Economic Theory 1

Содержание

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Economics 40% of the grade: the “offline” classes (20% in-class test

Economics

40% of the grade: the “offline” classes (20% in-class test +

20% final exam)
60% of the grade: the online-course “Introduction to Economic Theories” on the Coursera platform: https://coursera.org/learn/intro-economic-theories
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Economics Seminar 1-2. Economic Systems: Markets, Directives, etc.

Economics

Seminar 1-2. Economic Systems: Markets, Directives, etc.

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Hockey Stick of Economic Progress…

Hockey Stick of Economic Progress…

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What are Essential Institutions of Market Capitalism as a Type of

What are Essential Institutions of Market Capitalism as a Type of

Economic System?

- Private Property (as opposed to State Property and other types of Property)
- Market Coordination (as opposed to both Gift Exchange and Directives)
- Firm as a Productive Unit (as opposed to both Family-Based Production and “Socialistic” Enterprises)

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Some other Features of the Market Capitalism - Self-Interest – as

Some other Features of the Market Capitalism

- Self-Interest – as the

Basic Motivating Force
- Competition – as the Basic Regulatory Force
- Fixed Capital and Advanced Technologies
- Specialization
- Use of Money
- Motive of Profit
- Consumer Sovereignty
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Some Important Virtues of Market Capitalism - Freedom - Incentives - Efficiency

Some Important Virtues of Market Capitalism

- Freedom
- Incentives
- Efficiency

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Circular flow model (with savings and investments)

Circular flow model (with savings and investments)

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Innovativeness As a Key to the Winning in the Competitive World!

Innovativeness

As a Key to the Winning in the Competitive World!

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Preconditions for Innovativeness – according to Kornai (2012) - Competition -

Preconditions for Innovativeness – according to Kornai (2012)

- Competition
- Decentralized Initiative
-

Possibilities to Make Experiments with Innovations
- Expectations of Huge Material Reward for Innovations
- Access to External Financial Resources
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Hockey Stick… - of Not only Economic Progress but also -

Hockey Stick…

- of Not only Economic Progress but also
- of Rising

Inequality
- of Increasing Pollution/Waste
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Problems of Typical Capitalism - Instability and Crises - Unemployment -

Problems of Typical Capitalism

- Instability and Crises
- Unemployment
- Inflation
- Poverty and

Inequality
- Budget Deficits and Government Debt
- Disequilibrium of Balance of Payments
- etc.
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Attractiveness of the System of the Planned Socialism - “Anarchy of

Attractiveness of the System of the Planned Socialism

- “Anarchy of Production”

/ Crises substituted by “Plan” (by Directives)
- Private Property / Exploitation substituted by “Folk” Property (by State Property)
- More than Full Employment
- Fixed Prices
- Free Higher Education, Health Care etc.
- etc.
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The Rates of Economic Growth in the USSR (%)

The Rates of Economic Growth in the USSR (%)

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Some Comparisons (1985) Housing per capita – 12 m2 (USSR), 55

Some Comparisons (1985)

Housing per capita – 12 m2 (USSR), 55 m2

(USA)
Motor Cars per 1000 people – 55 (USSR), 550 (USA), 429 (Germany)
Telephones per 1000 people – 75 (USSR), 759 (USA), 598 (Germany)
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Some Defects of the Planned Socialism (on the example of the

Some Defects of the Planned Socialism (on the example of the

Soviet Economy)

- Difficulties of Coordination of Interests
- Lack of Relevant Information
- Monopolism
- Soft Budget Constraints and Shortage
- Barriers to Innovativeness
Kornai (1980; 2012), Gregory (2004)

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Special Problems of the Soviet Socialism - The large role of

Special Problems of the Soviet Socialism

- The large role of “production

of the capital goods”
- The large role of the military sector
- Almost fully destroyed private entrepreneurial sector
- Deeply rooted anti-market mentality
- Cruel legal punishment of entrepreneurial activity (examples are the case of Rokotov & Faibishenko and the cases of Aizenshpis)
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Concept of Transitional Economy (or Economy in Transition) Transition from “the

Concept of Transitional Economy (or Economy in Transition)

Transition from “the Plan”

to “the Market”
Transition from State Property to Private Property
Transition to Freedom and Efficiency…
* * *
Transitional economy as the economic system with radically changing institutions
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How to Make Transition? 1) Shock Therapy – liberalization ; privatization

How to Make Transition?

1) Shock Therapy – liberalization ; privatization

; stabilization…
Everything should be made fast and simultaneously (Poland, Czech Republic, Russia [?])
2) Gradualism – slow and gradual reforming (China, Vietnam, Hungary)
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Some Statistics of the Transitional Economies – 1989 & 1997

Some Statistics of the Transitional Economies – 1989 & 1997

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Concept of Transformational Recession Transformational Recession – deep and prolonged decrease

Concept of Transformational Recession

Transformational Recession – deep and prolonged decrease of

real GDP (real output) due to institutional changes caused by “Transition” (Kornai, 1994).
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Elements of Transformational Recession - Transition from “seller market” to “buyer

Elements of Transformational Recession

- Transition from “seller market” to “buyer market”
-

Price/Foreign Trade Liberalization
- Rupture in the Economic Coordination or Institutional Hiatus
- Hardening Budget Constraints
- Underdeveloped Financial Sector
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Transformational Recession for Russia, Ukraine, etc.: - Falling GDP in the

Transformational Recession for Russia, Ukraine, etc.:

- Falling GDP in the 1990

– 1998
- Collapse of Investment in the Fixed Capital
- Technological Degradation
- Rising Poverty and Inequality
- Criminalization
- Suicides
Etc.
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The Role of Institutional Traps in Russia (Polterovich, 1999) Institutional traps

The Role of Institutional Traps in Russia (Polterovich, 1999)

Institutional traps are

inefficient but stable norms of behavior. In particular, such norms can emerge in the conditions of transition.
Institutional traps are supported by mechanisms of coordination, learning, linkage and cultural inertia.
Examples of institutional traps: barter; arrears; corruption; tax evasion; self-fulfilling pessimistic expectations, etc.
How to break out of institutional traps?
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The Age Structure of the Productive Equipment in Russia in the 1990s (%)

The Age Structure of the Productive Equipment in Russia in the

1990s (%)
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The Average Age of the Russian Industrial Productive Equipment (years)

The Average Age of the Russian Industrial Productive Equipment (years)

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Some Specific Institutions of the Post-Soviet Russian Capitalism - Lack of

Some Specific Institutions of the Post-Soviet Russian Capitalism

- Lack of Effective

Protection of Property Rights and Contracts / Lack of Enforcement (one of the examples is “Night of the Long Scoops”)
- Lack of Real Competition due to Administrative Barriers to Entry and other aspects of Bureaucratic “Pressure”
- “Fusion” of Business and Authority
- Lack of Independence of Court System
- Abuse of Police Power (one of the examples is the Case of Dmitry Lopatin)
- Large role of the Shadow Economy and Criminal Groups
- Corruption and Bribes
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Comparative Analysis of Informal Institutions – Russia and “Counterparts” (1997), part

Comparative Analysis of Informal Institutions – Russia and “Counterparts” (1997), part

1

Share of managers which would refuse to invest 100 US dollars now in order to receive 200 US dollars 2 years after: in Poland - 22.1%, in Slovakia – 24. 6%, in Russia – 98. 9%.
Share of firms’ sales in other cities and/or countries: in Poland – 64. 7%, in Slovakia – 67. 6%, in Russia – 23. 3%.
Share of firms which would ready to buy good from new supplier for 10%-less-price rather than from the “established” supplier: in Poland – 42. 5%, in Slovakia – 48. 4%, in Russia – 1. 4%.
Share of firms reporting that companies pay for “protection” from mafia: in Poland – 8.0%, in Slovakia – 14. 9%, in Russia – 92. 9%.
Share of respondents believing that firms illegally pay for government’s service: in Poland – 20%, in Slovakia – 38%, in Russia – 91%.
Source: (Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan, Woodruff, 2000)

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Comparative Analysis of Informal Institutions – Russia and “Counterparts” (1997), part

Comparative Analysis of Informal Institutions – Russia and “Counterparts” (1997), part

2 (Johnson, Kaufmann, McMillan, Woodruff, 2000)