size where “everyone knows everyone” and “everyone knows what everyone should (or shouldn’t) be doing.”
Ideally, ID badges would: -- identify the person bearing the badge (“Sam Anderson”), and make it easy for third parties to verify that the right person has that badge (e.g., the picture on the badge matches its user) -- give the person’s status (“employee”, “visitor”, etc.) and role (“senior network engineer”, “custodian”, etc.) -- signal any atypical access (“machine room access allowed” or “must be accompanied at all times”) -- include a magstripe or barcode that allows the credential to be easily verified against an authoritative database -- be difficult to forge, resistant to unauthorized modifications, hard to accidentally damage, and cheap

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Credentials and A False Sense of Security
While ID badges have the

potential to improve security if properly used, sites need to be on guard against letting ID badges lull them into a false sense of security. Just because someone has an ID badge doesn’t mean that they should be immune from being challenged if they’re somewhere they shouldn’t be, or doing something they shouldn’t be doing.
Credentials should also be challenged and verified if the person presenting them isn’t known, or just “feels wrong” (trust your paranoia).
For example, it has been reported that penetration testers have been routinely able to gain unauthorized access to sterile areas of airports and sensitive federal facilities by displaying bogus law enforcement credentials. Such access is particularly troubling when those individuals are allowed access with firearms or other weapons.

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An Example of Credential Abuse From the GAO
“Our undercover agents

were 100 percent successful in penetrating 19 federal sites and 2 commercial airports. We were able to enter 18 of the 21 sites on the first attempt. The remaining 3 required a second visit before we were able to penetrate the sites.
At no time during the undercover visits were our agents’ bogus credentials or badges challenged by anyone. At the 21 sites that our undercover agents successfully penetrated, they could have carried in weapons, listening devices, explosives, chemical/biological agents, devices, and/or other such items/materials.
At each visit, our agents carried bogus badges and identification, declared themselves as armed law enforcement officers, and gained entry by avoiding screening. At least one agent always carried a valise.
Sixteen of the sites we visited contained the offices of cabinet secretaries or agency heads. At 15 of these sites, our undercover agents were able to stand immediately outside the suites of the cabinet secretary or agency head. In the 5 instances in which our agents attempted entry into such suites, they were successful. At 15 of the sites, our agents entered a rest room in the vicinity of these offices and could have left a valise containing weapons, explosives, and/or other such items/materials without being detected. Except for one agency, we made no attempt to determine whether any of the cabinet secretaries or agency heads were present at the time we visited their agencies.
At a federal courthouse, our agents were waved through a magnetometer but not screened. A briefcase that one of the agents carried was not checked. The agents were escorted to a gun box room, which they were permitted to enter alone. They were then instructed to lock their weapons, but no one supervised or observed the actual surrender of the agents’ weapons.
At the two airports we visited, our agents used tickets that had been issued in their undercover names for commercial flights. These agents declared themselves as armed law enforcement officers, displayed their spurious badges and identification, and were issued “law enforcement” boarding passes by the airline representative at the ticket counter. Our agents then presented themselves at the security checkpoints and were waved around the magnetometers. Neither the agents nor their valises were screened.” Source: GAO/T-OSI-00-10, “Security Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports,” May 25th, 2000, http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/11000/11400/11410/os00010t.pdf

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VIII. "Information Leakage"

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“Information Leakage” (FISMA PE-19)
The final area of physical security we might

consider is what FISMA PE-19 calls “information leakage.”
If we weren’t talking about physical security today, when you hear the term “information leakage,” the first thoughts that would probably come to mind would probably include: -- sniffing unencrypted network traffic -- SQL injection attacks (potentially extracting PII or other confidential data in unanticipated ways) -- malware (such as “banking trojans”) eavesdropping on user financial data -- BGP route injection attacks (“BGP shunts”) -- DNS poisoning -- etc.

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Physical Surveillance Of Your Personnel
The physical analog to some of those

network-based eavesdropping attacks would be physical surveillance of personnel using what's colloquially known as “bugs.”
For some reason, while most people are all too willing to believe that hackers and malicious software exist and could spy on your online activity, they are often skeptical that there are physical surveillance devices that are an equal or greater threat.
Put another way, some people think that “physical surveillance devices are something that only the tin foil hat crowd tends to worry about. No one’s going to bother ‘bugging’ my computer or my office or my car.”
I’m happy that those folks are feeling so physically secure, but that sense of security may be unwarranted.
Physical surveillance devices DO exist and do get used.

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Simple Example: A Hardware Keylogger

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More Hardware Logging Gear

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Eavesdropping
Just as your computer may have a hardware “bug” attached to

it, so, too, in some circumstances your data center or offices may be end up with a physical bug (surreptitious microphone or camera).
While popular television shows frequently show these devices being easily detected, in reality, at least when professional quality equipment is used and installed by a skilled professional, it can be difficult to detect and neutralize those bugs (the process of locating and defeating bugs is normally referred to as “technical surveillance counter measures” or TSCM).
If you remain skeptical that bugs are an real physical security issue, or that they can be difficult to detect and remove, I recommend you review the presentation: “Phone Talk,” http://www.tscm.com/Phone_Lecture_2009/Phone_Lecture_Reston_VA-2009.htm (167 slides)

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(Un)Trustworthy Hardware?
“Information leakage” and “physical security problems” take on a profound

new meaning if you can potentially end up with counterfeit hardware, or hardware made with counterfeit chips.
I would encourage everyone to become familiar with the threat I’m referring to in this area – a nice briefing is the FBI PowerPoint deck entitled, “FBI Criminal Investigation – Cisco Routers,” as embedded in graphical form in “FBI Fears Chinese Hackers Have Back Door Into US Government and Military,” see http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread350381/pg1
See also the excellent article “Dangerous Fakes,” http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_41/b4103034193886.htm
Buying counterfeit products is one physical security risk, but other physical security risks are associated with disposing of surplus/no longer needed hardware on the other end of the cycle…

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Dumpster Diving and Surplus Equipment
Historically, many crackers got their start by

digging interesting computer and networking gear out of corporate dumpsters (a fine art known as “dumpster diving”).
Today, there’s much more emphasis on recycling, and that’s laudable, but any storage media in surplus equipment needs to get wiped before that gear gets sold or otherwise disposed of, even if the system itself no longer boots/runs.
Beware of amateur efforts at rendering hard drives unusable – staff members can easily hurt themselves while attempting to destroy surplus equipment with sledge hammers or other improvised tools (one particularly dangerous example involved amateur use of thermite!). Surprisingly, information may still be able to be recovered from an apparently “destroyed” drive.
Consider hiring a contractor to crush or shred your drives, or (if your volume is large), perhaps get your own crusher/shredder.

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What About Software Drive Sanitization?
If you don't have access to hardware

drive destructors, or a drive destructor service, assuming the disk is still operable, another alternative is software drive sanitization. While this is less assured than hardware disk destruction, it is at least a little better than nothing.
A couple of starting points:
-- Darik's Boot and Nuke (DBAN): http://www.dban.org/
-- Apple's discussion of erasing disks securely (OS X 10.4 or later): http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?path=DiskUtility/ 10.5/en/duh1011.html

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Confidential Documents and Removable Media
Sensitive documents and removable physical media also

need to be shredded, incinerated, or otherwise securely destroyed.
Note that not all shredders are equally effective (e.g., wide strip shredders are not as good as cross cut micro confetti shredders).
Shredders also must be used properly (simple example of a user error compounding a poor technology choice: by feeding documents into a strip shredder sideways, you might end up with strips that have whole sentences intact!)
You should also be aware that document reconstruction software now exists that automates the jigsaw-puzzle-solving-like process of "unshredding" shredded documents.
Lastly, for those who outsource their document destruction, be sure you properly secure any mobile containers you use to accumulate sensitive documents meant for eventual pickup!

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IX. Conclusion

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All The Rest
It isn’t possible to go over everything that we

really should talk about when it comes to IT physical security in only an hour, so please don’t think that this is a comprehensive treatment –it’s not. This talk is really just designed to “wet your whistle” when it comes to thinking about physical security.
If you’re not routinely talking about physical security at your site, or you don’t have a formal physical security policy, you may want to begin working on this important area.
Hopefully this talk will at least provide some starting points for that conversation.

Physical Security: A Crucial (But Often Neglected) Part of Cybersecurity

Содержание

I. Introduction

Welcome and Thanks For Participating Today!Welcome to the Eugene IT Pro

Helping the Good Folks, Not the Bad OnesAny time you talk

Physical Security and IT: It's Not A Cool Topic, I Know,

II. Losing Hardware (Maybe Containing PII)

A Recent Example from the UK Press

Some Things to Note About That IncidentThis incident happened just last

Physical Access Typically Equals Total System ControlSometimes people think that they've

Encryption Isn't a "Magic Bullet," Either, UnfortunatelyWhen correctly used, carefully-implemented whole

Desktops Can Be As Vulnerable As LaptopsSomewhere along the line, many

Some HW Protective Solutions Can Be ExpensiveIf a new low-end PC

This Isn't "Just About Workstations" -- Another Physical Security Incident: Theft

Some Things to Note About This IncidentIf you have applied for

Please Note, I Do NOT Mean to Discourage Backups!Backups are a

"4800 Aussie Sites Evaporate After Hack" [* * *] In a statement published

Sometimes They "Take," Sometimes They "Give"..."Stuxnet Worm Heralds New Era of

Hardware With PII Isn't The Only PhysSec Issue“Masked thieves storm into

Not All Incidents Are Intentional: Fiber Runs Across Bridges, and Bridges

Fiber Also Runs Through Tunnels; Tunnels Sometimes Accidentally Burn: The Howard

Tunnels Like The Howard Street One Can Be Key Physical Security

Bad As Those Incidents Are, Others Are (Arguably) Worsehttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7222536.stm , October

Summarizing The Physical Security Risk ModelWhat Might Happen?Damage from a natural

Summarizing The Physical Security Risk ModelWho Might Do It?Act of GodRandom

III. Is Physical Security Something That's On The IT Security Radar?

Do IT Security People Care About Physical Security?If you’re involved with

Physical Facilities Security Is Certainly A Big Issue for Federal Agencies (But

One Notable Federal Exception: FISMAThe Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)

Physical Security Areas From FISMA: PE-1—PE-19PE-1 Physical and Environmental Protection Policy

An Example: PE-4 – Access Control for Transmission Media

IV. Attacks on Critical Facilities?

What the Feds REALLY Worry About When It Comes To Physical SecurityVehicle

Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia

WE Can’t Worry About “Everything…”In the real world, we all have

But Eugene Can Be a Surprising PlaceSometimes Eugene isn't the sleepy

Operation Backfire

Responding to Bomb ThreatsTerroristic threats, such as bomb threats, can also

University of Texas Police Department K-9 Unit

University of Wisconsin Police Department K-9 Unit

San Diego State Police Department K-9 Unit

Sometimes IT's Role Is Supporting Efforts to Mitigate the Impact of

V. Physical Security of Your Networks

Network Outages Due to Physical Network DamageRegardless of how skeptical we

Architecting and Building for High AvailabilityOne way you can improve the

Redundancy and Resiliency Isn’t Free (Duh)Of course, the downside of all

Provisioning Multiple Links For a 100 Unit loadLinks 1 Link Lost 2

Diminishing ReturnsWhen you’re thinking about how much you want to spend