Aircraft type course: airbus a320 category b1

Содержание

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ATA 27 FLIGHT CONTROLS GENERAL Flight Controls System Component Location.................................................... Side

ATA 27 FLIGHT CONTROLS
GENERAL
Flight Controls System Component Location....................................................
Side Stick Description/Operation......................................................................
Flight Control

Laws...........................................................................................
ROLL/YAW
Roll Control Normal D/O...................................................................................
Roll Control Abnormal Operation......................................................................
Yaw Control Normal D/O...................................................................................
Yaw Control Abnormal D/O...............................................................................
Aileron Servo Control Operation.......................................................................
Spoiler Servo Control Operation.......................................................................
Rudder Trim Actuator D/O................................................................................
Rudder Servo Control Operation.......................................................................
Rudder Limiter Operation..................................................................................
Yaw Damper Servo Actuator Operation............................................................
Speed Brake & Ground Spoiler D/O.................................................................
PITCH
Pitch Control Normal D/O..................................................................................
Pitch Control Abnormal D/O..............................................................................
Elevator Servo Control Operation.....................................................................
THS Actuator Operation....................................................................................
EFCS
EFCS Control Interface.......................................................................................
EFCS Monitor Interface.......................................................................................
SLATS AND FLAPS
Slats/Flaps Control D/O.......................................................................................
Slats/Flaps Abnormal Locking Operation............................................................
Slats/Flaps Abnormal Half Speed Operation.......................................................
Slats Mechanical Drive D/O................................................................................
Flaps Mechanical Drive D/O................................................................................
Flaps Mechanical Drive D/O (A321)....................................................................
Flaps Drive Stations D/O.....................................................................................
Flaps Drive Stations D/O (A321).........................................................................
Flaps Attachment Failure DET Description.........................................................
SFCC Control Interfaces.....................................................................................
SFCC Monitor Interfaces.....................................................................................
Flight Controls System Line Maintenance...........................................................

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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GENERAL FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION SYSTEM OVERVIEW The control is

GENERAL FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION SYSTEM OVERVIEW The control is achieved through the

following conventional surfaces. PITCH Two elevators and the Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS) achieve the pitch control. Elevators are used for short-term activity. The THS is used for long-term activity. ROLL Roll control is achieved by one aileron and spoilers 2 to 5 on each wing, numbered from wing root to wing tip. YAW The rudder does the yaw control. The rudder is used during cross wind take-off and landing, and in case of engine failure (thrust asymmetry). The yaw damper function controls the rudder for Dutch roll damping and turn coordination. SPEED BRAKES The speed brake function is used in flight to increase the aircraft drag. Spoilers 2 to 4 are used. Roll orders and speed brake orders are added with priority given to the roll function. GROUND SPOILERS The ground spoiler function is used to destroy the lift during landing and in case of aborted take-off. All spoiler panels are used. AILERON DROOP The aileron droop function increases the lift on the part of the wing which has no flaps. The ailerons are deflected downwards when the flaps are extended.

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION

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GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION SYSTEM OVERVIEW – PITCH - AILERON DROOP

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION

SYSTEM OVERVIEW – PITCH -

AILERON DROOP
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FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION SYSTEM OVERVIEW (continued) HIGH LIFT Slats

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION SYSTEM OVERVIEW (continued) HIGH LIFT Slats and flaps achieve

the high lift function. There are two flaps, inboard and outboard, and five slats on each wing, numbered from wing root to wing tip. The A321 has double slotted flaps. The slats and flaps are electrically controlled and hydraulically operated. Two Slat Flap Control Computers (SFCCs) do the control and monitoring. Each computer has one slat and one flap channel. The slat and flap systems are similar. A Power Control Unit (PCU) drives each system with two hydraulic motors coupled to a differential gearbox. Torque shafts and gearboxes transmit the mechanical power to the actuators, which drive the surfaces. Each motor is powered by a different hydraulic system and has its own valve block and Pressure Off Brake (POB). Valve blocks control the direction of rotation and the speed of their related PCU output shaft. The POB locks the transmission when the slat and flap surfaces have reached the selected position or if hydraulic power fails. Wing Tip Brakes (WTBs) are given in order to stop and lock the system when major failures are detected. They are hydraulically activated and can only be reset on ground. Position Pick-Off Units (PPUs) send slat and flap position feedback to the SFCCs and ECAM. Flap sensors installed between inboard and outboard flaps inhibit further flap operation when a flap attachment failure is detected. The signal is sent to the SFCCs via the Landing Gear Control and Interface Units (LGCIU). To prevent an aircraft stall, slats cannot be fully retracted at high angles of attack or low speeds (Alpha/speed lock function). The FLAPS lever has five positions: 0, 1, 2, 3 and FULL. Two configurations correspond to position 1: Configuration 1 and Configuration 1+F. These are selected as shown on the graphic. The flaps lever selects simultaneous operation of the slats and flaps. The five lever positions correspond to the surface positions as shown on the graphic.

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION

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GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION SYSTEM OVERVIEW - HIGH LIFT

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION

SYSTEM OVERVIEW - HIGH LIFT

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GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION SYSTEM OVERVIEW - HIGH LIFT

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION

SYSTEM OVERVIEW - HIGH LIFT

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FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION SYSTEM OVERVIEW (continued) COMPUTERS A computer

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION SYSTEM OVERVIEW (continued) COMPUTERS A computer arrangement permanently controls

and monitors the flight control surfaces, it also records and stores faults. This arrangement includes: • 2 Elevator Aileron Computers (ELAC) for pitch and roll control, • 3 Spoiler Elevator Computers (SEC) for pitch and roll control, • 2 Flight Augmentation Computers (FAC) for yaw control, • 2 Flight Control Data Concentrators (FCDC) for indication and maintenance tests, • 2 Flight Management Guidance Computer (FMGC) for autopilot commands, • 2 Slat Flap Control Computers (SFCC) for slat and flap control.

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION

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GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION SYSTEM OVERVIEW - COMPUTERS

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION

SYSTEM OVERVIEW - COMPUTERS

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FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION SYSTEM OVERVIEW (continued) ACTIVE SERVO CONTROLS

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION SYSTEM OVERVIEW (continued) ACTIVE SERVO CONTROLS There are two

servo controls for each aileron, for each elevator and for the yaw damping function. In normal configuration, one servo control actuates the surface. It is called active servo control. The second, which follows the surface deflection, is in damping mode. When only manual pitch trim is available, the centering mode is applied to the elevators. The actuators are hydraulically maintained in neutral position. RECONFIGURATION PRIORITIES In normal configuration, the following computers do the servoloop control. The arrows indicate the actuation reconfiguration priorities in case of computer failure or loss of hydraulic circuits.

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION

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GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION SYSTEM OVERVIEW - ACTIVE SERVO CONTROLS & RECONFIGURATION PRIORITIES

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION

SYSTEM OVERVIEW - ACTIVE SERVO

CONTROLS & RECONFIGURATION PRIORITIES
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FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION COMPONENT LOCATION COMPUTERS All the flight

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION COMPONENT LOCATION COMPUTERS All the flight control computers

are located in the avionics compartment.

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION

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GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION COMPONENT LOCATION - COMPUTERS

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION

COMPONENT LOCATION - COMPUTERS

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SIDE STICK DESCRIPTION/OPERATION GENERAL The main function of the side sticks

SIDE STICK DESCRIPTION/OPERATION GENERAL The main function of the side sticks is to

transmit to the Electrical Flight Control System (EFCS) the lateral and longitudinal manual control orders in the form of electrical signals, depending on the position of the hand grip. It also generate the related artificial feel loads using spring rods, springs and dampers. In autopilot mode, a solenoid is energized in order to keep the side sticks in the neutral position. By doing this, the solenoid provides a higher load level in order to prevent any unwanted switching to the manual control mode, while keeping the possibility to override the autopilot if required. A thermoformed polycarbonate casing houses the mechanical assembly to prevent the penetration of foreign matter, which could jam the moving parts. Two identical transducer units are associated to each computer, one for roll control, another one for pitch control. A transducer unit comprises sets of potentiometers driven by a duplicate mechanism and connected to the EFCS computers via connectors. Ring pins can be installed for adjustment. WARNING: During handling, make sure that the side stick assembly stays in vertical position. There is a risk of skydrol leakage from dampers.

GENERAL - SIDE STICK DESCRIPTION/OPERATION

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GENERAL - SIDE STICK DESCRIPTION/OPERATION GENERAL

GENERAL - SIDE STICK DESCRIPTION/OPERATION

GENERAL

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SIDE STICK DESCRIPTION/OPERATION SIDE STICK AND PRIORITY LOGIC Side sticks, one

SIDE STICK DESCRIPTION/OPERATION SIDE STICK AND PRIORITY LOGIC Side sticks, one on each

lateral console, are used for manual pitch and roll control. They are springloaded to neutral. When the autopilot is engaged, a solenoid-operated detent locks both side sticks in the neutral position. If the pilot applies a force above a given threshold (5daN in pitch, 3.5 daN in roll), the autopilot disengages and the side stick unlocks and sends an input to the computers. The hand grip includes 2 P/Bs: An autopilot disconnect/side stick priority P/B and a push-to-talk button. Side stick priority logic: When only one pilot operates the side stick, his demand is sent to the computers. When the other pilot operates his side stick, in the same or opposite direction, both pilot inputs are algebraically added. The addition is limited to single-stick maximum deflection. NOTE: In the event of simultaneous inputs on both side sticks (2° deflection off the neutral position in any direction), the two green SIDE STICK PRIORITY lights, on the glareshield, come on and the "DUAL INPUT" voice message activates. A pilot can deactivate the other side stick, and take full control by pressing and keeping pressed his takeover P/B. For latching the priority condition, it is recommended that the takeover P/B be pressed for more than 40 seconds. The takeover pushbutton can then be released without losing priority. However, a deactivated side stick can be reactivated at any time, by momentarily pressing either takeover P/B. If both pilots press their takeover P/Bs, the last pilot to press their P/B will have priority. NOTE: If an autopilot is engaged, any action on a takeover P/B will disengage it. In a priority situation, a red light will come on, in front of the pilot whose side stick is deactivated. A green light will come on, in front of the pilot who has taken control, if the other side stick is not in the neutral position (to indicate a potential and unwanted control demand). NOTE: If one stick is deactivated on ground, at takeoff thrust application, the takeoff «CONFIG» warning is triggered.

GENERAL - SIDE STICK DESCRIPTION/OPERATION

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GENERAL - SIDE STICK DESCRIPTION/OPERATION SIDE STICK AND PRIORITY LOGIC

GENERAL - SIDE STICK DESCRIPTION/OPERATION

SIDE STICK AND PRIORITY LOGIC

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FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS PRINCIPLE A side stick or an autopilot sends

FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS PRINCIPLE A side stick or an autopilot sends an electrical

signal to the flight control computers for an aircraft maneuver. The flight control computers process the demand and send it to the control surfaces. The processing uses pre-set limitations and instructions called LAWS. In normal law, regardless of the pilots' input, the computers will prevent excessive maneuvers and make sure the safe envelope is not exceeded in pitch and roll axes. The rudder control is designed as on a conventional aircraft. Normal law is modified depending on the phase of flight. It operates in 3 modes: • Ground mode: operates on the ground when the aircraft is electrically and hydraulically powered. There is a direct relationship between the side stick and the control surfaces. • Flight mode: operates in the air after a gradual transition from ground mode just after lift-off, • Flare mode: modifies the flight mode to give a conventional "feel" to the landing phase. In normal LAW, when the aircraft is in flight mode, the control surface deflection is not directly proportional to the side stick deflection. A side stick deflection gives a rate demand to the flight control computers, which set control surface deflection to meet the rate demand. For the same side stick input, the control surface deflections will be large at low speed and small at high speed. A side stick input is a rate of roll demand in roll and a load factor (g) demand in pitch. Yaw control is conventional. The response information is fed back to the flight control computers. The computers process this feedback and adjust the control surface deflection to ensure that the maneuver rate demand is achieved accurately. This means that control surface deflections may be altered with no change in side stick position. When in flight mode, if you wish to perform a descending left turn for example, you must set the required attitude and then return the side stick to neutral. The neutral side stick position requires zero rates of pitch and roll. The flight control computers will maintain the set attitude until you use the side stick to ask for an attitude change. During the entire maneuver, there is no need for pilot trim inputs.

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS

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GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS PRINCIPLE

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS

PRINCIPLE

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GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS PRINCIPLE

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS

PRINCIPLE

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FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS NORMAL LAW Normal law provides a number of

FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS NORMAL LAW Normal law provides a number of airborne pitch

protections. They are: • Load factor limitation, • Pitch attitude protection, • High angle of attack protection, • High speed protection. In lateral control, there is only one protection, which is for bank angle. NOTE: Turn co-ordination and "Dutch roll" damping are automatically provided in normal law. Pilot inputs on the rudder pedals are not required. LOAD FACTOR LIMITATION Load factor limitation prevents structural overstress by a limitation of the control surface deflections through the flight control computers. Full side stick movement is always available. The load factor is automatically limited to: • (+) 2.5 g to (-) 1 g in clean configuration, • (+) 2 g to 0 g in other configurations.

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS

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GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS NORMAL LAW - LOAD FACTOR LIMITATION

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS

NORMAL LAW - LOAD FACTOR LIMITATION

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FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS NORMAL LAW (continued) PITCH ATTITUDE PROTECTION If the

FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS NORMAL LAW (continued) PITCH ATTITUDE PROTECTION If the aircraft reaches the

pitch attitude protection nose up limits, then the flight control computers will override pilot demands and keep the aircraft within the safe flight limits. The pitch attitude protection limits are shown as small green dashes on the Primary Flight Display (PFD). The pitch up values are different depending on the aircraft configuration and speed between 30 and 20 degrees up. The nose down limit is 15 degrees.

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS

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GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS NORMAL LAW - PITCH ATTITUDE PROTECTION

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS

NORMAL LAW - PITCH ATTITUDE PROTECTION

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FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS NORMAL LAW (continued) HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK PROTECTION

FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS NORMAL LAW (continued) HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK PROTECTION The high Angle

Of Attack (AOA) protection is designed to prevent a stalling of the aircraft and to ensure optimum performance in extreme maneuvers, for example windshear or Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) warning recovery. This protection takes priority on all others. This protection displays information on the side of the PFD speed scale. Under normal law, when the angle of attack becomes more than PROT, the system changes from normal mode to protection mode: The side sticks controls directly an angle of attack. NOTE: V PROT and V MAX may be different because they are G-load sensitive. When the speed decreases, V PROT reaches VLS, which is the lowest speed that can be selected with the autothrust engaged. A low energy warning, repeated every 5 seconds, indicates to the pilot that the aircraft energy becomes lower than a threshold. Under this threshold, the thrust must be increased to recover a positive flight path angle through pitch control. The low energy warning is available in the following conditions: • Above 100 ft RA and • Below 2,000 ft RA and • In conf 2, 3, FULL and • Not in TOGA, ...

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS

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NORMAL LAW (continued) HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK PROTECTION (continued) With autothrust

NORMAL LAW (continued) HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK PROTECTION (continued) With autothrust inoperative or

not engaged, the speed can reduce to the first level of AOA protection, V PROT, which is shown at the top of the amber / black band (barber pole). If engaged, the autopilot will disconnect. Nose up pitch trim is inhibited below V PROT. The flight control computers will maintain V PROT if the side stick is released. The floor protection is usually available from lift-off down to 100 ft RA. A/THR is automatically activated and commands TOGA thrust when the aircraft angle of attack is above a pre-determined threshold. This is indicated by an "A FLOOR" indication on the Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA) and also on the Engine Warning Display (EWD). If the pilots override V PROT with the side stick, the speed can reduce to V MAX. In normal law, the flight control computers will maintain V MAX, even if a pilot holds a side stick fully aft. In this protection range, the normal law demand is modified and side stick input is an AOA demand, instead of a load factor demand. If the pilot releases the side stick at V MAX, the speed will return to V PROT and will be maintained.

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS

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GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS NORMAL LAW - HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK PROTECTION

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS

NORMAL LAW - HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK

PROTECTION
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GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS NORMAL LAW - HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK PROTECTION

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS

NORMAL LAW - HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK

PROTECTION
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GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS NORMAL LAW - HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK PROTECTION

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS

NORMAL LAW - HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK

PROTECTION
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FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS NORMAL LAW (continued) HIGH SPEED PROTECTION The high

FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS NORMAL LAW (continued) HIGH SPEED PROTECTION The high speed protection is

designed to prevent the aircraft from exceeding maximum speed. These protection limits are displayed on the PFD speed scale. VMO/MMO is shown at the bottom of the red/black barber pole. Green dashes indicate the speed at which the protection is activated. When the airspeed/Mach increases above VMO/MMO, an overspeed ECAM warning is triggered (refer to Autoflight chapter). If the airspeed/Mach increases to the protection activation speed: • the autopilot disengages and, • the flight control computers send a pitch up command to the control surfaces to prevent more acceleration. The side stick authority is reduced, but the flight control computers will permit this speed to be exceeded momentarily for maneuvering if necessary. With stick released, the speed will return to VMO/MMO.

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS

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GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS NORMAL LAW - HIGH SPEED PROTECTION

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS

NORMAL LAW - HIGH SPEED PROTECTION

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FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS NORMAL LAW (continued) BANK ANGLE PROTECTION Under normal

FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS NORMAL LAW (continued) BANK ANGLE PROTECTION Under normal law, bank angle

protection limits the angle of bank to 67 degrees, shown by green dashes on the PFD. If the pilot holds full lateral side stick, the angle of bank will increase and maintain 67 degrees. The Flight Director (FD) on the PFD will disappear if the angle of bank exceeds 45 degrees. If the side stick is released at any time when the bank angle exceeds 33 degrees, the aircraft will return to and maintain a 33 degrees bank angle. The FD will be displayed again on the PFD when the angle of bank reduces to less than 40 degrees. The autotrim is inhibited above 33 degrees. With the angle of attack protections active: • The bank angle is limited to 45 degrees and no more. With the high speed protection active: • The system maintains a positive spiral stability to 0 degree bank angle, so that if the side stick is released, the aircraft returns to wing level. The bank angle limit is also reduced from 67 to 40 degrees.

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS

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GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS NORMAL LAW - BANK ANGLE PROTECTION

GENERAL - FLIGHT CONTROL LAWS

NORMAL LAW - BANK ANGLE PROTECTION

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ROLL/YAW ROLL CONTROL NORMAL D/O SIDESTICK The sidestick sends electrical orders

ROLL/YAW ROLL CONTROL NORMAL D/O SIDESTICK The sidestick sends electrical orders to the ELevator

Aileron Computers (ELACs) and Spoiler Elevator Computers (SECs). ELAC There are two ELACs: ELAC 1 normally controls the ailerons, with ELAC 2 as back-up. In case of failure of ELAC 1, ELAC 2 will automatically take control. SEC Using orders coming from the ELACs, each SEC sends orders to one or two pairs of spoilers, without back-up. FAC Flight Augmentation Computer (FAC) 1, with FAC 2 as back-up, transmits turn coordination orders for the rudder. FMGC When the autopilot is engaged, the Flight Management and Guidance Computer (FMGC) sends roll commands to the ELACs and the FACs, and to the SECs through the ELACs via ARINC 429 data buses. AILERONS There are two electrically-controlled hydraulic actuators per aileron, one in active mode and the other in damping mode. The left blue and right green actuators are controlled by ELAC 1 and the other two actuators by ELAC 2. All aileron actuators revert to damping mode in case of a double ELAC failure or green and blue hydraulic low pressure.

ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL NORMAL D/O

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SPOILERS Each spoiler is powered by one hydraulic actuator. Surfaces are

SPOILERS Each spoiler is powered by one hydraulic actuator. Surfaces are automatically

retracted if a fault is detected by the monitoring system or if there is no electrical supply. In case of loss of hydraulic power supply: • if retracted, the surface remains retracted, • if not retracted, the surface will maintain existing deflection to the zero hinge moment position or less if pushed down by aerodynamics. NOTE: Spoilers 1 are not used for roll control.

ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL NORMAL D/O

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ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL NORMAL D/O SIDESTICK - SPOILERS

ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL NORMAL D/O

SIDESTICK - SPOILERS

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ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION COMPUTER FAILURES A computer failure can engage

ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION COMPUTER FAILURES A computer failure can engage a

lateral abnormal configuration. ELAC 1 FAILURE The loss of ELevator Aileron Computer (ELAC) 1 leads to select ELAC 2 active. ELAC 2 computes the lateral orders in normal law and transmits them to the Spoiler Elevator Computer (SEC) for the roll spoiler.

ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION

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ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION COMPUTER FAILURES - ELAC 1 FAILURE

ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION

COMPUTER FAILURES - ELAC 1

FAILURE
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ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION COMPUTER FAILURES (continued) ELAC 1+2 FAILURE In

ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION COMPUTER FAILURES (continued) ELAC 1+2 FAILURE In case of

loss of both ELACs only spoilers are available. The SECs control the roll in direct law and the yaw damping function normal law is lost.

ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION

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ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION COMPUTER FAILURES - ELAC 1+2 FAILURE

ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION

COMPUTER FAILURES - ELAC 1+2

FAILURE
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ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION SERVO CONTROL FAILURES AILERON SERVO CONTROL FAILURE

ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION SERVO CONTROL FAILURES AILERON SERVO CONTROL FAILURE In case

of failure of one aileron servo control, the second one takes over and is controlled by the other ELAC. In this example, ELAC 1 still computes the orders and ELAC 2 is in slave mode.

ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION

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ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION SERVO CONTROL FAILURES - AILERON SERVO CONTROL FAILURE

ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION

SERVO CONTROL FAILURES - AILERON

SERVO CONTROL FAILURE
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ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION SERVO CONTROL FAILURES (continued) ELAC 1 SERVO

ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION SERVO CONTROL FAILURES (continued) ELAC 1 SERVO CONTROLS

FAILURE In case of failure of both ELAC 1 servo controls, then ELAC 2 does the computation and controls its servo controls.

ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION

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ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION SERVO CONTROL FAILURES - ELAC 1 SERVO CONTROLS FAILURE

ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION

SERVO CONTROL FAILURES - ELAC

1 SERVO CONTROLS FAILURE
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ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION SERVO CONTROL FAILURES (continued) FAILURES ON THE

ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION SERVO CONTROL FAILURES (continued) FAILURES ON THE SAME

AILERON In case of failure of both servo controls of the same aileron, the other aileron is still operated.

ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION

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ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION SERVO CONTROL FAILURES - FAILURES ON THE SAME AILERON

ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION

SERVO CONTROL FAILURES - FAILURES

ON THE SAME AILERON
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ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION SERVO CONTROL FAILURES (continued) SPOILER SERVO CONTROL

ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION SERVO CONTROL FAILURES (continued) SPOILER SERVO CONTROL FAILURE In

case of failure of a spoiler servo control, the opposite surface is retracted.

ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION

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ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION SERVO CONTROL FAILURES - SPOILER SERVO CONTROL FAILURE

ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION

SERVO CONTROL FAILURES - SPOILER

SERVO CONTROL FAILURE
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ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION ELECTRICAL FAILURE In case of total electrical

ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION ELECTRICAL FAILURE In case of total electrical loss,

induced roll is obtained by using the rudder pedals, which have a mechanical control.

ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION

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ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION ELECTRICAL FAILURE

ROLL/YAW - ROLL CONTROL ABNORMAL OPERATION

ELECTRICAL FAILURE

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YAW CONTROL NORMAL D/O GENERAL The yaw control is done by

YAW CONTROL NORMAL D/O GENERAL The yaw control is done by the rudder,

with a maximum deflection of 25° for the A320 and A321, and 30° for the A318 and A319. The rudder is operated by three moving body servocontrols with a common mechanical input. RUDDER PEDALS The two pairs of rudder pedals are connected together. They are linked by a cable loop to the mechanical summing point which in turn is connected to the hydraulic rudder actuators via a differential unit. Mechanical rudder control is always available from the rudder pedals. The pedal position signals are sent to the ELevator Aileron Computers (ELACs) by the transducer (XDCR) unit. If installed, the Force Transducer Unit (FTU) is used to measure pilots forces applied on the pedals. This information is not used in flight control system but transmitted to the Flight Control Data Concentrator (FCDC) to be recorded by the Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR). ELAC In flight, the ELACs transmit the yaw damping and turn coordination to the Flight Augmentation Computers (FACs) for rudder deflection. There is no feedback to the pedals for yaw damping and turn coordination. FAC The two FACs control the yaw damper servo controls. FAC 1 has priority. FAC 2 is in hot stand-by. RUDDER The rudder is powered by three hydraulic actuators operating in parallel. The position of the rudder is transmitted to the System Data Acquisition Concentrator (SDAC) through a position XDCR unit. This position is shown on the lower display unit of the ECAM.

ROLL/YAW - YAW CONTROL NORMAL D/O

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ROLL/YAW - YAW CONTROL NORMAL D/O GENERAL - RUDDER

ROLL/YAW - YAW CONTROL NORMAL D/O

GENERAL - RUDDER

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YAW CONTROL NORMAL D/O FMGC When the autopilot is engaged, the

YAW CONTROL NORMAL D/O FMGC When the autopilot is engaged, the Flight Management

and Guidance Computers (FMGCs) send commands to the FACs for rudder trimming, yaw control and yaw damping function. The FMGCs energize the artificial feel stiffening solenoid to increase the threshold of the rudder artificial feel and to avoid unintentional autopilot disconnection. YAW DAMPING The yaw dampers servo activation controls are connected to the rudder hydraulic actuators through a mechanical differential unit: each servo actuator is controlled by its related FAC. No feedback to the rudder pedals is given thanks to the differential unit.

ROLL/YAW - YAW CONTROL NORMAL D/O

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ROLL/YAW - YAW CONTROL NORMAL D/O FMGC & YAW DAMPING

ROLL/YAW - YAW CONTROL NORMAL D/O

FMGC & YAW DAMPING

Слайд 55

YAW CONTROL NORMAL D/O RUDDER TRIM The rudder trim is achieved

YAW CONTROL NORMAL D/O RUDDER TRIM The rudder trim is achieved by one

or two electric motors at a time, each controlled by its associated FAC. In manual flight, the pilot can apply rudder trim at 1°/sec from the RUDder TRIM rotary switch. Also, an asymmetry compensation function is available in case of lateral asymmetry, and a yaw automatic trim is active for lateral asymmetry and engine failure compensation at 5°/sec. Trimming causes rudder pedal movement. RUDDER LIMITATION Rudder deflection limitation is achieved by a variable stop unit driven by one or two electric motors at a time. Each motor is controlled by its associated FAC. The rudder deflection becomes limited as speed is increased.

ROLL/YAW - YAW CONTROL NORMAL D/O

Слайд 56

ROLL/YAW - YAW CONTROL NORMAL D/O RUDDER TRIM & RUDDER LIMITATION

ROLL/YAW - YAW CONTROL NORMAL D/O

RUDDER TRIM & RUDDER LIMITATION

Слайд 57

YAW CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O ALTERNATE LAW The alternate yaw damper law

YAW CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O ALTERNATE LAW The alternate yaw damper law computed in

the Flight Augmentation Computer (FAC) becomes active if the roll normal law fails. Turn coordination is no longer available. The alternate yaw damper law also becomes active in these cases: • two Air Data References (ADRs) or two Inertial References (IRs) or two ELevator Aileron Computers (ELACs) or both ailerons or all spoilers fail or blue+green hydraulic low pressure or of pitch normal law is lost, • the alternate law in FAC 1 is active with the emergency electrical supply (emergency generator running), • the yaw damper authority is limited to +/- 5° rudder deflection. YAW MECHANICAL The mechanical rudder control, which is available at all times, must be used following the failures shown below: • two FACs or three ADRs or three IRs or green+yellow hydraulic low pressure or electrical power on batteries only. NOTE: In case of a dual FAC failure, a specific channel in each FAC selects the rudder.

ROLL/YAW - YAW CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O

Слайд 58

ALTERNATE LAW & YAW MECHANICAL ROLL/YAW - YAW CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O

ALTERNATE LAW & YAW MECHANICAL

ROLL/YAW - YAW CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O

Слайд 59

AILERON SERVO CONTROL OPERATION GENERAL Each aileron is equipped with two

AILERON SERVO CONTROL OPERATION GENERAL Each aileron is equipped with two identical electro-hydraulic

servo-controls. These servo-controls have two modes: • the active mode • the damping mode. ACTIVE MODE In the active mode, the solenoid valve is energized by the Electrical Flight Control System (EFCS). This enables the HP fluid to flow and to put the mode selector valve in the active position. The two chambers of the actuator are thus connected to the servo-valve control lines. Theservo-control is then in the active mode. The Linear Variable-Differential Transducer (LVDT) supplies an electrical signal to the ELAC, which identifies this change of state. The feedback transducer (also called LVDT) gives the servo-loop feedback.

ROLL/YAW - AILERON SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

Слайд 60

ROLL/YAW - AILERON SERVO CONTROL OPERATION GENERAL & ACTIVE MODE

ROLL/YAW - AILERON SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

GENERAL & ACTIVE MODE

Слайд 61

AILERON SERVO CONTROL OPERATION DAMPING MODE In damping mode, the actuator

AILERON SERVO CONTROL OPERATION DAMPING MODE In damping mode, the actuator follows the

control surface movements. In this configuration, the solenoid valve is de-energized and the mode selector valve moves under the action of its spring. The two chambers of the actuator are thus interconnected through the damping orifice. The LVDT identifies this change of state and transmit it to the EFCS. The fluid reserve allows to hold the volume of fluid in the actuator chambers: • if the temperature of the hydraulic fluid changes or, • if there is a leakage. The fluid reserve is permanently connected to the return line of the servo-valve. MAINTENANCE AND RIGGING FACILITIES After replacement of the servo-control, it is necessary to adjust the feedback transducer (LVDT). It is necessary to get an equal voltage in the secondary winding (electrical zero) when the aileron is in neutral position. This is done through an action on the feedback transducer adjustment device located on the actuator.

ROLL/YAW - AILERON SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

Слайд 62

ROLL/YAW - AILERON SERVO CONTROL OPERATION DAMPING MODE & MAINTENANCE AND RIGGING FACILITIES

ROLL/YAW - AILERON SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

DAMPING MODE & MAINTENANCE AND RIGGING

FACILITIES
Слайд 63

SPOILER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION ACTIVE MODE In active mode the spoiler

SPOILER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION ACTIVE MODE In active mode the spoiler servo

control actuator is hydraulically supplied. According to the command signal to the servo valve the spoiler surface will extend or retract. The feedback transducer Linear Variable Differential Transducer (LVDT) provide(s) the servo loop feedback.

ROLL/YAW - SPOILER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

Слайд 64

ROLL/YAW - SPOILER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION ACTIVE MODE

ROLL/YAW - SPOILER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

ACTIVE MODE

Слайд 65

SPOILER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION BIASED MODE The servo-control actuator is pressurized.

SPOILER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION BIASED MODE The servo-control actuator is pressurized. Due

to an electrical failure the command signal is lost. The biased servo valve pressurizes the retraction chamber. The spoiler actuator stays pressurized and the spoiler remains retracted.

ROLL/YAW - SPOILER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

Слайд 66

ROLL/YAW - SPOILER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION BIASED MODE

ROLL/YAW - SPOILER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

BIASED MODE

Слайд 67

SPOILER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION LOCKED MODE In locked mode, the hydraulic

SPOILER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION LOCKED MODE In locked mode, the hydraulic pressure

is lost. The closing valve closes the retraction chamber. The surface can only be moved towards the retracted position, pushed by aerodynamical forces.

ROLL/YAW - SPOILER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

Слайд 68

ROLL/YAW - SPOILER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION LOCKED MODE

ROLL/YAW - SPOILER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

LOCKED MODE

Слайд 69

SPOILER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION MANUAL MODE To be unlocked, the servo

SPOILER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION MANUAL MODE To be unlocked, the servo control

actuator must be depressurized. The maintenance unlocking device can be engaged thanks to a key equipped with a red flame. This tool cannot be removed when the servo control is in maintenance mode. Once the maintenance unlocking device is engaged the spoiler surface can be raised manually for inspection purposes.

ROLL/YAW - SPOILER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

Слайд 70

ROLL/YAW - SPOILER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION MANUAL MODE

ROLL/YAW - SPOILER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

MANUAL MODE

Слайд 71

RUDDER TRIM ACTUATOR GENERAL The rudder trim actuator is installed on

RUDDER TRIM ACTUATOR GENERAL The rudder trim actuator is installed on the rudder

system, in the tail area and it's or are one of the mechanical inputs of the rudder servo controls. The rudder trim actuator enables the zero force position of the artificial feel and trim unit to be adjusted. CONTROLS The rudder trim actuator is an electromechanical unit, which converts the electrical input from the Flight Augmentation Computers (FACs) into a rotation of its output shaft. The rudder trim actuator can be controlled either by the RUDder TRIM control switch located in the center pedestal of the cockpit, in manual mode, or by the Flight Management & Guidance Computers (FMGCs) in AP mode. In both cases orders are sent via the FACs. In automatic control, the rudder trim function controlled by the FAC, fulfills the generation and the accomplishment of the engine failure recovery function. In this case, the engine failure compensation slow law orders are sent to the rudder trim actuator. The AP also provides signals, which validate the detection of engine failure as a function of the engine rating. DESCRIPTION/OPERATION The rudder trim actuator has two DC motors, installed on the same shaft. Each one is controlled by one independent electronic module, with only one motor operating at a time, via FAC1 or 2. The motors permanently coupled to a reduction gear, drive the output shaft, via a torque limiter. Then the output shaft drives four Rotary Variable Differential Transducers (RVDTs), transmitting the output shaft position signal to the FACs.

ROLL/YAW - RUDDER TRIM ACTUATOR

Слайд 72

ROLL/YAW - RUDDER TRIM ACTUATOR GENERAL - DESCRIPTION/OPERATION

ROLL/YAW - RUDDER TRIM ACTUATOR

GENERAL - DESCRIPTION/OPERATION

Слайд 73

RUDDER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION ACTIVE MODE When the rudder servo control

RUDDER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION ACTIVE MODE When the rudder servo control actuator is

in active mode, the actuator moves to the right or to the left according to the control valve position. The high pressure is connected to the return via the heating orifice; this fulfills the permanent heating leakage.

ROLL/YAW - RUDDER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

Слайд 74

ACTIVE MODE ROLL/YAW - RUDDER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

ACTIVE MODE

ROLL/YAW - RUDDER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

Слайд 75

RUDDER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION DAMPING MODE The rudder servo control actuator

RUDDER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION DAMPING MODE The rudder servo control actuator changes to

damping mode, as soon as the hydraulic pressure supply is cut. When the servo control is depressurized, the spring sets the damping and pressure-relief valve to the bypass position, and the hydraulic fluid goes from one chamber to the other via the damping orifice.

ROLL/YAW - RUDDER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

Слайд 76

DAMPING MODE ROLL/YAW - RUDDER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

DAMPING MODE

ROLL/YAW - RUDDER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

Слайд 77

RUDDER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION JAMMED CONTROL VALVE If the control valve

RUDDER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION JAMMED CONTROL VALVE If the control valve jams, the

rudder servo control actuator follows the rudder surface movement, ensured by the other rudder servo controls. Rudder locking or runaway in the event of a servo control valve jamming is prevented by a spring rod and pressure relief valve arrangement.

ROLL/YAW - RUDDER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

Слайд 78

ROLL/YAW - RUDDER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION JAMMED CONTROL VALVE

ROLL/YAW - RUDDER SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

JAMMED CONTROL VALVE

Слайд 79

RUDDER LIMITER OPERATION LOW SPEED CONFIGURATION Under 160 kts the stops

RUDDER LIMITER OPERATION LOW SPEED CONFIGURATION Under 160 kts the stops are in

low-speed configuration. Full input/output lever movement to the rudder servo control is available. VARIABLE LIMITATION Between 160 and 380 kts the rudder deflection is limited as a function of speed. The corresponding law is computed by the Flight Augmentation Computers (FACs). HIGH SPEED CONFIGURATION Above 380 kts the stops are in high-speed configuration. Only limited input/output lever movement to the rudder servo control is available.

ROLL/YAW - RUDDER LIMITER OPERATION

Слайд 80

ROLL/YAW - RUDDER LIMITER OPERATION LOW SPEED CONFIGURATION - HIGH SPEED CONFIGURATION

ROLL/YAW - RUDDER LIMITER OPERATION

LOW SPEED CONFIGURATION - HIGH SPEED CONFIGURATION

Слайд 81

RUDDER LIMITER OPERATION TRAVEL LIMITATION UNIT The mechanical design of the

RUDDER LIMITER OPERATION TRAVEL LIMITATION UNIT The mechanical design of the Travel Limitation

Unit (TLU) is such that a single mechanical failure (rupture or disconnection) cannot cause the loss of the travel limitation function. The TLU has two brushless electric motors separately controlled by an electronic assembly. Each motor drives two screws via a reduction gear and permits the symmetrical linear displacement of two nuts used as adjustable stops. A non-locking rotary stop limits the stroke of one of the screw/nut assemblies which are irreversible. There are two levers on each connection shaft; one is connected to the input rod and the other is used as a punctual stop. The movement of each screw is transmitted to a Rotary Variable Differential Transducer via the reduction gear which permits to indicate the position of the variable stop. NOTE: To prevent icing, there is a heating system which includes two coils and their regulating thermostats.

ROLL/YAW - RUDDER LIMITER OPERATION

Слайд 82

ROLL/YAW - RUDDER LIMITER OPERATION TRAVEL LIMITATION UNIT

ROLL/YAW - RUDDER LIMITER OPERATION

TRAVEL LIMITATION UNIT

Слайд 83

RUDDER LIMITER OPERATION FAC If both FACs fail, the rudder travel

RUDDER LIMITER OPERATION FAC If both FACs fail, the rudder travel limitation value

is frozen immediately. In this case, an emergency control brings back the stops to the low speed configuration (maximum possible deflection of the rudder) when slats are extended. NOTE: To bring back the stops to the low speed configuration, the motors are used as 2-phase asynchronous motor energized by 26V 400 Hz power. This control mode is achieved when the coil of a specific relay ( each motor has a relay ) is energized for a period of 30 s approximately. This time is sufficient to bring back the stops to the low speed configuration.

ROLL/YAW - RUDDER LIMITER OPERATION

Слайд 84

ROLL/YAW - RUDDER LIMITER OPERATION FAC

ROLL/YAW - RUDDER LIMITER OPERATION

FAC

Слайд 85

YAW DAMPER SERVO ACTUATOR OPERATION ACTIVE MODE The actuator is in

YAW DAMPER SERVO ACTUATOR OPERATION ACTIVE MODE The actuator is in active mode

when both solenoid valves are energized; the hydraulic pressure and the servo valve are available. The two selector valves are connected to the servovalve outputs and allow the servo actuator to operate in active mode. In this case the pressure switch is not activated. The feedback transducer of the Linear Variable Differential Transducer (LVDT) type supplies the servo loop feedback information to the Flight Augmentation Computers (FACs). FAC 1 controls and monitors the green servo actuator and FAC 2 the yellow one. Only one yaw damper at a time is in active mode, the other one is in a by-pass mode. MONITORING A pressure switch installed on to the servo actuator detects any different position between the selector valves.

ROLL/YAW - YAW DAMPER SERVO ACTUATOR OPERATION

Слайд 86

ROLL/YAW - YAW DAMPER SERVO ACTUATOR OPERATION ACTIVE MODE & MONITORING

ROLL/YAW - YAW DAMPER SERVO ACTUATOR OPERATION

ACTIVE MODE & MONITORING

Слайд 87

YAW DAMPER SERVO ACTUATOR OPERATION BYPASS MODE BOTH SOLENOID VALVES DE-ENERGIZED

YAW DAMPER SERVO ACTUATOR OPERATION BYPASS MODE BOTH SOLENOID VALVES DE-ENERGIZED The two-solenoid valves

are de-energized and the associated selector valves are set to the bypass mode under the action of their spring. The two-piston chambers are, in this case, interconnected. The pressure switch is not activated.

ROLL/YAW - YAW DAMPER SERVO ACTUATOR OPERATION

Слайд 88

ROLL/YAW - YAW DAMPER SERVO ACTUATOR OPERATION BYPASS MODE - BOTH SOLENOID VALVES DE-ENERGIZED

ROLL/YAW - YAW DAMPER SERVO ACTUATOR OPERATION

BYPASS MODE - BOTH SOLENOID

VALVES DE-ENERGIZED
Слайд 89

YAW DAMPER SERVO ACTUATOR OPERATION BYPASS MODE (continued) ONE SOLENOID VALVE

YAW DAMPER SERVO ACTUATOR OPERATION BYPASS MODE (continued) ONE SOLENOID VALVE DE-ENERGIZED ONLY In

case of a single electrical failure causing one selector valve to be in bypass mode, the other being in active mode, the result lies in the interconnection of the two actuator chambers, thus the actuator is in bypass mode. In this way, by means of the pressure switch, which is now connected to the supply pressure, this abnormal configuration is indicated to the FACs.

ROLL/YAW - YAW DAMPER SERVO ACTUATOR OPERATION

Слайд 90

ROLL/YAW - YAW DAMPER SERVO ACTUATOR OPERATION BYPASS MODE - ONE SOLENOID VALVE DE-ENERGIZED ONLY

ROLL/YAW - YAW DAMPER SERVO ACTUATOR OPERATION

BYPASS MODE - ONE SOLENOID

VALVE DE-ENERGIZED ONLY
Слайд 91

YAW DAMPER SERVO ACTUATOR OPERATION BYPASS MODE (continued) HYDRAULIC FAILURE With

YAW DAMPER SERVO ACTUATOR OPERATION BYPASS MODE (continued) HYDRAULIC FAILURE With no hydraulic pressure,

the two selector valves are set, under the action of their spring, in bypass mode, thus the two chambers of the piston are interconnected. In this case, the pressure switch is not activated.

ROLL/YAW - YAW DAMPER SERVO ACTUATOR OPERATION

Слайд 92

ROLL/YAW - YAW DAMPER SERVO ACTUATOR OPERATION BYPASS MODE - HYDRAULIC FAILURE

ROLL/YAW - YAW DAMPER SERVO ACTUATOR OPERATION

BYPASS MODE - HYDRAULIC FAILURE

Слайд 93

SPEED BRAKE & GROUND SPOILER D/O SPEED BRAKE FUNCTION The speed

SPEED BRAKE & GROUND SPOILER D/O SPEED BRAKE FUNCTION The speed brake function

is commanded in the flight phase following a pilot's action on the speed brake lever. The speed brakes can be driven by Spoiler and Elevator Computers (SECs) 1 and 3, and supplied from the hydraulic system. The surfaces ensuring this function are spoilers 2 thru 4. When one surface is not available on one wing, the symmetrical one, on the other wing, is inhibited. The switching to alternate or direct laws does not affect the speed brake function. The different priorities of this function are: • the roll order has priority over the speed brake function. When the sum of roll and speed brake commands, relative to one surface, is greater than the maximum possible deflection, the symmetrical surface is retracted until the difference between the two surfaces is equal to the roll order, • if the Angle-Of-Attack (AOA) protection is activated with speed brakes extended, the speed brakes are automatically retracted.

ROLL/YAW - SPEED BRAKE & GROUND SPOILER D/O

Слайд 94

ROLL/YAW - SPEED BRAKE & GROUND SPOILER D/O SPEED BRAKE FUNCTION

ROLL/YAW - SPEED BRAKE & GROUND SPOILER D/O

SPEED BRAKE FUNCTION

Слайд 95

SPEED BRAKE & GROUND SPOILER D/O SPEED BRAKE LOGIC The speed

SPEED BRAKE & GROUND SPOILER D/O SPEED BRAKE LOGIC The speed brake control

lever sends commands to the speed brakes. The SECs receive the information from the Slats and Flaps Control Computers (SFCCs) and the throttle lever transducer unit. Speed brake extension is inhibited in the conditions given below: • failure of SEC 1 and 3, • failure of left or right elevator (only spoilers 3 & 4 are inhibited), • Angle-Of-Attack (AOA) protection is available, • in FLAP FULL configuration (A320) or FLAP FULL or position 3 (A319/A321). If speed brakes are extended, they automatically retract and stay retracted until the inhibition condition stops and the lever is reset. The SECs control a steep-approach function. NOTE: For a steep-approach landing, on an A318, the SECs control the deflection of speed brakes No. 4, 3 and 2, to a maximum angle of 30°, 30° and 0° respectively. For a go-around, the maximum speed brake rate is 20°/s.

ROLL/YAW - SPEED BRAKE & GROUND SPOILER D/O

Слайд 96

ROLL/YAW - SPEED BRAKE & GROUND SPOILER D/O SPEED BRAKE LOGIC

ROLL/YAW - SPEED BRAKE & GROUND SPOILER D/O

SPEED BRAKE LOGIC

Слайд 97

ROLL/YAW - SPEED BRAKE & GROUND SPOILER D/O SPEED BRAKE &

ROLL/YAW - SPEED BRAKE & GROUND SPOILER D/O

SPEED BRAKE & GROUND

SPOILER D/O GROUND SPOILER FUNCTION When the logic conditions which determine the lift dumper extension are fulfilled, a deflection order is sent to spoilers 1 to 5, to 10º or 50º extension depending on the state of both Main Landing Gear (MLG) legs, compressed or not. Ground spoilers are armed when the speed brake control lever is pulled up, in manual mode. Moreover, a pitch pre-command at ground spoiler extension/retraction avoids induced pitch effects, in normal or AP mode. The ground spoiler function is automatic.
Слайд 98

ROLL/YAW - SPEED BRAKE & GROUND SPOILER D/O GROUND SPOILER FUNCTION

ROLL/YAW - SPEED BRAKE & GROUND SPOILER D/O

GROUND SPOILER FUNCTION

Слайд 99

ROLL/YAW - SPEED BRAKE & GROUND SPOILER D/O SPEED BRAKE &

ROLL/YAW - SPEED BRAKE & GROUND SPOILER D/O

SPEED BRAKE & GROUND

SPOILER D/O GROUND SPOILER LOGIC The ground spoiler control is entirely automatic. Achieved by the spoilers 1 to 5. The maximum deflection is 50° with a deflection rate of 30°/second. The ground spoilers are armed: • when the speed brake control lever is pulled up into the ARMED position. Ground spoilers automatically extend when armed: • both thrust levers at forward idle and both MLG touch down (Flight / Ground transition), • or during Take Off (TO) run at speed greater than 72 knots (kts) and both thrust levers retarded at forward idle. Ground spoilers automatically extended (not armed): • when both MLG touch down and reverse is selected on at least one engine (remaining engine at idle), • or during TO run speed greater than 72 kts and reverse is selected on at least one engine (remaining engine at idle). Ground spoilers partially extend: • when reverse is selected on at least one engine (remaining engine at idle) and one MLG is compressed. This partial extension (10°), by decreasing the lift, will ease the compression of the second MLG, and consequently will lead to the normal ground spoiler extension. NOTE: The speed brake handle will not move during spoiler deflection or retraction. The spoiler position will be displayed on the lower ECAM display WHEEL page.
Слайд 100

ROLL/YAW - SPEED BRAKE & GROUND SPOILER D/O GROUND SPOILER LOGIC

ROLL/YAW - SPEED BRAKE & GROUND SPOILER D/O

GROUND SPOILER LOGIC

Слайд 101

PITCH - PITCH CONTROL NORMAL D/O PITCH PITCH CONTROL NORMAL D/O

PITCH - PITCH CONTROL NORMAL D/O

PITCH PITCH CONTROL NORMAL D/O SIDE STICK The

side stick sends electrical orders to the ELevator Aileron Computers (ELACs) and Spoiler Elevator Computers (SECs). ELAC There are two ELACs. ELAC 2 normally controls the elevators and Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS) with ELAC 1 as a backup. In case of ELAC 2 failure, ELAC 1 automatically takes over. SEC In case of dual ELACs failure, SEC 1 or 2 automatically takes over pitch control. FMGC When the Autopilot (AP) is engaged, the Flight Management and Guidance Computer (FMGC) sends AP commands to the ELACs. ELEVATORS Each elevator is powered by two actuators, one in active mode, and the other in damping mode with automatic changeover in case of failure. Both actuators become active in case of large pitch demands. ELAC 2 controls the green and yellow actuators and ELAC 1 controls the blue actuators. THS The THS is positioned by a screw actuator driven by two hydraulic motors, which are controlled by one of the three electric motors. One electrical trim motor is operative at a time, and the other two are in standby. Motor 1 is controlled by ELAC 2, motor 2 by ELAC 1 or SEC 1, and motor 3 by SEC 2. TRIM WHEELS The mechanical trim, which has priority over the electrical trim, is operated from the manual trim wheels.
Слайд 102

SIDE STICK - TRIM WHEELS PITCH - PITCH CONTROL NORMAL D/O

SIDE STICK - TRIM WHEELS

PITCH - PITCH CONTROL NORMAL D/O

Слайд 103

PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O ALTERNATE LAW If the normal law of

PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O ALTERNATE LAW If the normal law of the ELevator

Aileron Computer (ELAC) 2 fails, the control goes to the ELAC 1. If the normal law of both ELACs fails, the alternate law takes over. The failures lead to an activation of the alternate law with reduced protections. IN ELAC WITH PROTECTIONS Alternate law with reduced protections including load factor and stability augmentation, is active in ELAC 1 or 2 in case of either: • double self-detected Air Data Reference (ADR) or Inertial Reference (IR) failure, • 2nd not self-detected ADR failure, • double hydraulic failure blue and green or yellow and green, • loss of roll normal law, • alternate law active in ELAC 1 with emergency electrical supply. IN ELAC WITHOUT PROTECTIONS Depending on the failures, the pitch channel can switch to an alternate law without protections. Alternate law without protection including stability augmentation lost and load factor protection retained, is active in ELAC 1 or 2 in case of either: • 2nd not self-detected ADR failure, • triple ADR failure.

PITCH - PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O

Слайд 104

PITCH - PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O ALTERNATE LAW - IN ELAC

PITCH - PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O

ALTERNATE LAW - IN ELAC

WITH PROTECTIONS & IN ELAC WITHOUT PROTECTIONS
Слайд 105

PITCH - PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O ALTERNATE LAW - IN ELAC

PITCH - PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O

ALTERNATE LAW - IN ELAC

WITH PROTECTIONS & IN ELAC WITHOUT PROTECTIONS
Слайд 106

PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O ALTERNATE LAW (continued) IN SEC After a

PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O ALTERNATE LAW (continued) IN SEC After a double ELAC failure,

alternate law with or without stability augmentation, becomes active in the Spoiler Elevator Computer (SEC).

PITCH - PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O

Слайд 107

PITCH - PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O ALTERNATE LAW - IN SEC

PITCH - PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O

ALTERNATE LAW - IN SEC

Слайд 108

PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O DIRECT LAW If the alternate law is

PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O DIRECT LAW If the alternate law is lost, the

direct law computed in ELAC 1 or 2 becomes active. The pitch direct law is active in case of either: • dual IR failure, • triple IR failure, • failure of the RA. The auto trim is lost and the crew has to use the mechanical trim. In case of loss of both ELACs when the alternate law is already lost, the direct law computed in SEC 1 or 2 becomes active.

PITCH - PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O

Слайд 109

PITCH - PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O DIRECT LAW

PITCH - PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O

DIRECT LAW

Слайд 110

PITCH - PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O DIRECT LAW

PITCH - PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O

DIRECT LAW

Слайд 111

PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O MECHANICAL BACK-UP In case of total electrical

PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O MECHANICAL BACK-UP In case of total electrical failure or

loss of all computers, pitch control can be achieved by the mechanical trim system. The four elevator actuators are in centering mode.

PITCH - PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O

Слайд 112

PITCH - PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O MECHANICAL BACK-UP

PITCH - PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O

MECHANICAL BACK-UP

Слайд 113

PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O PITCH LAW RECONFIGURATION This diagram summarizes the

PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O PITCH LAW RECONFIGURATION This diagram summarizes the pitch law

reconfiguration.

PITCH - PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O

Слайд 114

PITCH - PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O PITCH LAW RECONFIGURATION

PITCH - PITCH CONTROL ABNORMAL D/O

PITCH LAW RECONFIGURATION

Слайд 115

ELEVATOR SERVO CONTROL OPERATION ACTIVE MODE When the elevator servo control

ELEVATOR SERVO CONTROL OPERATION ACTIVE MODE When the elevator servo control is in

the active mode, it is pressurized and both solenoid valves are de-energized. The servo valve is controlled by one computer at a time.

PITCH - ELEVATOR SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

Слайд 116

PITCH - ELEVATOR SERVO CONTROL OPERATION ACTIVE MODE

PITCH - ELEVATOR SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

ACTIVE MODE

Слайд 117

ELEVATOR SERVO CONTROL OPERATION DAMPING MODE In case of a computer

ELEVATOR SERVO CONTROL OPERATION DAMPING MODE In case of a computer failure (e.g.

ELAC2 failure), the related solenoid valve is energized by the other computer and the elevator servo control is in the damping mode as it is the actuator that is depressurized. This causes the interconnection of the two actuator chambers through the damping orifice.

PITCH - ELEVATOR SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

Слайд 118

PITCH - ELEVATOR SERVO CONTROL OPERATION DAMPING MODE

PITCH - ELEVATOR SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

DAMPING MODE

Слайд 119

ELEVATOR SERVO CONTROL OPERATION RE-CENTERING MODE When the elevator servo control

ELEVATOR SERVO CONTROL OPERATION RE-CENTERING MODE When the elevator servo control is in

the re-centering mode, it is pressurized, the solenoid valves and servo valve are de-energized, the servo valve is centered to the neutral position by its mechanical input. Due to the centering device, the servo control actuator is maintained hydraulically in its neutral position.

PITCH - ELEVATOR SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

Слайд 120

PITCH - ELEVATOR SERVO CONTROL OPERATION RE-CENTERING MODE

PITCH - ELEVATOR SERVO CONTROL OPERATION

RE-CENTERING MODE

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THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS DESCRIPTION HYDRAULIC MOTORS Both hydraulic motors drive

THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS DESCRIPTION HYDRAULIC MOTORS Both hydraulic motors drive the

ball screw actuator through a power differential gearbox. It moves up or down a ball nut on which the Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS) surface is mounted. VALVE BLOCKS One valve block is given for each hydraulic motor. PRESSURE OF BRAKES The Pressure-Off Brakes (POBs) are applied in case of hydraulic pressure loss. POSITION TRANSDUCERS The THS actuator has two inductive position transducer packages. They are the command position transducer and the monitor position transducer. Position transducers are installed to feed back the actual position of the override mechanism output and the ball screw position to the Electrical Flight Control System (EFCS) computer.

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION

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PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS DESCRIPTION - HYDRAULIC MOTORS - POSITION TRANSDUCERS

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION

THS DESCRIPTION - HYDRAULIC MOTORS -

POSITION TRANSDUCERS
Слайд 123

THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS OPERATION THS STATIC In the Static mode:

THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS OPERATION THS STATIC In the Static mode: • there

is no input (no electrical power at all three electrical motors and no mechanical command), • the control valves are in neutral position, • the chambers at each end of the control valves are connected to return.

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION

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PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS OPERATION - THS STATIC

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION

THS OPERATION - THS STATIC

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THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS OPERATION (continued) NORMAL OPERATION ELAC2 (in normal

THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS OPERATION (continued) NORMAL OPERATION ELAC2 (in normal control) sends

a drive command to the servomotor No1.The electrical motor No1 causes the input levers and control valves to move and at the same time a mechanical feedback signal is sent from the override mechanism to the cockpit causing the trim wheels to move. The hydraulic fluid is supplied to both hydraulic motors through the control valve opening. Both hydraulic motors operate at the same time and move the ball screw through the power differential. The rotation of the screw jack gives a feedback signal to the feedback differential, causing the control valves moving back to neutral, consequently the whole system stop.

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION

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PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS OPERATION - NORMAL OPERATION

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION

THS OPERATION - NORMAL OPERATION

Слайд 127

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS OPERATION - NORMAL OPERATION

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION

THS OPERATION - NORMAL OPERATION

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PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS OPERATION - NORMAL OPERATION

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION

THS OPERATION - NORMAL OPERATION

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THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS OPERATION (continued) OPERATION WITH ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS OPERATION (continued) OPERATION WITH ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM IN

LOW PRESSURE Since the yellow hydraulic system is in low pressure, only the green hydraulic motor runs to move the ball screw at half speed via the power differential. The hydraulic fluid is supplied to the green hydraulic motor only. The green hydraulic motor operates and moves the ball screw through the power differential at half speed. The rotation of the screw jack gives a feedback signal to the feedback differential, causing the control valves moving back to neutral, consequently the whole system stop.

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION

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PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS OPERATION - OPERATION WITH ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM IN LOW PRESSURE

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION

THS OPERATION - OPERATION WITH ONE

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM IN LOW PRESSURE
Слайд 131

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS OPERATION - OPERATION WITH ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM IN LOW PRESSURE

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION

THS OPERATION - OPERATION WITH ONE

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM IN LOW PRESSURE
Слайд 132

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS OPERATION - OPERATION WITH ONE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM IN LOW PRESSURE

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION

THS OPERATION - OPERATION WITH ONE

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM IN LOW PRESSURE
Слайд 133

THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS OPERATION (continued) THS MECHANICAL INPUT A mechanical

THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS OPERATION (continued) THS MECHANICAL INPUT A mechanical input link

is connected to an override mechanism. This allows the pilot to override the ELAC and SEC signals through the application of a sufficient force to the control wheels in the cockpit. An override mechanism reverts to the electrical control after release of the mechanical control. The hydraulic fluid is supplied to both hydraulic motors through the control valve opening. Both hydraulic motors operate at the same time and move the ball screw through the power differential. The rotation of the screw jack gives a feedback signal to the feedback differential, causing the control valves moving back to neutral, consequently the whole system stop.

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION

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PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS OPERATION - THS MECHANICAL INPUT

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION

THS OPERATION - THS MECHANICAL INPUT

Слайд 135

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS OPERATION - THS MECHANICAL INPUT

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION

THS OPERATION - THS MECHANICAL INPUT

Слайд 136

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS OPERATION - THS MECHANICAL INPUT

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION

THS OPERATION - THS MECHANICAL INPUT

Слайд 137

THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS OPERATION (continued) JAMMING MODE ELAC2 (in normal

THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS OPERATION (continued) JAMMING MODE ELAC2 (in normal control) sends

a drive command to the servomotor No1.The electrical motor No1 causes the input levers and control valves to move and at the same time a mechanical feedback signal is sent from the override mechanism to the cockpit causing the trim wheels to move. The hydraulic fluid is supplied to both hydraulic motors through the control valve opening. Both hydraulic motors operate at the same time and move the ball screw through the power differential. If one control valve or its driving mechanism is jammed the hydraulic supply of both hydraulic motors is cut by the Shut-Off Valve (SOV) control device in each valve block, the comparator piston operates both SOVs. Both POBs are applied and the THS is immobilized and locked.

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION

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PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS OPERATION - JAMMING MODE

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION

THS OPERATION - JAMMING MODE

Слайд 139

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS OPERATION - JAMMING MODE

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION

THS OPERATION - JAMMING MODE

Слайд 140

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION THS OPERATION - JAMMING MODE

PITCH - THS ACTUATOR OPERATION

THS OPERATION - JAMMING MODE

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EFCS EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE PILOT ORDERS The pilot orders like side

EFCS EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE PILOT ORDERS The pilot orders like side stick, speed brake,

ground spoiler or throttle position signals, are transmitted to the ELevator Aileron Computers (ELACs) and Spoiler Elevator Computers (SECs). According to these inputs and their control laws, the computers calculate the elevator, aileron, spoiler, THS and rudder deflection.

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

Слайд 142

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE PILOT ORDERS

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

PILOT ORDERS

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EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE FLIGHT CONTROL PANELS P/Bs located on the FLighT

EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE FLIGHT CONTROL PANELS P/Bs located on the FLighT ConTroL panels

are used to engage/disengage or reset their respective computer software.

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

Слайд 144

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE FLIGHT CONTROL PANELS

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

FLIGHT CONTROL PANELS

Слайд 145

EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE The hydraulic pressure status is sent

EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE The hydraulic pressure status is sent to the

ELACs and SECs for activation or deactivation of the related servo controls and laws. The hydraulic pressure is also sent to the Flight Augmentation Computers (FACs), at least for yellow and green for the yaw damper actuator.

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

Слайд 146

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

HYDRAULIC PRESSURE

Слайд 147

EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE RUDDER PEDAL POSITION The signal from the rudder

EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE RUDDER PEDAL POSITION The signal from the rudder pedal transducers

is used for nose wheel steering via ELACs / Braking Steering Control Unit (BSCU) and to tell ELACs / FACs that the pilot is now in control for turn coordination, while yaw damping signals are maintained.

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

Слайд 148

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE RUDDER PEDAL POSITION

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

RUDDER PEDAL POSITION

Слайд 149

EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE FMGC If the autopilot is active, pitch, roll

EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE FMGC If the autopilot is active, pitch, roll and yaw

orders computed by the Flight Management and Guidance Computer (FMGC) are sent to the ELACs and FACs, which control and monitor the surface deflections.

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

Слайд 150

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE FMGC

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

FMGC

Слайд 151

EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE FAC The FACs receive rudder deflection information computed

EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE FAC The FACs receive rudder deflection information computed either by

the ELACs or FMGCs for dutch roll damping, engine failure compensation and turn coordination.

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

Слайд 152

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE FAC

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

FAC

Слайд 153

EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE ADIRS The Air Data/Inertial Reference System (ADIRS) transmits

EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE ADIRS The Air Data/Inertial Reference System (ADIRS) transmits air data

and inertial reference data to the ELACs and SECs, and also to the FACs (see ATA 22 course) for flight envelope protection computation.

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

Слайд 154

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE ADIRS

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

ADIRS

Слайд 155

EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE LGCIU The Landing Gear Control and Interface Units

EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE LGCIU The Landing Gear Control and Interface Units (LGCIUs) transmit

L/G position information to the ELACs and SECs.

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

Слайд 156

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE LGCIU

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

LGCIU

Слайд 157

EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE SFCC The Slat Flap Control Computers (SFCCs) transmit

EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE SFCC The Slat Flap Control Computers (SFCCs) transmit slat flap

surface position to the ELACs and SECs for law computation.

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

Слайд 158

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE SFCC

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

SFCC

Слайд 159

EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE RA The Radio Altimeter (RA) transmits the altitude

EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE RA The Radio Altimeter (RA) transmits the altitude information to

the ELACs for flare law activation.

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

Слайд 160

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE RA

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

RA

Слайд 161

EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE BSCU The BSCU receives information from the ELACs

EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE BSCU The BSCU receives information from the ELACs for the

nose wheel steering system and from the SECs for the auto brake function.

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

Слайд 162

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE BSCU

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

BSCU

Слайд 163

EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE WHEEL TACHOMETER Each MLG wheel speed is transmitted

EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE WHEEL TACHOMETER Each MLG wheel speed is transmitted by wheel

tachometers to the SECs for ground spoiler, only in case of Rejected Take-Off.

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

Слайд 164

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE WHEEL TACHOMETER

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

WHEEL TACHOMETER

Слайд 165

EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE ACCELEROMETER The vertical accelerometers, installed in the FWD

EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE ACCELEROMETER The vertical accelerometers, installed in the FWD cargo compartment,

transmit the vertical acceleration of the A/C to the ELACs and SECs. The vertical accelerometers are also used for the computation of the pitch trim function and load factor function.

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

Слайд 166

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE ACCELEROMETER

EFCS - EFCS CONTROL INTERFACE

ACCELEROMETER

Слайд 167

EFCS MONITOR INTERFACE FWC/ECAM The flight control system failures are sent

EFCS MONITOR INTERFACE FWC/ECAM The flight control system failures are sent to the

Flight Warning Computers (FWCs) by the Flight Control Data Concentrators (FCDCs). The FWCs elaborate the failure messages on the EWD display. The FWCs receive flight control data from the FCDCs for indication on the ECAM displays. CFDIU/MCDU Data are exchanged between the FCDCs and the Centralized Fault Display System (CFDS), which enables two communication modes, normal mode and interactive mode. Normal mode: • the FCDCs send the flight control system failures to the CFDS, • the CFDS adds general data such as time, date, ATA chapter, flight phase, leg, to the failure message on the MCDU display. Interactive mode: the CFDS sends to the FCDCs: • the request for consultation of the BITE inside each computer, • the maintenance test request. The CFDS receives faulty Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) data from the FCDCs which are displayed on the MCDU for trouble-shooting and test purposes.

EFCS - EFCS MONITOR INTERFACE

Слайд 168

EFCS - EFCS MONITOR INTERFACE FWC/ECAM & CFDIU/MCDU

EFCS - EFCS MONITOR INTERFACE

FWC/ECAM & CFDIU/MCDU

Слайд 169

SLATS AND FLAPS SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O PCU/SFCC DESCRIPTION This presentation shows

SLATS AND FLAPS SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O PCU/SFCC DESCRIPTION This presentation shows the detailed operation

of the Power Control Unit (PCU) and the Slat Flap Control Computer (SFCC), through a normal extension sequence. As slat and flap system control is identical, only the flap system is shown. Each SFCC flap channel includes 2 lanes and an output module that controls its related valve block. Each valve block includes three solenoid valves. Two of them, called directional valves, command the control valve spool for retraction or extension, while the enable solenoid valve controls the Pressure-Off Brake (POB). The output module has several functions: • collect and analyze the data from lanes 1 and 2, • output data to the related valve blocks.

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O

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SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O PCU/SFCC DESCRIPTION

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O

PCU/SFCC DESCRIPTION

Слайд 171

SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O SOLENOID VALVE EXTENSION SELECTION Moving the slat flap

SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O SOLENOID VALVE EXTENSION SELECTION Moving the slat flap lever rotates

the Command Sensor Unit (CSU), which issues a new position demand signal to each SFCC. This signal is processed in flap lanes 1 and 2. The position demand and the actual position from the Feedback Position Pick-off Unit (FPPU) are compared in the SFCC flap lanes. If the requested and actual positions are different, each lane generates command signals that are compared by the output module. If the command signals are in agreement, the output module generates drive commands for PCU valve block activation. Each SFCC channel controls its related solenoid valves. As the extend solenoid is energized, the control valve spool moves from neutral towards the fully deflected position. The direction of valve spool movement controls the direction of rotation of the motor. The degree of valve spool movement controls the rotation speed of the motor. The position of the control valve spool is monitored by a Linear Variable Differential Transducer (LVDT) mounted on one end of the valve block.

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O

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SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O SOLENOID VALVE - EXTENSION SELECTION

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O

SOLENOID VALVE - EXTENSION SELECTION

Слайд 173

SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O SOLENOID VALVE (continued) HIGH SPEED MOVEMENT The enable

SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O SOLENOID VALVE (continued) HIGH SPEED MOVEMENT The enable solenoid valve is

energized to release the POB, and the flaps begin to extend. With the control valve spool fully deflected, the maximum available fluid flow is directed to the motors, which run at full speed for flap extension.

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O

Слайд 174

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O SOLENOID VALVE - HIGH SPEED MOVEMENT

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O

SOLENOID VALVE - HIGH SPEED

MOVEMENT
Слайд 175

SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O SOLENOID VALVE (continued) LOW SPEED MOVEMENT As the

SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O SOLENOID VALVE (continued) LOW SPEED MOVEMENT As the flap approaches the

requested position, detected by FPPU, the SFCC energizes the retract solenoid. This causes the spool control valve to move back slowly to the neutral position. The control valve spool movement reduces the fluid flow, which reduces the motor speed.

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O

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SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O SOLENOID VALVE - LOW SPEED MOVEMENT

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O

SOLENOID VALVE - LOW SPEED

MOVEMENT
Слайд 177

SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O POB When the flaps reach the requested position,

SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O POB When the flaps reach the requested position, all solenoid

valves are de-energized and the POB is applied. The motor stops and the POB is applied to lock the flaps until a new position is requested.

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O

Слайд 178

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O POB

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS CONTROL D/O

POB

Слайд 179

SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL LOCKING OPERATION GENERAL Here is a brief reminder of

SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL LOCKING OPERATION GENERAL Here is a brief reminder of the Wing

Tip Brake (WTB) application logic. Asymmetry, runaway, overspeed and uncommanded movement are detected by cross comparison of Asymmetry Position Pick-Off Unit (APPU) and Feedback Position Pick-off Unit (FPPU) signals. If any of these failures are detected by a Slat Flap Control Computer (SFCC) and confirmed by the second one, the WTBs are applied. NOTE: That if an SFCC does not operate, the other SFCC receives a WTB-arm signal automatically. Thus, if the second SFCC subsequently detects a failure, a solenoid valve on each WTB is energized.

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL LOCKING OPERATION

Слайд 180

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL LOCKING OPERATION GENERAL

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL LOCKING OPERATION

GENERAL

Слайд 181

SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL LOCKING OPERATION ASYMMETRY Asymmetry is defined as a positional

SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL LOCKING OPERATION ASYMMETRY Asymmetry is defined as a positional difference between

the LH and RH APPUs. Asymmetry is usually due to a broken shaft between both APPUs. The asymmetry threshold is above 5° synchro positional difference between both APPUs. RUNAWAY The SFCCs identify a runaway by comparing the LH and RH APPU positions with the FPPU position. The reason for a runaway on slat transmission could be a broken shaft between the slat PCU and the T-gearbox. To avoid that air loads move the slats in a runaway condition, the WTBs will be applied. As LH and RH flap transmissions are directly connected to the Flap PCU only a gearbox failure can cause a runaway. To avoid that air loads move the flaps in a runaway condition, the WTBs will be applied. OVERSPEED An overspeed is detected when the rotation speed of the transmission measured by any Position Pickoff Unit (PPU) is too high.

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL LOCKING OPERATION

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SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL LOCKING OPERATION ASYMMETRY - RUNAWAY & OVERSPEED

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL LOCKING OPERATION

ASYMMETRY - RUNAWAY &

OVERSPEED
Слайд 183

SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL LOCKING OPERATION UNCOMMANDED MOVEMENT Uncommanded movement is defined as

SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL LOCKING OPERATION UNCOMMANDED MOVEMENT Uncommanded movement is defined as a movement

away from the selected position by a value that exceeds the threshold.

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL LOCKING OPERATION

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SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL LOCKING OPERATION UNCOMMANDED MOVEMENT

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL LOCKING OPERATION

UNCOMMANDED MOVEMENT

Слайд 185

SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL LOCKING OPERATION FAILURE MONITORING If PCUs are in operation,

SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL LOCKING OPERATION FAILURE MONITORING If PCUs are in operation, extended solenoid

and enable solenoid are energized and the flaps extend. PPU information is used for system monitoring. If one SFCC detects an asymmetry, its associated valve block is de-energized. A "WTB arm" signal is sent to the other SFCC flap channel to check whether asymmetry is confirmed, or not. If the other SFCC confirms the asymmetry, the WTB solenoid is energized, PCUs are de-energized and the flap drive system is stopped. A reset of the WTBs can be done on ground only via the Centralized Fault Display System (CFDS). If asymmetry is only detected by one computer, the associated flap drive system is considered faulty.

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL LOCKING OPERATION

Слайд 186

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL LOCKING OPERATION FAILURE MONITORING

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL LOCKING OPERATION

FAILURE MONITORING

Слайд 187

SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL HALF SPEED OPERATION PRESENTATION We will study examples on

SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL HALF SPEED OPERATION PRESENTATION We will study examples on abnormal operations

which cause the system to operate at half speed. As slat and flap operations are identical, only flaps operation will be shown. When half speed is detected, a level 1 caution is generated and a fault message is displayed on the EWD. The STS page appears after the pilot confirms the Flap fault by pressing the CLEAR button on the ECAM control panel or calls the STS by pressing STS button on the ECP. A green message SLAT/FLAP SLOW is displayed on the SD. NOTE: The STS message " SLAT/FLAP SLOW" will only appear if both Engines are running. On ground with engines off, no Slat/ Flaps STS message will appear.

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL HALF SPEED OPERATION

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SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL HALF SPEED OPERATION PRESENTATION

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL HALF SPEED OPERATION

PRESENTATION

Слайд 189

SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL HALF SPEED OPERATION SFCC FAILURE In this example Slat

SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL HALF SPEED OPERATION SFCC FAILURE In this example Slat Flap Control

Computer (SFCC) 2 flap channel is inoperative and SFCC 1 operates normally. Each flap channel lane of SFCC 1 generates command signals. The drive commands, generated in SFCC1 Output module, control the related solenoid valve in the flap PCU. Only the related green hydraulic motor is operative. As the yellow valve block is not energized, the Pressure-Off Brake (POB) holds the output shaft of the yellow hydraulic motor. Due to the differential gearbox, the system moves with full torque at half speed.

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL HALF SPEED OPERATION

Слайд 190

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL HALF SPEED OPERATION SFCC FAILURE

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL HALF SPEED OPERATION

SFCC FAILURE

Слайд 191

SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL HALF SPEED OPERATION HYDRAULIC FAILURE Each SFCC channel monitors

SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL HALF SPEED OPERATION HYDRAULIC FAILURE Each SFCC channel monitors the hydraulic

pressure for its associated PCU motor. Signals from the Linear Variable Differential Transducer (LVDT) are used to compare the position of the control valve with the drive command orders. In this example, a green hydraulic low pressure is detected by SFCC1. As soon as the hydraulic pressure drop is detected, the PCU valve block solenoids are de-energized. The POB holds the output shaft of the green hydraulic motor. Only the yellow valve block is energized, so only the yellow hydraulic motor is operative. Due to the differential gearbox, the system moves with full torque at half speed. As the green hydraulic system also supplies one slat PCU motor, the slat system is affected as well.

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL HALF SPEED OPERATION

Слайд 192

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL HALF SPEED OPERATION HYDRAULIC FAILURE

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS/FLAPS ABNORMAL HALF SPEED OPERATION

HYDRAULIC FAILURE

Слайд 193

SLATS MECHANICAL DRIVE D/O GENERAL Torque shafts and gearboxes transmit power

SLATS MECHANICAL DRIVE D/O GENERAL Torque shafts and gearboxes transmit power from the

Power Control Unit (PCU) to the actuators which drive the slat operating mechanism. PCU The PCU incorporates two hydraulic motors, each controlled by an electrically signaled valve block. The slat PCU drives the slat transmission system via a single output shaft. TORQUE SHAFTS The rotation of the torque shafts drives all gearboxes and rotary actuator input shafts simultaneously and at the same speed. Steady bearings, attached to the structure, support the torque shafts where small angular changes of alignment occur. GEARBOXES Six gearboxes are used in the slat transmission system where changes in torque shaft alignment occur: • one 19-degree bevel gearbox changes alignment under the wing center box, • one T-gearbox changes alignment through 90 degrees in each wing, • two 63.5-degree bevel gearboxes take drive from below each wing level into the wing leading edge. ACTUATORS The actuators produce the torque and speed reduction necessary to drive the slats at the required rate. Each actuator drives its associated slat track through a pinion driven by the actuator output shaft.

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS MECHANICAL DRIVE D/O

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SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS MECHANICAL DRIVE D/O GENERAL - PCU - ACTUATORS

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS MECHANICAL DRIVE D/O

GENERAL - PCU -

ACTUATORS
Слайд 195

SLATS MECHANICAL DRIVE D/O TRACKS The slats are attached to the

SLATS MECHANICAL DRIVE D/O TRACKS The slats are attached to the forward ends

of the tracks which run in guide rollers. Slat 1 is supported by four tracks, but only T2 and T3 are driven. T1 and T4 prevent slat loss in case of attachment failure. Slats outboard of the pylon are supported by two driven tracks. TORQUE LIMITERS Each actuator incorporates a bi-directional torque limiter which protects the structure from overload. WTB The Wing Tip Brakes (WTBs) stop and hold the transmission if the Slat Flap Control Computers (SFCCs) detect abnormal operation such as asymmetry and runaway. Once applied, the WTBs can only be reset on the ground by maintenance action via the Centralized Fault Display System (CFDS). APPU The Asymmetry Position Pick Off Units (APPUs) enable the SFCC to monitor the system for asymmetry and runaway conditions. One APPU is mounted outboard of track 12 in each wing. It gives the slat actual position to the SFCC.

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS MECHANICAL DRIVE D/O

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SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS MECHANICAL DRIVE D/O TRACKS - TORQUE LIMITERS - APPU

SLATS AND FLAPS - SLATS MECHANICAL DRIVE D/O

TRACKS - TORQUE LIMITERS

- APPU
Слайд 197

FLAPS MECHANICAL DRIVE D/O PCU The Power Control Unit (PCU) incorporates

FLAPS MECHANICAL DRIVE D/O PCU The Power Control Unit (PCU) incorporates two hydraulic

motors, each one controlled by an electrically-signaled valve block. The flap PCU drives the flap transmission output shafts. TORQUE SHAFTS The rotation of the torque shafts drives all gearboxes and rotary actuator input shafts simultaneously, at the same speed. Steady bearings, attached to the structure, support the torque shafts where small angular changes are present. GEARBOXES Three types of one-to-one ratio gearboxes are used in the flap transmission where large changes in torque shaft alignment are present. A right angle gearbox changes alignment through 90 degrees for input to track 1 offset gearbox. A line gearbox transmits the drive along the rear face of the rear false spar. A 19-degree bevel gearbox aligns the drive with the rear spar. ACTUATORS One actuator operates the flap mechanism at each track. It supplies the torque and speed reduction necessary to drive the flap at the required rate. Each actuator is driven by an offset gearbox that transmits power from the torque shaft to the plug-in rotary actuator. TORQUE LIMITERS Each actuator incorporates a bi-directional torque limiter which protects the structure from overload. WTB The Wing Tip Brakes (WTBs) stop and hold the transmission if the Slat Flap Control Computers (SFCCs) detect abnormal operation such as asymmetry, runaway, overspeed or uncommanded movement. Once applied, the WTBs can only be reset on the ground, by maintenance action via the Centralized Fault Display System (CFDS). APPU The Asymmetry Position Pick Off Units (APPUs) enable the SFCC to monitor the system for asymmetry and runaway conditions. The APPUs are mounted on the flap actuator assemblies No. 4. They give the flap actual position to the SFCC.

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS MECHANICAL DRIVE D/O

Слайд 198

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS MECHANICAL DRIVE D/O PCU - TORQUE SHAFTS - APPU

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS MECHANICAL DRIVE D/O

PCU - TORQUE SHAFTS

- APPU
Слайд 199

FLAPS MECHANICAL DRIVE D/O (A321) PCU The Power Control Unit (PCU)

FLAPS MECHANICAL DRIVE D/O (A321) PCU The Power Control Unit (PCU) incorporates two

hydraulic motors, each one controlled by an electrically signaled valve block. The flap PCU drives the flap transmission output shafts. TORQUE SHAFTS The rotation of the torque shafts drives all gearboxes and rotary actuator input shafts simultaneously, at the same speed. Steady bearings, attached to the structure, support the torque shafts where small angular changes are present. GEARBOXES Three types of one-to-one ratio gearboxes are used in the flap transmission where large changes in torque shaft alignment are present. A right angle gearbox changes alignment through 90 degrees for input to track 1 offset gearbox. A line gearbox transmits the drive along the rear face of the rear false spar. A 19-degree bevel gearbox aligns the drive with the rear spar. ACTUATORS One actuator operates the flap mechanism at each track. It supplies the torque and speed reduction necessary to drive the flap at the required rate. Each actuator is driven by an offset gearbox that transmits power from the torque shaft to the plug-in rotary actuator. TORQUE LIMITERS Each actuator incorporates a bi-directional torque limiter that protects the structure from overload. WTB The Wing Tip Brakes (WTBs) stop and hold the transmission if the Slat Flap Control Computers (SFCCs) detect abnormal operation such as asymmetry, runaway, overspeed or uncommanded movement. Once applied, the WTBs can only be reset on the ground, by maintenance action via the Centralized Fault Display System (CFDS). APPU The Asymmetry Position Pick Off Units (APPUs) enable the SFCC to monitor the system for asymmetry and runaway conditions. One APPU is mounted on the flap actuator assembly. It gives the flap actual position to the SFCC.

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS MECHANICAL DRIVE D/O (A321)

Слайд 200

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS MECHANICAL DRIVE D/O (A321) PCU - TORQUE SHAFTS - APPU

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS MECHANICAL DRIVE D/O (A321)

PCU - TORQUE

SHAFTS - APPU
Слайд 201

FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O GENERAL Each flap is supported by carriages

FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O GENERAL Each flap is supported by carriages that run

on tracks extending from the wing rear spar. Each carriage has a containment device to hold it on the track if a failure occurs. The carriages, tracks and beams at tracks 2, 3 and 4 are of similar construction. Track 1 is attached to the fuselage.

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O

Слайд 202

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O GENERAL

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O

GENERAL

Слайд 203

FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O FLAP DRIVES Carriage 1 is held below

FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O FLAP DRIVES Carriage 1 is held below the track

and travels on four vertical-load and two side-load rollers. The rollers contain bearings that are grease-lubricated through grease points on the carriage. Carriages 2, 3 and 4 are retained on their tracks by six vertical and four side-load rollers. The rollers are lubricated through grease points at the front and rear of the carriage. A fail-safe hook retains the flap on the track in the event of a structural failure of the carriage.

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O

Слайд 204

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O FLAP DRIVES

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O

FLAP DRIVES

Слайд 205

FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O FLAP AND TRACK FAIRINGS A flap link

FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O FLAP AND TRACK FAIRINGS A flap link arm is

attached to the flap bottom surface immediately outboard of each track position. The forward end of each link arm is bolted to the drive lever on its associated actuator. At tracks 2, 3 and 4 a track fairing operating arm is attached to the flap bottom surface. The operating arm is connected to a linkage that operates the moveable track fairing during flap extension and retraction. The link arms transmit the drive from the rotary actuators directly to the flap surface.

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O

Слайд 206

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O FLAP AND TRACK FAIRINGS

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O

FLAP AND TRACK FAIRINGS

Слайд 207

FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321) GENERAL Each flap is supported by

FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321) GENERAL Each flap is supported by carriages that

run on tracks extending from the wing rear spar. Each carriage has a containment device to hold it on the track if a failure occurs. The carriages, tracks and beams at tracks 2, 3 and 4 are of similar construction. Track 1 is attached to the fuselage. A hinge mechanism connects the leading edge of the tab surface to the primary surface of the flap.

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321)

Слайд 208

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321) GENERAL

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321)

GENERAL

Слайд 209

FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321) FLAP DRIVES Six vertical-load and four

FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321) FLAP DRIVES Six vertical-load and four side-load rollers

hold each carriage on its track at tracks 2, 3 and 4. Only four vertical-load and two side-load rollers hold the carriage on track 1. A fail-safe hook keeps the flap on the track if there is a structural failure of the carriage. Bolts attach the carriage to the flaps. Bolts have eccentrics for flaps rigging.

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321)

Слайд 210

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321) FLAP DRIVES

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321)

FLAP DRIVES

Слайд 211

FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321) FLAP AND TRACK FAIRINGS A flap

FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321) FLAP AND TRACK FAIRINGS A flap link arm

is attached to the flap bottom surface immediately outboard of each track position. The link arms transmit the movement from the rotary actuators to the flap surface. Attached to the flap bottom, at tracks 2, 3 and 4, a track operates the moveable track fairing during flap movement.

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321)

Слайд 212

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321)

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321)

Слайд 213

FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321) TYPICAL TABS The inner tab is

FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321) TYPICAL TABS The inner tab is attached to

the rear spar of the flap at track 2 and hinges 1A and 1B. The outer tab is attached to the rear spar of the flap at tracks 3 and 4 and at hinges 3A, 3B and 3C. When the flaps move, the tabs are operated by a linkage connected from: • the shroud box assembly to hinge 1A tab attachment bracket, • the roller carriages of tracks 2, 3 and 4 to the tab attachment brackets.

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321)

Слайд 214

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321) TYPICAL TABS

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321)

TYPICAL TABS

Слайд 215

FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321) A321 FIELD TRIP SLATS AND FLAPS

FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321) A321 FIELD TRIP

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS

DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321)
Слайд 216

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321) A321 FIELD TRIP

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS DRIVE STATIONS D/O (A321)

A321 FIELD TRIP

Слайд 217

FLAPS ATTACHMENT FAILURE DET DESCRIPTION SENSORS Two flap disconnect sensors are

FLAPS ATTACHMENT FAILURE DET DESCRIPTION SENSORS Two flap disconnect sensors are fitted on

the interconnecting strut between inner and outer flaps on each wing. The flap disconnect sensors, which are proximity sensors, detect any flap disconnection. LGCIU Each Landing Gear Control and Interface Unit (LGCIU) receives signals from two sensors and transmits this data to its related Slat Flap Control Computer (SFCC). The LGCIUs are used to process signals from proximity sensors. SFCC The SFCCs monitor the flap-attachment failure detection sensors to find connection failure. If the SFCCs receive a flap disconnect signal: • the valve block solenoids on the Power Control Unit (PCU) are de-energized, • the Pressure-Off Brakes (POBs) lock the two hydraulic motors, • the SFCCs give a class 1 level 2 caution and the ECAM display unit shows a failure message. System reset is only possible on the ground. The ECAM display unit shows a failure message if: • the SFCC gets different data from the two sensors on the same wing or, • one sensor gives incorrect data.

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS ATTACHMENT FAILURE DET DESCRIPTION)

Слайд 218

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS ATTACHMENT FAILURE DET DESCRIPTION) SENSORS - LGCIU & SFCC

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLAPS ATTACHMENT FAILURE DET DESCRIPTION)

SENSORS - LGCIU

& SFCC
Слайд 219

SFCC CONTROL INTERFACES CSU The Command Sensor Unit (CSU) sends two

SFCC CONTROL INTERFACES CSU The Command Sensor Unit (CSU) sends two discrete signals

to each channel for a new slat/flap position request. LH AND RH APPU The Asymmetry Position Pick Off Units (APPUs) send synchro signals to each channel for asymmetry detection and system monitoring. FPPU The position of the Power Control Unit (PCU) output shaft is measured by the Feedback Position Pick-off Unit (FPPU) and sent to the computers for system control and monitoring. LH AND RH WTB Discrete outputs from the computers are sent to the Wing Tip Brakes (WTBs) for solenoid valve control. PCU Discrete outputs from the computers are transmitted to the PCU for solenoid valve control. Analog signals are sent by the Linear Variable Differential Transducers (LVDTs) to monitor the control spool valves of the PCU. ADIRU Air Data/Inertial Reference Units 1 and 2 (ADIRUs 1 and 2) send corrected angle of attack and computed air speed data for ALPHA LOCK computation. LGCIU Landing Gear Control and Interface Units (LGCIUs) send flap disconnect data for control of flap attachment failure detection. CFDIU The Centralized Fault Display Interface Unit (CFDIU) sends data about failure environment and command words for BITE tests.

SLATS AND FLAPS - SFCC CONTROL INTERFACES

Слайд 220

SLATS AND FLAPS - SFCC CONTROL INTERFACES CSU - CFDIU

SLATS AND FLAPS - SFCC CONTROL INTERFACES

CSU - CFDIU

Слайд 221

SFCC MONITOR INTERFACES FWC The Instrumentation Position Pick-off Units (IPPUs) supply

SFCC MONITOR INTERFACES FWC The Instrumentation Position Pick-off Units (IPPUs) supply slat/flap

position data to the Flight Warning Computer (FWC), for warning activation. SDAC The System Data Acquisition Concentrators (SDACs) receive ARINC data in order to generate the appropriate ECAM displays. Information received from the Slat Flap Control Computers (SFCCs) can be displayed after the flight on operator request. Level 2 cautions, resulting from flap system faults, are processed in the SDACs and then displayed on the ECAM upper display. Slat channel interface is identical. ELAC AND SEC Position data received from the SFCCs are used for electrical flight control law selection. FAC Position data sent to the Flight Augmentation Computers (FACs) are used for flight envelope protection computation. GPWC The Ground Proximity Warning Computer (GPWC) receives the flap position data for approach and landing via the control panel 21VU. There is no slat information sent by the SFCC slat channel. CFDIU The Centralized Fault Display Interface Unit (CFDIU) receives failure data from the SFCCs and command words for the BITE test. Information received from the SFCCs can be displayed after the flight on operator request. Test plugs can be used for trouble-shooting when the Centralized Fault Display System (CFDS) is inoperative or not installed. Slat channel interface is identical.

SLATS AND FLAPS - SFCC MONITOR INTERFACES

Слайд 222

ADIRU Flap position data are used by the Air Data/Inertial Reference

ADIRU Flap position data are used by the Air Data/Inertial Reference Units

(ADIRUs) for Angle-Of-Attack (AOA) and static source correction. Flaps higher than 9° and 34° data are used for AOA correction. Flaps higher than 19° data are used for the static source correction. There is no slat channel interface to the ADIRUs. CIDS The Cabin Intercommunication Data System (CIDS) receives slat flap position discretes for automatic lighting of cabin passenger signs. EIU The Engine Interface Unit (EIU) receives a slat flap lever retracted position discrete for minimum idle. Slat channel interface is identical.

SLATS AND FLAPS - SFCC MONITOR INTERFACES

Слайд 223

FWC - EIU SLATS AND FLAPS - SFCC MONITOR INTERFACES

FWC - EIU

SLATS AND FLAPS - SFCC MONITOR INTERFACES

Слайд 224

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE DAILY CHECK During the daily check,

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE DAILY CHECK During the daily check, the external

walk around will include the visual check for evidence of damage and fluid leakage of the: • Left and right wing leading edge slats, • Left and right wing trailing edge flaps and flap track fairings, • Left and right ailerons, • Left and right THS surfaces, • Left and right elevators, • Rudder. NOTE: The visual check of the Flight Control Surfaces is made from the ground with Flaps/Slats in the retracted position.

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE

Слайд 225

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE DAILY CHECK

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE

DAILY CHECK

Слайд 226

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MEL/DEACTIVATION AILERONS As aileron servocontrol is

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MEL/DEACTIVATION AILERONS As aileron servocontrol is a MMEL

item, the deactivation is done by disconnecting the related electrical connector. The detailed procedure is given in the AMM. SPOILERS The spoiler servocontrol is a MMEL item. To deactivate the spoiler servocontrol, disconnect the electrical connector from the receptacle of the servocontrol. The detailed procedure is given in the AMM.

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE

Слайд 227

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MEL/DEACTIVATION - AILERONS & SPOILERS

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE

MEL/DEACTIVATION - AILERONS

& SPOILERS
Слайд 228

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MEL/DEACTIVATION (continued) ELEVATORS The elevator servocontrol

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MEL/DEACTIVATION (continued) ELEVATORS The elevator servocontrol position transducer (XDCR)

is a MMEL item. If an ECAM warning "ELEVator SERVO FAULT "appears with a Centralized Fault Display System (CFDS) message "USE STandBY XDCR", the two plugs of the elevator servocontrol position XDCRs must be swapped. Detailed procedures are given in the AMM.

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE

Слайд 229

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MEL/DEACTIVATION - ELEVATORS

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE

MEL/DEACTIVATION - ELEVATORS

Слайд 230

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MEL/DEACTIVATION (continued) ELAC There are two

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MEL/DEACTIVATION (continued) ELAC There are two ELACs (ELAC 1

and 2). Both ELACS are MEL items. Inoperative ELAC 2 is a NO GO item. Except for Extended Range (ER) operations, ELAC 1 or any ELAC 1 function may be inoperative if all the MMEL restrictions are applied. Maintenance procedures related to ELAC 1 deactivation are detailed in the AMM. SEC There are three SECs. Only one SEC out of three can be inoperative and deactivated if all MMEL restrictions are applied. Maintenance procedures related to one SEC deactivation are detailed in the AMM. FAC There are two FACs (FAC 1 and FAC 2) are installed on the A/C. An inoperative FAC 1 is a NO GO item. FAC 2 may be inoperative and deactivated if all MMEL restrictions are applied. Maintenance procedures related to FAC 2 deactivation are detailed in the AMM. FCDC There are two FCDCs installed on the A/C. An inoperative FCDC 1 is a NO GO item. FCDC 2 may be inoperative and deactivated following a flight crew procedure. SFCC SFCC1 and SFCC2 monitor and control the flaps. An inoperative SFCC 1 is a NO GO item. Only SFCC 2 flap and slat channel may be inoperative if all restrictions given in the MMEL are applied.

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE

Слайд 231

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MEL/DEACTIVATION - ELAC - SFCC

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE

MEL/DEACTIVATION - ELAC

- SFCC
Слайд 232

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MEL/DEACTIVATION (continued) WTB On SLAT or

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MEL/DEACTIVATION (continued) WTB On SLAT or FLAP WTBs, one

or two solenoids related to SFCC 2 may be inoperative if operation of SFCC 1 WTB is confirmed by a test before each flight. The related procedure for deactivation of the WTB solenoid is detailed in the AMM.

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE

Слайд 233

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MEL/DEACTIVATION - WTB

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE

MEL/DEACTIVATION - WTB

Слайд 234

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE TIPS IMPROVE FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE TIPS IMPROVE FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM TROUBLE SHOOTING

AND MINIMIZE NO FAULT FOUND RATE (ELAC/SEC) Put the trouble shooting on fault message into focus and not only on the ECAM warning. Indeed, message gives precise information on the possible root causes. TSM task related to the fault message has to be followed. Follow step by step the TSM related to the failure messages: • Taking into account previous action done (i.e. LRU removal), if issue is still there on A/C, do the following step proposed by the TSM. Send Trouble Shooting data with removed LRU to ease repair in shop: • Repair shop can do dedicated tests or actions (e.g. relay replacement) if the PFR, test result and / or trouble shooting data, if available, are given. Intermittent faults must follow a trouble shooting as per TSM: Intermittent fault = repetitive fault experienced in flight and not confirmed on ground. • After three occurrences of the same phenomenon (even if the ground test is still OK), the other steps of the TSM procedure must be followed. • While doing the wiring inspection, it is advised to check the wires to help reproducing the issue on ground.

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE

Слайд 235

MAINTENANCE TIPS IMPROVE FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM TROUBLE SHOOTING AND MINIMIZE NO

MAINTENANCE TIPS IMPROVE FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM TROUBLE SHOOTING AND MINIMIZE NO FAULT

FOUND RATE (ELAC/SEC) (continued) Do the follow-up of A/C & remove the LRU, to confirm the failure origin and identify potential rogue units: This lets: • either explain No Fault Found (NFF), if the issue is still shown on A/C, • or to confirm the failure origin (Fault Found (FF) in accordance with removal cause), • or to identify potential rogue Units, if the issue is no more on A/C despite NFF LRU. Removed LRU can be put in quarantine pending the end of Trouble Shooting: This applies for intermittent trouble shooting issues and: • give updated and complete information to the repair shop, • avoid installation of a unit with intermittent failure on a new A/C, • get easier LRU follow-up. Use Thales Chronic unit policy (send units suspected as chronics to Thales): As per Thales policy, chronic unit policy (deep investigations) applies to computers: • removed 3 times within 18 months, • whatever the reason of removal, • FF or NFF.

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE

Слайд 236

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE TIPS

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE

MAINTENANCE TIPS -

IMPROVE FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM TROUBLE SHOOTING AND
MINIMIZE NO FAULT FOUND RATE (ELAC/SEC)
Слайд 237

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE TIPS (continued) ELEVATOR SERVOCONTROL SWAPPING

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE TIPS (continued) ELEVATOR SERVOCONTROL SWAPPING TOOL (BUNDLE) When

applicable, use the elevator servocontrol swapping tool (bundle). This tool lets either confirm a servocontrol failure or direct on other possible causes, which are wiring or computer issue. It can be used in case of an "ELEVATOR SERVO FAULT" or "ELAC PITCH FAULT" warning message experienced. In this procedure, the operator can interchange the wiring between two servocontrols (the one supposed unserviceable and one known as serviceable). Let there be "X" as ELAC & SEC computers (E1, S1 or E2, S2) and related servocontrol. Without the swapping tool (normal wiring), computers "A" control the elevator Servocontrol "A" and computers "B" control the elevator Servocontrol "B". When the swapping tool is used, computers "A" control the elevator Servocontrol "B" and computers "B" control the elevator Servocontrol "A". Two wiring mode can be used to connect the servocontrols: • Adjacent servocontrol wiring. • Opposite servocontrol wiring. NOTE: As solenoid valve short-circuit could cause damage a serviceable computer, swapping is not applicable for servocontrol solenoid valves issues: see caution note in TSM tasks.

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE

Слайд 238

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE TIPS

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE

MAINTENANCE TIPS -

ELEVATOR SERVOCONTROL SWAPPING TOOL (BUNDLE)
Слайд 239

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE TIPS (continued) EXTENSION To be

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE TIPS (continued) EXTENSION To be unlocked, the servo

control actuator must be depressurized. After the Flaps full extension the Slats/Flaps Locking Tool must be installed on the flap/slat control lever. Deactivate the spoilers electrical control by pulling the related Circuits Breakers. The maintenance unlocking device tool can be engaged by using a key with a red flame. This tool cannot be removed when the servo control is in maintenance mode.

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE

Слайд 240

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE TIPS - EXTENSION

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE

MAINTENANCE TIPS -

EXTENSION
Слайд 241

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE TIPS (continued) SAFETY COLLAR INSTALLATION

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE TIPS (continued) SAFETY COLLAR INSTALLATION Once the maintenance-unlocking

device is engaged the spoiler surface can be raised manually for inspection functions. After the spoiler is fully raised by hand, install the Safety Collar on the servocontrol rod.

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE

Слайд 242

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE TIPS - SAFETY COLLAR INSTALLATION

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE

MAINTENANCE TIPS -

SAFETY COLLAR INSTALLATION
Слайд 243

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE TIPS (continued) RETRACTION To retract

FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE TIPS (continued) RETRACTION To retract the spoiler, the

Safety Collar must be removed from the servocontrol rod. When the maintenance unlocking device tool is turned and disengaged, the spoiler servocontrol is back to active mode. Reactivate the spoilers electrical control by reengaging the related Circuits Breakers. Do the operational test of the spoiler hydraulic actuation. Return the aircraft to the initial configuration (retract Flaps/Slats).

SLATS AND FLAPS - FLIGHT CONTROLS SYSTEM LINE MAINTENANCE

- Предыдущая
Витамины. Классификация витаминов
Следующая -
Игра Интервью

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